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Abstract
Abstract
In 1989 the end of the cold war was brought about by diplomatic and political 
change. The defence industries, which had previously benefitted from stable and 
steadily growing military expenditure, were faced with a long term decline in 
domestic and world markets. While there were decreasing arms industries in the 
main supplier countries, other countries, particularly the emerging nations with 
growing economies, increased the level of arms production. The traditional arms 
suppliers competed to gain a market share in these countries and offered technology 
transfers, offsets and licensed production arrangements. The arms industrialists of 
the traditional supplier nations have become concerned that licensed manufacturing 
leads to countries eventually setting up their own production. The relationship 
between licensed and indigenous production of arms presented a fruitful area of 
research. The hypothesis investigated in this study was that:
licensed production leads to indigenous production of aims.
Three methods were used to test the hypothesis: (a) a macro-analysis of the
numerical data collated on twelve countries' arms production over twenty five years, 
(b) four case studies of the arms production of ASEAN, Australia, Japan and Israel 
and (c) a survey by questionnaire of arms dealers and suppliers. Finally, validation 
interviews were carried out with a panel of experts on weapons production and arms 
trade who were asked to comment on the findings of the studies.
All three studies gave the same result that the value of indigenous production is not 
a result of the value of licensed production of arms. The panel of experts found that 
the result of the studies corresponded to their understanding and experience of the 
arms industry: joint ventures and licensed production were used to establish a 
domestic arms industry but the impetus for setting up and carrying out both licensed 
and indigenous production came from strategic, political and economic motives and 
the socio-economic background of the particular country.
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Chapter 1
1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE
DEFENCE INDUSTRY
1.1 BACKGROUND - OPTIONS FOR CHANGE AND THE REDUCED
DEFENCE BUDGET
Since the end of World War II the British defence policy has been designed almost 
entirely to deter any threat to western Europe from the Warsaw Treaty Organisation 
(WTO) and has mvolved a strong commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO). Kiely (1990) has described how NATO was founded in 1949 
following the Soviet blockade of Berlin. NATO provided a military balance for 
Western Europe and the United States of America against Soviet aggression. NATO 
became a highly effective political organisation and one of the longest and most 
successful military alliances in modem history. There are several publications 
specialising in defence policies of nations, for example IISS's yearly book "Strategic 
Survey". Jane Sharp in the Written Evidence to The Defence Committee Tenth 
Report (p.80 to p.83) describes how since 1989 there has been significant change in 
the assessment of priority threats and Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) policy has 
been profoundly influenced by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) 
negotiations, by the political and military changes in the WTO, the unification of 
Germany and the agreement on a new strategy for NATO.
The British Government announced defence cuts in the Defence Secretary’s Statement 
to Parliament "Options For Change" which was published in July 1990 and the 
declining defence budgets have been reconfirmed in the 1991 and 1992 "Statement
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For Defence Estimates". Defence spending which was reduced by 10% over the 
preceding five years were budgeted to reduce by 6% in real terms over the next three 
years.
The size of the defence budget and its allocation have a major impact on the defence 
industry, in ship building, in the armoured vehicle sector, in aerospace and electronics 
industries and in many other industries which are direct or indirect suppliers of 
products or services to those industries. The Commission of the European 
Communities became highly concerned about the impact of declining defence budgets 
on these industries and commissioned a report to be carried out by Eurostrategies 
(Eurostrategies, 1991). The report concluded that the decline and the restructuring 
process of the defence industry were so fundamental that even the occurrence of the 
Gulf War would not reverse it and it was predicted that approximately one third of 
the 1.5 million jobs in the European defence industry would be lost.
There have been concerns that cutting military contracts would have immediate 
deleterious effects on the UK economy. It has been predicted (Electronics Times, 11 
June 1992, p. 1) by the MOD and DTI that the cancellation of the European Fighter 
Aircraft programme would result in the reduction by billions of pounds of the share 
values of 34 main contractors and 60 subcontractors, a loss of 32000 jobs and a cost 
of £280M per year to the Treasury in lost income tax and national insurance. A 
further concern (Electronics Times, 23 January 1992, p. 10) was the resultant loss of 
manufacturing development and skill in the engineering industry.
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1.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE DEFENCE 
INDUSTRY
There are several studies on the defence industry and the defence market which show 
how the relationship between government and the defence industrial base has 
developed and changed. The study of British and the European armaments market 
undertaken by Walker and Gummett (1989) highlighted the changes in British 
defence procurement policy from 1980 to 1989. These are summarised in the 
following sections.
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1.3 PERIOD OF HIGH DEFENCE SPENDING, 1980-1985
During the early 1980s, the British Conservative government attached great 
importance to military power (Walker and Gummett, 1989) and undertook a 
programme of strengthening the armed forces and upgrading its nuclear deterrence 
capability and consequently UK industry benefited from sustained high defence 
equipment procurement budgets. The literature reviewed has not considered that the 
equipment procurement programmes during this period were focused on several major 
projects to the do.riment of other programmes which were afforded lower priority. 
The available airframe funding was directed to the Tornado aircraft programme and 
the associated air launched weapons, leaving very little support for other airframe 
programmes. Table 1.3 shows how the funding available for fixed wing and rotary 
wing airframe programmes was dominated by the Tornado programme.
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TABLE 1.3 Major airframe projects current in 1985
MAJOR AIRFRAME PROJECT TOTAL AIRFRAME PROJECT 
DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION 
COST AT AVERAGE 1985/86 PRICES
AIRCRAFT
Tornado 9200 £M
Nimrod MR MK 2 850 £M
Nimrod Airborne Early Warning MK3 Not quoted, under review in 1985.
Harrier GR5 1200 £M
HELICOPTERS
Lynx 1100 £M
Sea King 600 £M
Chinook 250 £M
EH 101 1450 £M
Source: Table by current author, adapted from table presented in Second Report 
from the Defence Committee, Session 1985-86, p. 132.
The nuclear Trident programme absorbed a substantial portion of funding. The peak 
of Trident expenditure was estimated at between 11 and 20 per cent of the defence 
equipment budget (Third Report from the Defence Committee, Session 1984-85, p. 
322, paragraph 2021) and about 33 per cent of the naval equipment budget (Third 
Report from the Defence Committee, Session 1984-85, p. 331, paragraph 18.B(ii) Q. 
1115). These programmes offered the prime-contractor companies profits from the 
high added values. However, during this period other areas were down-graded in 
priority and there was a moratorium on defence spending for other programmes 
particularly for naval requirements. The outlook for the British naval shipbuilding 
industry looked bleak, until the Falklands conflict caused the government to abandon 
or delay its plans for deep cuts in the navy.
Whilst these programmes gave the government the display of military power it 
sought, (Walker and Gummett, 1989, p. 420), there was growing concern in
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Whitehall about several aspects of the defence market, particularly:
lack of competition between defence companies in the United Kingdom, 
a too close relationship between industrialists, civil servants and the military, 
cost escalation and lack of cost control,
inefficiency in both defence research and development and in production.
Escalating costs were seen on several major programmes such as Polaris and Nimrod 
Airborne Early Warning Aircraft (Table 1.3). The lack of cost control, the high cost 
of defence and the need for reform have been studied by Deger (1981), Dunne and 
Smith (1983), Hartley (1987), Hartley and Hooper (1987), Hartley, Hussain and 
Smith (1987), Smith (1987) and Smith (1988) who stressed the need for reform in 
defence equipment procurement.
During these years of high military equipment spending, defence was seen as an 
attractive market and defence contractors grew by acquisition of smaller defence 
contractors (Walker and Gummett, 1989, p. 422). Walker and Gummet (1989, p. 
423) report the takeover of the government-owned Royal Ordnance Factories and 
Austin Rover and they quote an unnamed French industrialist as saying:
"The problem for the British Government is that it now has two 
ministries of defence - one called the Ministry of Defence, the other 
called British Aerospace."
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1.4 REVISED PROCUREMENT, THE LEVENE REFORMS, 1984-1988
The period from 1984-5 to the present (1996) is associated with competitive 
procurement. The changes in defence procurement methods are widely known as the 
Levene reforms, named after Sir Peter Levene, the Chief of Defence Procurement in 
the UK Ministry of Defence, appointed in 1985. The main features of the Levene 
reforms have been described by Walker and Gummett, (1989):
competitive tenders, where suppliers compete for development and production 
contracts,
fixed price contracts,
r» A f i io l  f  n
ul£ j_luv± vvuuai'iuai ivj.jjjo9
revised payments procedures, where payment is dependant on progress, 
new arrangements for risk sharing between government and industry.
The Levene reforms allowed the major prime contractors to increase their dominance 
of the defence market. British Aerospace, Rolls-Royce and Vickers Shipbuilding 
maintained their near monopolies in aircraft, aero-engines and submarines. Whilst 
the Ministry of Defence sought to reduce both its management of major contracts and 
the role of the Government defence research agencies, the contractors became 
increasingly dominant in contract management and in research and military 
technology. The financial and technical controls of prime-contract and major contract 
management, the control of sub-system and component procurement and the control 
of the advanced technology base began to shift from the MOD to the major prime 
contractors.
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PRIVATISATION
Anthony (1993) reported that the UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher started a 
denationalization programme of defence industries and several defence industries 
were privatised:Rolls-Royce, British Aerospace, VSEL, Swan Hunter, Vosper 
Thomeycroft, Yarrow Yard, Royal Ordnance, Devonport and Shorts. Schneider 
(1993) reported that privatisation in European defence industry advanced most 
significantly in the UK and in Germany (i.e. in the former Federal Republic of 
Germany). Schneider reported th'jt the same pattern of privatisation was not seen in 
France, where the French government chose to retain state ownership of the major 
elements of the defence industry.
The government in its efforts to increase competition and to achieve wider choice, 
sought to widen the supplier base by bringing in new UK suppliers from other market 
sectors such as software and telecommunications and from European contractors and 
elsewhere.
During this period the government tried to discourage mergers and monopolies, 
which they considered would reduce competition, for example in 1986 the bid by 
GEC for Plessey was blocked by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (Morgan, 
1989 and Walker and Gummett, 1989, p. 422). It is noted that Sir Peter Levene, the 
former Chief of Defence Procurement in the UK Ministry of Defence who advocated 
a policy of increased competitiveness for defence procurement (Walker and Gummett 
1989), was in 1992 with the takeover specialists Wassersein Perella (Electronics 
Times 16 January 1992, p. 11).
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Some UK defence companies such as Lucas and Smiths Industries were successful 
in achieving growth in the USA by embarking on a series of acquisitions which gave 
them direct access to the US civil aerospace market (Eurostrategies Report, 1989). 
Gee (1988) and Stodden (1988) describe how in 1987 the UK-based Smiths 
Aerospace and Defence Group acquired a portion of the USA group Lear Siegler Inc 
and the units were renamed SLI Avionics Systems Corp and SLI International Corp. 
The acquisitions doubled the level of Smiths avionics business and by 1988 
approximately one third of Smiths' employees wevo based in the USA and Smiths 
achieved defence contracts to the value of 100 Million ECUs to the US Department 
of Defence (Eurostrategies Report, 1991).
There were also some disastrous acquisitions as defence companies sought to acquire 
high-technology companies with unproven or suspect management credibility. The 
catastrophic result of the merger between the UK company, Ferranti and the USA 
company, International and Control, ISC was widely reported in the media. 
Electronics Times (18 June 1992, p. 12) reported that Ferranti were defrauded of 
$189M, 3500 Ferranti employees lost their jobs and a chief executive of ISC, James 
Guerin, was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.
1.5 THE END OF THE COLD WAR 1989
Kiely (1990) reports that during 1989 and 1990 following the destruction of the 
Berlin Wall and the break up of the Warsaw Pact, there was great hope for world 
peace and security. A perception was that communism and fascism were collapsing.
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The events have been catalogued by the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
in their publication, Military Balance 1991-1992 and by the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute in the SIPRI Yearbook 1990. Mikhail Gorbachev had 
brought fundamental change to Soviet policy. There was the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan. America made substantial cuts to its military Strategic Defense 
Initiative programme (SDI). At a United Nations speech in December 1989 Mikhail 
Gorbachev announced the economic failure of the communist system. On 9th 
November 1989 the worlds media watched the Berlin Wall being opened. By the 
end of 1989 the world witnessed revolutions in all the Eastern and Central European 
allies of the USSR, all peaceful except for Romania:
Poland. On 19th August 1989 a non-communist government was appointed. 
Czechoslovakia. On 29th December 1989 the former opposition member, 
Vaclav Havel was elected president.
Hungary announced a free voting procedure for future elections for the 
presidency.
In Romania the revolution was bloody because the Securitate police used 
force against the Romanian population. President Ceausescu and Elena 
Ceausescu were arrested by the Romanian Army and executed on Christmas 
Day 1989.
By the end of 1989 Albania was the last stronghold of communism left in 
Eastern Europe. In the first multi-party elections in March 1991 the ruling 
communist party retained power, but since then Albania has resumed 
diplomatic relations with a number of countries and has abandoned its
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traditional policy of isolation.
On 1st April 1991 the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist as a military alliance and the 
Treaty was formally and finally terminated on 1st July 1991 at the final meeting of 
the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in Prague.
1.6 THE UNSTABLE WORLD AND THE END OF THE MILITARY 
BALANCE
Kiely (1990) pointed out that the expectation that the world would become more 
peaceful as a result of these changes was premature. The "Military Balance", that 
was the military balance between the world superpowers and their military dominance 
on the world was destabilised and with the dominance of the superpowers removed 
there emerged potential opportunities for military conflicts based on economic, 
political, international and technological developments.
Saracino (1993) considered that with the break up of the Warsaw Pact, the world has 
witnessed an unprecedented level of ethnic violence and civil strife. The lid of the 
pressure cooker that was Soviet control has been removed and old scores are being 
settled. Saracino (1993) considers that the removal of Soviet control has led to 
greater instability in Eastern Europe, the conflict which started in 1991 in the former 
Yugoslavia being a prime example. Saracino (1993) concluded that there has been 
no "peace" dividend in terms of peace and that if the war in the former Yugoslavia 
were to continue, there would be an increasing probability of the violence migrating 
to countries such as Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro.
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In his report on the United Nations, Saracino (1993) expresses the view that unless 
the United Nations has both the financial and the political will to act as the world's 
policeman, the role will fall by default to the USA. The United Nations is the only 
political body with a mandate to enforce international law. Global defence 
expenditure at the end of the 1980-1990 decade reached nearly US$1 trillion per 
annum, equivalent to US$2 million per minute, whereas the cost of the United 
Nations peace keeping operations in 1993 is US$3 billion per annum.
Figure 1.6.1 shows the locations of the major armed conflicts in the world during 
1989 (as defined by Lindgren et al, 1990) where a conflict has incurred more than 
one thousand battle-related deaths. Lindgren identified 32 locations of major armed 
conflicts and in some locations there were several conflicts being fought 
simultaneously. Not shown on the Figure 1.6.1 are 75 major conflicts where the total 
number of battle related deaths is less than the one thousand level. Figure 1.6.2 
shows the locations of the countries with nuclear weapons capability and those 
countries believed to be building nuclear weapons capability (SIPRI Yearbook 1990) 
and having a nuclear weapons programme (The Economist, Volume 34, Number 
7775, 1992 and Sunday Express 10 January 1993, p. 18). Figure 1.6.3 shows those 
unstable areas of the world where democracies may be forced or may choose to 
intervene in military conflicts. The Economist (Volume 34, Number 7775, 1992) 
considered that democracies may be drawn into "wars of interest" and "wars of 
conscience".
Where there are "wars of interest" the democracies are considered likely to intervene
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because there may exist an economic interest in those areas, for example for a 
strategic raw material. A high risk area identified in the Economist (Volume 34, 
Number 7775,1992) is the oil-rich Muslim Crescent of North Africa, the Middle East 
and South West Asia.
The Economist characterised "wars of conscience" as occurring in those countries 
where there may be separate racial or religious groups and where there may be 
group-against-group savagery. It was considered that democracies may intervene 
militarily where the savagery is too horrifying for democracies to ignore and not 
necessarily where the democracies interests are threatened. Examples are seen in the 
former Yugoslavia and large areas of Africa, Asia and Latin America.
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FIGURE 1.6.1
Locations of armed conflicts in 1989, where there have been more than 1000 deaths 
as a result of the battle.
Figure by current author from data presented by Lindgren et al in SIPRI Yearbook
1990.
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FIGURE 1.6.2
Locations of countries with nuclear capability
Map by current author from data presented in the references.
Locations of countries with nuclear capability in 1989 
Source : Sipri Year Book 1990
Locations of countries possibly building nuclear capability 
Source: Sunday Express 10 January 1993, p 16 
and The Economist, Volume324, Number 7775, 1992
KEY:
Red:
Blue:
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FIGURE 1.6.3
The unstable world where democracies may intervene with military force 
KEY:
Green: WARS OF CONSCIENCE, COUNTRIES WHERE THERE MAY BE
SEPARATE RACIAL OR RELIGIOUS GROUPS, WHERE THERE 
MAY BE GROUP AGAINST GROUP SAVAGERY.
Where savagery is too horrifying fov democracies to ignore, but not 
necessarily where a democracy's economic interest is threatened.
Where within a country there are separate racial or religious identities and 
there can be group against group savagery.
Examples are the former Yugoslavia and large sections of Africa, Asia ,and 
Latin America.
Red: WARS OF INTEREST, HIGH RISK AREAS
Blue: WARS OF INTEREST, LOW RISK AREAS
Democracies are likely to intervene because there may exist an economic 
interest, for example in strategic raw materials from these areas.
An example is the oil-rich "Muslim Crescent" of North Africa, the Middle 
East and South West Asia 
An example is North and South Korea 
Source: Maps by current author adapted from map presented in the Economist, 5th 
September 1992, Supplement "Defence in the 21st century", p. 4.
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FIGURE 1 . 6 . 3  THE U NSTA BLE  WORLD WHERE DEMOCRACIES MAY 
INTERVENE WITH MILITARY FORCE
W A R S O F  C O N S C IE N C E
WARS O F  IN T E R E S T H IC H  R ISK  A REA S
W ARS O F IN T E R E S T M ED IU M  R IS K  A R E A S
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AREAS OF THE WORLD CONSIDERED FOR COMBAT MODELS
Klare (1991) has reported that the US military had two main combat models before 
the break up of the Warsaw Pact, for high intensity and low intensity combat. They 
envisaged high-intensity conflict in Europe between US/NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
and low-intensity conflict against guerrillas in Central America. A later model, 
which has gained higher priority since the break up of the Warsaw Pact is mid­
intensity conflict with periodic battles against strongly armed regional forces such as 
Syria or Iraq.
Klare (1991) reports that mid-intensity conflicts are likely to be rapid-paced and with 
highly sophisticated weapons. Within the Third World there are large powers which 
have acquired substantial weapons arsenals and the capability of producing chemical 
or nuclear weapons, including Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Pakistan, South Africa, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, North Korea and South Korea. 
Saracino (1993) considers that the proliferation of arms sales to warring factions by 
countries hungry for foreign currency, in particular the US dollar, in which so many 
deals are made, is an extremely serious issue. Ventor (1993) pointed out that the 
Somali warlords engaged in what is described as "brutal clan warfare"in Somalia had 
obtained weapons from several arms producing countries: 
landmines - United Kingdom, CIS. 
small arms and rocket propelled grenades - Russia, 
carbines - Italy, Spain, Portugal, China, Brazil.
miscellaneous weapons - Israel, South Africa, North Korea, South Korea, 
France.
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The USA has supplied military aid, arms and technology not just to close allies such 
as Israel, South Korea and Turkey, but also to other Third World countries such as 
Iraq and other allies of the former Soviet Union, in order to diminish military 
dependence on Moscow. Klare (1991) believes that priority should be given at 
international level to curbing the spread of advanced military technology rather than 
committing to a strategy which will lead to recurring military conflicts.
1.7 N ATO, THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EC
Membership of NATO has been the foundation of UK national security policy 
(Defence Committee, Statement of the Defence Estimates, Vol 1,1991) and has been 
the major influence on British defence expenditure and therefore on the relationship 
between the UK defence industry and its major customer, the UK Government. 
Approximately 95% of the UK defence budget is directed to fulfilling NATO 
commitments (Forecast International, 1990). Whilst still strongly committed to 
NATO, the UK has joined the Atlantic Alliance in order to balance the traditional 
dominance of NATO by the USA and in 1988 the UK took presidency of the 
Western European Union (WEU).
Since the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations, the political and 
military changes in former WTO countries, the WEU has become increasingly 
important in matters of European defence and security policy. Aerospace World 
(February, 1992, p. 53) describes how following the EC Summit Conference in 
Maastricht in December 1991 (Treaty on European Union, CONF-UP-UEM 2002/92
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AF/UP-UEM/en p.30 to p.35), it was agreed that the WEU will formulate and 
implement a common European defence policy. The agreement covered :
The Western European Union has a role as the defence agency of the EC. 
The creation of a central planning office, improved interaction between 
defence staffs of European countries and improved co-operation in 
observation, logistics transport, training
Active consideration by the EC of France's proposal for increased 
collaboration on arms development and procurement, leading to a European 
joint weapons procurement agency.
1.8 ARTICLE 223 OF THE TREATY OF ROME
Fedderson and Silva (1992) have described how Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome 
1957, which established the European Economic Community, provides exemption 
from the provisions of the Treaty for the manufacture and trade in armaments, in 
order to retain national security independence within each member nation of the EC.
There is no co-ordination of defence equipment procurement between the European 
NATO countries and each of these countries except France relies heavily on defence 
equipment imports from the USA (Sipri Year Book 1991). The USA defence 
exporters appear to benefit from Article 223 (Business Europe, 21 April 1986, pp 1- 
2). Unattributable sources consider it likely that the EC Article 223 may be repealed 
and the WEU with the influence and support of the EC will become the major 
instrument in co-ordinating European defence.
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The European dependence on USA equipment is shown in Table 1.8 which shows 
the level of imported USA defence equipment as a percentage of the total equipment 
procurement by country for the year 1988. The large trade imbalance has been 
compensated by offset contracts placed by the US suppliers in the importing 
countries.
TABLE 1.8 European dependence on usa defence equipment, 1988
COUNTRY DEFENCE EQUIPMENT IMPORTS FROM USA  
AS % OF TOTAL EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT
Turkey 89%
Greece 78%
Denmark 77%
Norway 64%
Italy 53%
Holland 44%
Portugal 44%
Spain 41%
Germany 33%
Belgium 32%
United Kingdom 7%
France 1%
Source: Table generated by present author from data presented in Eurostrategies Report 1991.
The Eurostrategies Report 1991 explains that the European defence industries have 
directed effort to exporting to the Third World and to the Middle East as they were 
unable to establish strong market shares in the USA or within Europe.
An estimated 25% by value, approximately $15B, of European defence equipment 
procurement was imported from the USA in 1988 according to the Eurostrategies 
Report, 1991 and the European defence equipment exports to the USA are around 
one twentieth of that value, at $750M in that year. This USA-European trade in
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armaments is called the "two-way street" but European industrialists have described 
the 20:1 imbalance in armaments trade as a three lane highway in one direction and 
a footpath in the other. The Eurosrategies Report, 1991 considers that the American 
view is that the high level of defence export to Europe is compensated by the burden 
to the US economy of the US military presence in Europe. A European view is that 
the high level of US exports is a result of aggressive marketing and US government 
Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Aid, FMS and FMA, initiatives and the 
low level of European exports to the US results from USA protectionism.
Aerospace-World (February 1992, p. 53) reported that a proposal by Germany, the 
Netherlands and Belgium at the EC Maastricht Conference in December 1991, called 
for the removal of Article 223, but this proposal was not agreed.
The Financial Times (15 October 1991, p. 2) reports that the Bow Group, an 
independent Conservative Party think-tank, proposes a single European market in 
armaments and this can be achieved within the present terms of the Treaty of Rome 
without amendment of Article 223.
NATO has drawn up a document (Electronics Times, 29 October 1992, p. 36) 
covering the code of conduct for procurement of arms, which is intended to open up 
the military market to free competition thus enabling nations to get the best value 
for money. The code is not legally binding and allows exemptions in the case of 
essential national imperatives.
Fletcher (1992) has suggested that as the influence of the Western European Union
Page 25
Chapter 1
increases, there may emerge a co-ordinated definable European defence market and 
in the long term a European procurement agency.
1.9 CONCLUSION
1. The Western and Soviet defence industries had the benefit of largely stable 
and steadily growing markets for several decades. This was based on the 
"military balance" and the policy of deterrence between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact. ; There was increasing scale of investment in defence 
procurement and increasing scale of sophistication in military technology. The 
relationship between government and industry has traditionally been that 
between supplier and principal and sometimes only customer, the Ministry of 
Defence. The relationship began to change in the mid-1980s with the 
introduction of competitive tendering and the government actively seeking a 
wider choice of supplier, including foreign suppliers. Similarly the defence 
industries sought to widen their customer base to include foreign 
governments.
2. While industrialists are seeing their domestic arms markets decline, 
commercial pressure is being applied to Government by interest groups 
wishing to increase arms exports. There has been increased interest in the 
financial balance of the military trade between countries and trade 
associations and industrial interest groups are presenting ideas of policies or 
strategies to create stability in the defence industry and in defence trade.
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3. The end of the cold war in 1989 was brought about by diplomatic and 
political changes in the East and West and the defence industries were faced 
with a long term decline in domestic and world markets. The break up of the 
Warsaw Pact and the removal of Soviet control in Eastern Europe has led to 
an unprecedented level of ethnic violence and civil strife. An example is seen 
in the violence in the former Yugoslavia. The world has become extremely 
unstable with over one hundred major armed conflicts in 1989 and an 
increasing number of countries are developing or? purchasing highly advanced 
weapons systems capabilities including chemical, nuclear and biological 
weaponry. Third world countries are building up substantial weapons 
arsenals. The proliferation of arms sales to warring factions by countries 
hungry for foreign currency, particularly US dollars, is a serious issue and is 
leading to increased levels of violence.
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FIGURE 2.1. a and b
The photographs are copies of postcards showing battle zones in World War I. The 
scenes:
No.725 Les Ruines d'Albert, Somme
No.7222 Eglise de Dcniecourt, Somme
No.1266 English Front, Virgin of Montbauban
No.1255 English front, digging a communications trench through
Delleville Wood.
The photographs are shown in order to compare the devastation suffered during the 
1914-1918 war, with the low level of damage from precision weapons demonstrated 
in the Gulf War in 1991 shown in Figures 2.1.c and d.
Postcards from private collection, by permission of Norman Coker.
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1266. L A  G R A N D E  G U E R R E  1914-17. — E n g lish  Front.
La Merge de M O N T A U B A N  - La settle chose reslee intacte aprcs les bom bardem enls. 
T he V irgin o f  M ontauban - T he o n ly  th ing left un touched hv sh e ll fire
Vise P aris 1266
1255. L A  G R A N D E  G U E R R E  1914-17. —  E n glish  Front. 
Tam m tjs  creusan l unc  tranchee dans le bois D E L L E V IL L E  
D igging a com m u n ica tion  trench throngh - B ellev ille  w ood
V ise Paris 1255
Phot. Express"
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FIGURE 2.1.c.
The photographs were taken during the Gulf War, 17 January 1991 to 26 February
1991.
The photographs show:
laser targeting on a strategic bridge at night, 
bridge being hit by a laser guided bomb
a day-time damage assessment photograph showing the destruction of the 
bridge and the low level of damage to the immediate vicinity.
Photographs by permission of GEC Ferranti Limited.
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FIGURE 2.1.d.
The figures show hardened aircraft shelters being targeted and hit by laser guided 
bombs. The photographs were taken during the Gulf War (17 January 1991 to 26 
February 1991). The two bomb damage assessment photographs on the following p. 
show the damage to the hardened shelters and a low level of damage to the 
surrounding areas.
Photographs by permission of GEC Ferranti Limited.
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2. TRENDS IN DEFENCE TECHNOLOGY AND IN THE ARMAMENTS
TRADE
2.1 TECHNOLOGY
Fletcher (1992) has reported that the discussions of a European rapid reaction force 
are aimed at strengthening the capability to cope with less clearly defined threats than 
that of the NATO versus Warsaw Pact, where the scope, timing and area of military 
conflict are not predictable. High technology military equipment is likely to be 
provided for a rapid reaction force and therefore larger defence industries with the 
necessary resources or highly specialised industries will benefit from these types of 
equipment procurement. Kirkpatrick in RUSI(1993) points out that the then current 
British armed forces faced multi-scenario situations, ( and compared their equipment 
requirements to those of the Victorian times against as wide a range as Red River, 
Taku forts, desert, jungle, against assegais and Mauser rifles). He concluded that the 
range of situations required a high level of flexibility and robustness in military 
organisation and weaponry. Kiely (1990) reported that in the West there is political 
pressure to minimise civilian casualties in times of conflict. Recently wars involving 
the West have been conducted under the full glare of the media and therefore high 
precision weapon systems (Figures 2.1.a ,b, c, and d) and stand-off weapons (where 
the launch platform is out of reach of enemy fire) are politically more acceptable than 
lower technology systems.
Klare (1991) reports that the USA military funding for weapons and forces will be 
directed towards strategic mobility, mobile firepower, advanced tactical aircraft,
Page 37
Chapter 2
advanced stand-off missiles, anti-tactical ballistic missiles, command, control, 
communications and intelligence (C3I) and medium sized combat brigades and 
divisions.
2.2 TECHNOLOGY FOR SIMPLE OPERABILITY AND EASE OF 
MAINTAINABILITY
Kiely (1990) reports that the trend towards more complex and higher technology 
weapons will increasingly be accompanied by an increase in simplicity of operation 
and maintenance. There are two factors influencing this trend. The first is that the 
world markets are becoming more important to defence industries and the level of 
skill in the user and in the maintenance crew will be lower. The second factor is that 
a consequence of cuts in military expenditure by the United Kingdom and other 
western countries, is that the numbers of equipment in service and the numbers of 
personnel in the armed forces will be reduced and therefore the equipment must be 
user-friendly and highly automated for less manpower, with high reliability and less 
support-intensive maintenance (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1992).
Whereas the aims of technology have until around 1989 been directed to higher 
performance, Kiely (1990) considers that technological innovation will be 
increasingly directed towards simplicity, reliability and low cost.
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CONSEQUENCE OF UNSKILLED OPERATORS IN IMPORTING NATIONS.
Chaisson and Slade (1991) considered that the problem of developing nations not 
having skilled operators to maintain and use the imported system was either ignored, 
resulting in the systems rapidly deteriorating and becoming unusable, or was 
countered by contracting foreign nations to carry out maintenance and operation. In 
the Gulf area many military systems are supported and maintained by the British 
military working under contract to the UK Ministry of Defence. The existence of 
this established support presence brought immediate benefit in operational integration 
for the allied forces in the Gulf War. Several British defence companies had teams 
of skilled engineers in Saudi Arabia when the hostilities began and the teams 
remained in place throughout the Gulf War, enabling equipment upgrades and 
modifications to be made quickly.
NEW NICHE MARKETS
Kiely (1990) points out that new niche markets are evolving partly due to the world's 
post cold war situation. He noted the new opportunities for retrofit and upgrading 
of equipment which results from the a growing emphasis on achieving effective use 
of existing hardware and facilities rather than automatic replacement by new 
generation equipment.
Training and simulation equipment has become important for both cost effectiveness 
and for environmental considerations. Kiely (1990) points out that in general all 
British Army equipment procurement contracts include training and simulation costs. 
Flight simulators, which provide pilots experience of flying over enemy terrain, are
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useful where environmental and safety considerations restrict low flight training. 
Other simulators are weapons effect ranges, computer based war games and electronic 
warfare trainers.
The requirement for treaty verification has provided opportunities for companies with 
surveillance technologies: seismic monitoring equipment for recording trial
explosions, remote sensing satellites, x-ray equipment, tamper-proof seals and 
tamper-proof tags.
There is increasing need for mine detection and mine clearance and for weapons 
disposal (Wyatt 1989). Many different types of specialist technologies are exploited 
to detect the range of explosive devices, from the improvised explosive devices 
commonly used by small terrorist groups to high technology smart explosives used 
by the military.
Chaisson and Slade (1990) have considered the military electronics market and their 
conclusion was that the military environment is continuing to show an increasing 
dependence on electronics. They predict that the large broadly based defence 
companies will survive but that medium size defence companies will be eliminated 
either by being unable to compete against the resources of the major companies or 
by being acquired by the larger companies. They predict that the smaller niche 
market companies will survive the future market changes. The principle product 
areas of military electronics are :
Command, control, communications and intelligence, C3I, which accounts for
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25% by value of the military electronics market,
Data and signal processing, 18% by value,
Electronic combat, 14% by value,
Fire control and integration, 10% by value,
Miscellaneous,for example testers and simulators, 10% by value,
Navigation, 7% by value,
Surveillance and detection, 16% by value.
Chaisson and Slade (1990) consider that there will be steady growth in the 
surveillance and detection segment of the military electronics market. The prediction 
for market growth is based on :
1. The extremely short warning times between being targeted by the enemy 
weapon system and being hit, during which time the evasive action or 
countermeasures must be deployed and the defensive weapons activated.
2. Signals intelligence is seen as a force multiplier on the military units 
resources.
3. There are growing paramilitary applications for surveillance and detection, 
particularly against drug trafficking, smuggling, piracy and slavery for 
example in the South China Seas. Slade (private communication, 1992) 
reported that in some named Third World countries, the criminal organisations 
have more advanced communications, radars and a variety of high 
performance fast boats (in addition to small wooden fishing boats) than the 
paramilitary or military forces.
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4. Chaisson and Slade (1991) reported that the need for improved electronics 
surveillance and detection technology and also the need for rapid-response 
field support for electronics intelligence were demonstrated during the Gulf 
War, when it was found that the libraries or databases which provide 
characterisation and classification of hostile radars and enemy signals were 
inadequate. It was reported by Chaisson and Slade (1991) that most of the 
hostile radars had been switched to war reserve modes (WARMS) and these 
: required immediate detection, analysis and classification. The updated
libraries then had to be incorporated into the electronic intelligence, electronic 
support measures and radar warning receivers as a matter of extreme urgency.
2.3 NON-LETHAL WEAPON TECHNOLOGY
Aviation Week and Space Technology (7 December 1992) has reported that the 
requirement for rapid reaction forces and the peacekeeping role of NATO forces has 
led to the development of non-lethal weapons. The article cites the opinion of US 
Senate Armed Service Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, that peacekeeping forces 
equipped with non-lethal weapons have a better chance of maintaining authority and 
avoiding attack without resorting to the use of lethal weapons. A key to maintaining 
peace is the avoidance of casualties and hostage-taking which escalate the hostilities. 
Examples of the application of non-lethal weapons are : 
to disable key electronic equipment 
to blind or bumout the sensors in weapons 
to shut off the power supply to enemy cities
Page 42
Chapter 2
to incapacitate enemy personnel.
The article mentions some of the disabling technologies under development or being 
reviewed at the USA Los Alamos military research laboratories. An acoustic weapon 
is being developed for protection of buildings and fixed installations and is based on 
an acoustic generator which produces sound at frequencies and volumes that 
incapacitate humans or can damage internal organs. An enemy has the choice to flee 
or to stay and be incapacitated. The availability of such a weapon at the siege of the 
US embassy in Tehran in 1979 would have helped to delay the siege while an escape 
was planned or while negotiations took place. Smaller acoustic weapons are being 
designed for use at critical sites for short periods of time, for example at critical 
airfields during an enemy's strategic operations.
Another disabling device which is being developed is optical flash equipment which 
emits a flash of light of sufficiently high intensity to burn-out sensor systems or to 
temporarily blind personnel. Aviation Week and Space Technology (7 December 
1992) has reported that the application of one type of technology for a disabling 
weapon which was used in the Gulf War against Iraq was discovered by accident. 
In January 1985, chaff, consisting of small metal strips to blind missile radars, was 
dropped on an air combat test range in the Pacific off the coast of California. The 
wind caused the chaff to drift inland to San Diego, the metal strips shorted out the 
city's power supply and 60,000 people in San Diego were without electricity. During 
the Gulf War Tomahawk cruise missiles were fitted with carbon fibre filled warheads 
and targeted at the commercial electricity generating plants which powered Iraq's air
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defence computers. Without the computer interfaces the air defence centres had to 
operate alone making them vulnerable to attack.
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FIGURE 2.4.1
The figure shows the world military expenditure over the decade 1981 to 1991. The 
expenditure is measured in US dollars in 1988 prices and exchange rates.
Source: figure by current author adapted from figure by Wulf (1993).
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FIGURE 2.4.2
The figure shows the value of imports of major conventional weapons, measured in 
US billions dollars at constant 1990 prices.
Source: figure by current author from data presented by Anthony et al in the SIPRI 
Yearbook 1992, p. 308
The grouping of the countries into developing, industrialised and least developed 
countries according to the SIPRI Yearbook 1992:
The countries of the developing world include India, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Egypt, North Korea, South Korea, Israel, Angola, Syria, Thailand, Iran, Pakistan, 
Taiwan, United Arab Emirates and others.
The countries of the industrialised world include USA, UK, Italy, Japan, Turkey, 
Spain, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, Germany, C.I.S., Australia, Canada, 
Netherlands, Bulgaria, France, Norway and others.
The world’s least developed countries include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Botswana, 
Chad, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Haiti, Laos, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, 
Somalia, Uganda, North Yemen, South Yemen, Yemen and others.
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2.4 WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND ARMAMENTS TRADE 
MILITARY EXPENDITURE
Wulf (1993), Deger (1992) and Deger (1993) have discussed the level of the world 
military expenditure. Figure 2.4.1 shows the world military expenditure measured 
in US billions dollars over the decade 1981 to 1991. The expenditure data was 
estimated by Herbert Wulf in terms of 1988 values and exchange rates with the US 
dollar and using the NATO definition of military expenditure which (as reported by 
Deger, 1990) includes current and capital expenditure on:
armed forces, defence departments, government defence agencies, government 
space agencies, 
paramilitary forces,
police forces trained and equipped for military action, 
military research and development, 
military tests and evaluation.
• retirement pensions of military forces and civilian staff, 
military aid by the donor country.
Wulf (1993) and Deger (1990 and 1991) reported that the world military expenditure 
increased steadily from 1989 to 1987 by about +3% per year. The 1987 world 
military expenditure is estimated at nearly 1000 billion US dollars, which equates to 
2 million US dollars per minute (Saracino, 1993). From 1987 to 1991 the world 
military expenditure has declined by approximately 4% per year. The world decline 
in military expenditure is dominated by the decline in the military expenditure of the
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countries of the industrialised world. The countries of the developing world have 
maintained a comparatively stable level of military expenditure during the 1981-1991 
decade.
Wulf (1993) considered that there were four major factors contributing to a decline 
in the defence industry:
1. The dismantling of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the collapse of the 
^Soviet Union have resulted in the perception of reduced Tireat. Wulf (1993) 
considered the resulting level of disarmament and force reduction modest in 
comparison to the magnitude of the changes. He believed that the reductions 
were the beginning of a long term downward trend in military spending.
2. Wulf (1993) considers that military budgets have been reduced in real terms 
and countries have given priority to other economic needs.
3. Wulf (1993) considers that where defence industries see their own domestic 
markets declining, there will be no viable alternative in attempting to increase 
export markets. He points out that the level of arms exports is declining.
4. As a result of arms control agreements some countries are offering surplus 
armaments for export.
MILITARY TRADE
Figure 2.4.2 shows the value of level of imports of major conventional weapons over 
the period 1982 to 1991. Anthony and Wulf (1990) and Anthony et al (1992) have 
discussed the status of the worlds arms trade in the five year periods up to 1989 and 
up to 1991 (figure 2.4.3). They report that during the previous decade the value of
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the worlds trade in major conventional weapons varied from $30B in 1980 to 
approximately $46B in 1987, the Iran-Iraq War being a major cause of the high 
volume in 1987. From 1987 to 1991 the worlds arms import trade decreased by 
approximately 18% per year to $22B in 1991. Wulf (1993) reported that although 
there was significant decline in arms exports, that is the export of completed 
armaments, there was not a similar reduction in arms production or in dual-use 
technology. He found that the major arms importing countries were negotiating 
contractual terms requiring indigenous arras production, the transfer of manufacturing 
technology and the supply of components and sub-systems.
Anthony and Wulf (1990) and Anthony et al (1992) noted two major trends in the 
arms trade during the period 1985 to 1991:
there was steady growth of imports of major conventional weapons by the 
industrialised countries, to the 1989 level of $16.5B per annum followed by 
decline.
in the Third World countries there was a peak in arms imports in 1987, 
followed by a decline.
2.5 IMPORTS IN THE INDUSTRIALISED WORLD
Table 2.5 shows the leading importers of weapons in the period 1985 to 1989 
in the countries of the industrialised world.
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TABLE 2.5. Leading importers of major weapons during 1985-1989 in the countries 
of the industrialised worid.
COUNTRY IN THE INDUSTRIALISED 
WORLD
AVERAGE MAJOR WEAPONS 
IMPORTS, $M PER YEAR, DURING 
1985-1989
1. Japan 2111
2. Czechoslovakia 1056
3. Spain 1030
4. Turkey 950
5. Poland 930
6. Canada 682
7. Greece 623
8. German Democratic Republic 592
9. Australia 591
10. Netherlands 545
11. USSR 462
12. Bulgaria 415
13. Hungary 372
14. Federal Republic of Germany 369
15. Yugoslavia 328
Other industrialised countries 2310
Total 13,365 M$ per year
Table by current author, adapted from data by Anthony and Wulf (1990)
Anthony and Wulf reported that the steady overall growth in weapons imports in the 
industrialised world during the period 1985 to 1989 was due to specific military 
developments in a few countries. The trends reported were as follows:
1. Weapons imports, of mainly Soviet equipment, by WTO countries declined 
from $4b p.a. (1985) to $2.7B p.a. (1989).
2. Weapons imports by NATO countries nearly doubled, from $3.8B p.a. (1985) 
to $7B p.a. (1989).
There were major military modernisation programmes in Greece, Spain, 
Turkey and Norway.
3. In the Pacific Rim, Japan and Australia have increased the weapons imports
Page 52
Chapter 2
and at the same time have expanded their domestic defence industrial bases.
4. Kiely (1990) has pointed out that non-aligned European countries, Albania, 
Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland and the former Yugoslavia, 
continue to be small spenders and therefore have little impact on overall 
trends in defence imports. Austria was reported as developing guided missile 
industrial capability in 1990 and Sweden is a major exporter of military 
equipment.
2.6 MILITARY IMPORTS IN THE THIRD WORLD
During the period 1985 to 1991 reviewed by Anthony and Wulf (1990) and by 
Anthony et al (1992) the level of weapons imports by Third World countries peaked 
in 1987 and then declined to 1991. In the Middle East there was very high military 
spending in the years of the Iran-Iraq war and during the build-up period prior to the 
Iraq invasion of Kuwait. In South Asia weapons imports increased substantially in 
the period 1985 to 1989. For example India, the world's highest military importer, 
doubled its military imports from $1876M per year in 1985 to $3819M per year in 
1989, the main suppliers being Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, United 
Kingdom and the USSR. Table 2.6 shows the Third World countries leading 
importers of major weapons during the period 1985 to 1989.
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TABLE 2.6 Third woiid countries leading importers of major weapons during the 
period 1985 to 1989.
COUNTRY IN THE THIRD 
WORLD
AVERAGE LEVEL OF MILITARY 
IMPORTS DURING THE PERIOD 1985 TO 
1989, $M PER YEAR
1. India 3469
2. Iraq 2397
3. Saudi Arabia 1752
4. Syria 1175
5. Egypt 1159
6. North Korea 1055
7. Afghanistan 922
8. Angola 743
9. Libya 637
10. Taiwan 589
11. Iran 588
12. Pakistan 583
13. South Korea 558
14. Israel 537
15. Thailand 372
Others 4657
Total 21,197 $M per year
Table by present author adapted from data presented by Anthony and Wulf (1990)
According to Anthony and Wulf (1990), Anthony et al (1992), and Wulf (1993) the 
decline in military imports by the developing nations and the Third World countries 
was associated with the following factors:
1. Less hard currency has been available to some Third World countries. Oil 
prices declined resulting in less funds being available to the countries of 
OPEC, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
2. Arms imports dropped considerably when several notable wars ended, for 
example the war between Iraq and Iran and the war between South African 
and Cuban/Angolan armed forces in Namibia.
In contrast the arms imports in Afghanistan increased significantly as the
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fighting escalated.
3. Arms exports of the former USSR fell dramatically from $17.7B in 1987 to 
$3.9b in 1991.
4. Wulf (1993) points out that a number of developing countries and Third 
World countries are building a domestic arms industry. In the 1970’s the 
domestic activity was largely limited to assembly of supplied kits but in the 
1990's there are expanding military electronics industries in the Third World. 
The domestic industrial military capability of Iraq has been reported in great 
detail and the extent of their capability surprised western observers.
OFFSETS
Horvath (1993) has described how several countries make military purchases 
conditional on securing offset contracts, whereby the supplier is committed to 
attracting investment into the buyers country, or arranging placement of purchase 
orders into the buyer country. Offer (1993) described in the Ministry of Defence 
DESO Newsletter (February 1993) the A1 Yamamah arms contracts with Saudi 
Arabia where British Aerospace was named as prime contractor. The A1 Yamamah 
agreement includes offset arrangements to provide investment in Saudi Arabia.
Two further examples of offset deals mentioned by Horvath (1993) were announced 
at the IDEX military equipment exhibition in Abhu Dhabi in February 1993, where 
the United Arab Emirates announced a $4B contract to purchase the French GIAT 
Industries army recovery vehicles and 436 Leclerc main battle tanks and a $300M 
contract to the USA company, Westinghouse, for an air defence command, control
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and communication system and the contractors are committed to generating 
investment in the UAE worth 60% of the value of the contracts.
Horvath (1993) considers that large diversified companies will be better placed than 
small defence companies to deal with offset investment requirements.
LICENCE FOR IN-COUNTRY MANUFACTURE
C 'Halloran in the BBC documentary programme, Panorama, 22 March 1993, reported 
that the list of arms exporters is including new countries such as South Africa (long 
range artillery systems), Slovakia and Iran (weapon systems, boats). Kiely (1990) has 
summarised how some countries are becoming newly established as arms exporters 
and Miggiano (1992) and Anthony (1992) have reported the expansion and upgrading 
of the arms industry in countries such as Australia, China, Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan.
Egypt has developed a range of as yet unsophisticated weaponry and is 
reportedly aspiring to become a major arms supplier to the Muslim world. 
Egypt has negotiated licensed production of UK anti-tank missiles, USA M-l 
Abrams main battle tanks, USA surveillance radars and USA AIM-9P air-to- 
air missiles.
China is developing a range of weapon systems and electronic warfare 
equipment, air-to-air missiles and also anti-aircraft missiles developed from 
the Soviet SA-7 missile. China has licensed production of French AS-365 
helicopters and Israeli PL-8H air-to-air missiles.
Brazil has limited production of air-to-air missiles and has licensed production
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of the Austrian GHN-45 155mm towed howitzer and the German SNAC-1 
nuclear powered submarine.
Indonesia has licensed production of the French AS-332 helicopter, the 
German NBo-105 helicopter, the German PB-57 patrol craft, the Spanish CN- 
212 transporter and the UK Hawk trainer aircraft.
2.7 THE LEADING EXPORTERS OF MAJOR WEAPONS
Anthony and Wulf (1990) have surveyed the leading exporting countries of major 
weapons over the years 1985 to 1989. They found that the United States and the 
Soviet Union dominated the military world trade, between them accounting for 71% 
of the world’s total military trade.
Table 2.7 shows the leading exporters of major weapons in the period 1985 to 1989.
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TABLE 2.7 Leading exporters of major weapons in the period 1985 to 1989
EXPORTING COUNTRIES AVERAGE LEVEL OF MILITARY 
EXPORTS DURING THE PERIOD 1985 TO 
1989, $M PER YEAR
1. USSR 13242
2. USA 10572
3. France 3160
4. UK 1542
5. China 1372
6. F.R.Germany 1003
7. Czechoslovakia 532
8. Italy 415
9. Sweden 375
10. Netherlands 351
11. Brazil 277
12. Israel 237
13. Spain 222
14. Canada 221
15. Egypt 154
Others 886
Total 34,563 $M PER YEAR
Table by present author from data presented by Anthony and Wulf (1990)
The USSR maintained steady world leadership in the export of weapons during the 
period 1985 to 1990 reported by Anthony and Wulf (1990). The Soviet Union 
accounted for more than half the imports into the Third World countries. 
Afghanistan, India, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Angola, Ethiopia and Nicaragua were 
major importers of weapons from the former USSR.
The German Democratic Republic was a major source of technical military assistance 
to the Third World and particularly to Cuba, Ethiopia (200 type T-55 tanks), India, 
Iraq (trucks, radar maintenance), Iran (refurbished MIG-21 fighter aircraft), 
Kampuchea and Vietnam.
For the USA the value of weapons exports to Third World countries decreased and
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exports to the industrialised world increased during 1985 to 1989. The opposite trend 
was seen for the USSR. The main weapons importer from the USA was its ally, 
Japan. Other traditional customers of the USA are Australia, Germany, Greece, 
Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, Brazil, South Korea, Pakistan, Taiwan and Thailand. 
Anthony and Wulf (1990) reported that the reducing level of USA sales to the 
Middle East were due to concern over the security of Israel.
Anthony and Wulf (1990) reported that over 60% of British arms exports were to the 
Third World during the 1985-1989 period under review, with these exports increasing 
slightly on aggregate. The UK military exports to the industrialised world decreased 
during 1987 and 1988 but recovered to a slightly lower figure than at the start of the 
5 year period reviewed in Anthony and Wulf (1990).
Anthony and Wulf (1990) reported that Western European countries were increasing 
arms exports to the Middle East during 1985 to 1989. They found that there was a 
trend where countries which had previously been supplied by the USA and by the 
USSR were seeking supply from Western Europe.
Anthony et al (1992) reported that the world total exports of major conventional 
weapons has reduced from $46B in 1987 to $22B in 1991 which represents a 
reduction by about 50% over four years. The trend was dominated by the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union and the sharply decreased level of military exports from the 
USSR. The USSR had been the largest single supplier of major conventional 
weapons over the decade 1980 to 1990.
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PROSPECT OF FACING ALLIES’ EQUIPMENT IN COMBAT
Chaisson and Slade (1991) considered that a major disadvantage to the west in 
relying on exports to reinforce the home defence industry was the prospect of facing 
one's own equipment or the equipment of one's allies in combat. The prospect 
became reality in the Falklands conflict when British forces faced the Argentinean 
forces armed with the Exocet missile, supplied by France (Forecast International, 
1990).
The list of user countries of one particular anti-ship missile, the Exocet missile, is an 
indication of the geographical spread of western high technology weapons:
Abu Dhabi Argentina Bahrain Belgium Brazil Brunei
Cameroon Chile Colombia Ecuador Egypt Gabon
Germany France Greece India Indonesia Iraq
Ivory Coast Kuwait Libya Malaysia Morocco Nigeria
Oman Pakistan Peru Philippines Qatar Korea
Saudi Arabia Singapore South Africa Thailand Tunisia UK
plus four other unidentified countries.
Western military equipment and western military technology can be unlawfully 
transferred to a third nation by the purchasing country.
The Patriot MIM-104 is a long range land-to-air missile developed by the USA
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company Raytheon and it is reported that Israel has a programme to procure 700 
Patriot missiles between 1991 and 1998. Dickerson (1992) reported information 
leaked to the US news media that China had purchased MIM-104 Patriot missile 
technology from Israel, an accusation which the Israeli and USA governments have 
denied. Israel has become a leading source of advanced technology to China, 
particularly since the Tiennanmen Square massacre in 1989. The Patriot is used in 
an air defence role to intercept incoming ballistic missiles. China develops an Mi­
series of ballistic missiles and it is believed that China will use knowledge of Patriot 
technology to strengthen the M-series against defensive counter-measures. It was 
considered that Israel received information on China's M-series in return as part of 
the agreement.
Dickerson (1992) has also reported other alleged transfers of technology by Israel: 
United States technology assistance was provided to Israel to develop Israel's 
now cancelled Lavi fighter aircraft programme. It has been alleged that Israel 
has passed on technology from the programme to China.
It is alleged that USA technology was used in developing Israel's Python air- 
to-air missile and that Israel has assisted China in the development of its PL-8 
air defence system.
It is alleged that Israel and South Africa co-operate in the development of 
armaments with technology transfer in both directions. It is alleged that Israel 
has supplied technology from its Arrow anti-tactical ballistic missile 
programme and South Africa has supplied strategic materials to Israel.
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2.8 ARMS PRODUCTION
Anthony (1993) reports that whilst there exists quantitative data on the value of the 
worlds arms exports, there is no comparative data on the value of arms production. 
Anthony (1993) cites Ross (1989) who classified countries in terms of their activities 
in arms production and according to the value of their armaments exports and the 
classifications or "tiers" are shown in Table 2.8.1.
TABLE 2.8.1 Classification of countries according to production of major weapons
CLASSIFICATION COUNTRIES
FIRST TIER
Full range of arms production capability under 
national control.
USA
The former USSR would have been included in this 
first tier.
SECOND TIER
Countries which could produce the full spectrum of 
arms but choose not to for political/economic reasons.
China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, 
United Kingdom
THIRD TIER
Countries having significant arms industries but 
which are not able to produce the full spectrum of 
arms.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Indonesia, 
Israel, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, South 
Korea, Taiwan.
Australia, Canada, Greece, Poland, Spain,
Turkey, Russia,
Ukraine .
Iran, Iraq and North Korea have announced plans to 
develop arms industries and have made significant 
investment to do so.
FOURTH TIER
Countries with minimal arms production.
Rest of world.
Source : table by current author from text of Anthony (1993).
Anthony (1993) was unable to include a chapter on Canada in time for publication 
of his book and the work has omitted countries such as Malaysia and the Philippines 
which are building an indigenous defence industry. Anthony (1993) concluded that 
self-sufficiency in arms production was not an achievable goal for most countries. 
Only the United States of America is in the first tier with the entire range of arms
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production under national control. Before the break up of the USSR, the USSR 
would have been included in the first tier. Anthony (1993) cited Colin Powell, 
Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff who considered that it would take at least 
20 years for Russia to rebuild its arms production capacity to the levels achieved in 
the mid-1980s. The second tier of countries are those which have the technical 
capability to support the production of the full range of arms equipment, but choose 
not to do so based on political or economic reasons. The third tier countries are 
those which have significant arms production capabilities but lack the capability to 
produce the full range of armaments. The fourth tier countries are those with 
minimal or zero arms production activities.
DEVELOPING DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL NATIONS
Krause (1992) reported that the three forces which play a role in shaping the patterns 
of military innovation and production and the subsequent transfer of arms and skill 
resulting in the flow of military technology are wealth, power and war. Krause's 
study (Krause, 1992) which covered centuries and included the historical evolution 
of international arms trade, found that none of the three forces were of higher 
importance than the other two over the medium term. The force of wealth was 
described in terms of economic forces that shape the production and distribution of 
goods within and between nations. The force of power was a result of the pursuit of 
power by nations which resulted in attempts to change their positions in arms 
production and in arms transfer. The force of war is the catalyst of necessity for 
military innovation and production which occurs before, during and after major
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conflicts. Krause (1992) concluded that there were features of the arms trade which 
were persistent throughout the epochs of history: 1) economic, political and military 
forces were the driving forces in directing arms trade, and 2) the existence of tiers 
of producers with different levels of capability in arms manufacture. Kraus (1992) 
also found contrasts in contemporary arms transfers and those of previous epochs: 1) 
the use of arms supply as a positive tool of foreign policy rather than as a negative 
tool such as an embargo, and 2) the emergence of transnational arms production.
Forecast International (1990) and Chaisson and Slade (1991) report that countries, for 
example those of the Pacific Rim, with emerging economies and a growing technical 
base are building indigenous arms production capabilities and are no longer willing 
to accept Western equipment without some form of counter-trade. In 1965 Indonesia, 
Taiwan and Singapore had no indigenous production and no licensed production of 
major weapon systems and relied 100% on imported major weapons. In 1990 
Indonesia imported 44% of its major weapons (indigenous production 41%, licensed 
production 15%), Taiwan imported 20% (indigenous production 50%, licensed 
production 30%) and Singapore imported 45% (indigenous production 34%, licensed 
production 20%) according to Anthony (1993). The countries with emerging 
economies want to "catch up" with western Europe and North America and believe 
they have the bargaining edge to do so.
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FIGURE 2.8.2
This is a figure of the values of major weapons procurement by twelve "Third Tier" 
countries during the period 1965 to 1990 and shows the values of major weapons 
procurement by i) indigenous production, ii) licensed production, iii) direct imports 
and iv) total weapons procurement. The third tier countries are those countries which 
have significant arms production capabilities, but lack the capability to produce the 
full range of armaments. The figure represents the data from twelve third tier 
countries:
Argentina Brazil Chile Egypt India Indonesia
Israel Pakistan Singapore South Africa South Korea Taiwan
Figure by current author from data presented by Anthony (1993)
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Anthony (1993) investigated the indigenous production, the licensed production and 
the direct imports of twelve countries within the third tier: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea and 
Taiwan. His observations are summarised:
1. India and Israel have the largest weapons manufacturing activity of the group.
2. The value of weapons production began to grow in the late 1970s in Brazil 
and South Korea and in the mid-1970s in South Korea and Taiwan.
3. In Latin America, in countries such as Argentina and Brazil, there was 
considerable growth in the arms industries, but growth is not sustained in the 
1990s. There is sharply declining volume of arms production in Argentina 
in the 1990s.
4. The value of major weapons production is rising in India, Indonesia, South 
Korea and Taiwan and all four countries produce a wide range of weapons 
in preference to limiting production to a few product areas.
5. Egypt and Israel have a stable level of arms production. Israel has been able 
to improve and upgrade high technology systems it has licensed or imported 
and has re-exported the modifications to the country of origin.
6. All the countries have used licensed production .
Figure 2.8.2 shows the values of weapons procurement for twelve third tier countries 
from 1965 to 1990, using data estimated by Anthony (1993). During the period 
reviewed by Anthony (1993) the total major weapons procurement has increased, as 
has licensed and indigenous production. The level of the value of defence imports 
increased from 1965 to 1987, with peaks in the years 1967, 1973, 1977, 1982, 1987.
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The value of defence imports has dropped since the last peak in 1987 and in 1990 
for the first time, the value of indigenous production became higher than the value 
of defence imports.
MOTIVATION FOR DEVELOPING AN INDIGENOUS DEFENCE INDUSTRY
A major reason for developing and maintaining an indigenous arms manufacturing 
capability is that reliance on another country can result in the supplier country 
dictating or influencing the foreign policy of the recipient country and the fear that 
at a time of crisis the supplier may not provide equipment or equipment support. 
Anthony (1993) listed examples of countries increasing indigenous arms capability 
following instances of arms embargoes by important suppliers:
Argentina (embargo of 1982) Chile (1974) India (1965)
Iran (1979) Iraq (1979) Pakistan (1965)
South Africa (1963) Turkey (1974)
Egypt and Israel were strongly affected by the 1950 Tripartite Declaration 
Regarding Security in the Near East where the continuation of arms supplies 
from the UK, USA and France was conditional on the recipients behaviour. 
Following the personal intervention by the President of the United States, 
Jimmy Carter, to block the supply of F-5G fighter aircraft to Taiwan, Taiwan 
directed extra effort to building its own fighter aircraft and built its first jet 
aircraft in 1982.
Anthony (1993) noted a second major disadvantage of reliance on imported weapon
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systems, is that at a time of crisis the supplier may choose to pass on confidential 
information about the weapon system performance to the enemy. An example of this 
was seen in the Falklands crisis (Eddy et al, 1982) in the willingness of France to 
provide full details to the UK of the performance of the French equipment supplied 
to Argentina, the Exocet anti-ship missile and the Etendard attack aircraft. France 
also provided Mirage fighter aircraft similar to the Argentinean Mirages for practice 
air-to-air combat targeting by RAF Harrier pilots.
The US Congress Office of Technology Assessment (1991) reviewed the criteria 
necessary and the methods used by developing countries to acquire an indigenous 
defence industry. The report concluded that the motivation for possessing an 
indigenous defence industry was based on strategic, political and economic 
considerations:
Strategic motivation Improved self-reliance
Security of supply
Arms race
Political motivation Regional power aspirations
Economic motivation Potential cost reduction
Potential foreign exchange earnings through
exports
Technology spin-off into non-defence industry
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FACTORS AFFECTING ABILITY TO ESTABLISH AN INDIGENOUS DEFENCE 
INDUSTRY
The Office of Technology Assessment (1991) report outlined four main factors which 
influenced the ability of developing countries to establish an indigenous defence 
industry
Sufficient finance Investment for manufacturing
Investment for R&D centres
Investment for imports
Domestic defence procurement budget
Diversified domestic industries Manufacturing capability in sectors such
as steel, metallurgy, machining, 
electronics.
Scientific and educational level Educational level of the workforce
Status of scientific and educational 
institutions
Direct state ownership of defence 
industry to ensure viability.
Fiscal and trade incentives to reduce 
costs to domestic defence industries. 
Access to export markets is particularly 
important where the domestic defence 
procurement budget is insufficient to 
ensure the economic viability of the 
domestic defence industry.
State involvement
Access to export markets
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PROCESS TO ESTABLISH AN INDIGENOUS DEFENCE INDUSTRY
The Office of Technology Assessment (1991) reported that most of the developing 
defence industrial nations have pursued a common process to achieve an indigenous 
defence industry. Initially domestic production is limited to component manufacture 
and then to assembly under licence of less advanced equipment, while higher 
technology systems continue to be imported. As the industrial base becomes more 
capable, in-country design and production of weapon systems are introduced whilst 
continuing to rely on imported high technology products.
The Office of Technology Assessment (1991) report concluded that licensed 
production was very common in developing defence industries and covered the 
manufacture of components, subassemblies and complete weapon systems.
The second most frequently used method to acquire defence technology was through 
joint venture and teaming arrangements, covering development and production, with 
companies of the leading defence industrialised nations, for example from USA or 
Europe and also to a lesser extent with companies from other developing defence 
industrial nations such as Brazil and Australia.
The Office of Technology Assessment (1991) report pointed out that since 1986 joint 
venture and teaming arrangements had been extended to cover the earlier stages of 
research and pre-development and that companies were collaborating on the design, 
production and the application of advanced military technology. It was noted that 
these ventures were restricted to the relatively advanced arms producers such as
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Brazilian defence companies.
The Office of Technology Assessment (1991) report described how offset 
arrangements for developing nations have become more common since the early 
1980s. The most common offset arrangement involves the purchasing country in the 
manufacture and supply of components for the weapon system being purchased. It 
is often the case that the supplier provides training and technical production data to 
the developing country. The experience gained through offset deals often leads to 
the more advanced stage of licensed production and eventually to indigenous 
development.
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2.9 CONCLUSIONS
1. The Third World and the emerging nations have been equipped largely with 
the products of relatively few nations, mainly the former USSR, USA, France, 
UK, China and Federal Republic of Germany. In recent years the level of 
defence imports in the Third World countries has steadily decreased to 
$12.3B per annum in 1991. About 56% of the world’s exports of military 
equipment are into the Third World countries. A large number of Third 
World countries will only enter into military equipment purchases if the 
supplier provides offset and technology transfer arrangements.
2. The Third World countries are emerging as manufacturers and exporters of 
military equipment and military technology in the Third World is becoming 
increasingly sophisticated.
3. In the industrialised world the value of defence imports represents about 44% 
of the world’s defence imports and the level has decreased to around $10B per 
annum in 1991. The level of high technology being demanded in several 
types of major weapon systems favours large suppliers with substantial 
technology resources, or specialist companies with capabilities in niche 
technologies. Companies wishing to gain access to specialist technologies in 
other organisations can gain those technologies in a realistic timescale by 
mergers, acquisition or by joint venture.
4. Countries such as those in the Pacific Rim with emerging economies and a
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growing technology base, are no longer willing to accept western equipment 
without some form of counter trade. They want to "catch up" with Europe 
and North America and believe they have the bargaining edge to do so. 
Supplier countries are being asked to enter into technology transfer 
agreements, offset and counter trade and technical assistance in setting up in­
country manufacture.
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Chapter 3 
The impact of defence cuts
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3. IMPACT OF DEFENCE CUTS
3.1 IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY
PAYBACK FROM THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY TO GOVERNMENT
Smith (1993) reported that following initial defence procurement contracts, the British 
Government had achieved a remarkably high return in terms of values of export 
levels and income tax revenue.
The UK government invested £1B in the 1970s on the British Aerospace 
Hawk trainer and ground attack aircraft and the resulting export sales have 
been valued at £12B and the estimated taxes and other revenues are estimated 
at £5B.
The £12.5B investment dating from the 1970s in the Tornado aircraft has 
resulted in exports to Saudi Arabia valued at £35B. The estimated value of 
tax revenue to the UK is £11B.
It was predicted that the European Fighter Aircraft will produce UK tax 
revenues around £11B.
Smith (1993) concluded that major international defence programmes are highly 
remunative to the nation and that no other manufacturing industry was comparable 
in the scale of economic return and benefit. Sir John Weston in RUSI (1993) 
pointed out that the British Government had no mechanism which allowed the 
economic benefit to the nation to be considered in the defence procurement process.
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The figures shown above by Smith (1993) are for specific major programmes, i.e. for 
specific aircraft. To compare the level of arms export sales to the UK MOD 
investment in general equipment procurement it is possible to examine the MOD 
Defence Export Services figure (Thomas, 1993) for 1992:
£4.5B for defence equipment exports from the UK, 1992
£9.3B for estimated MOD UK defence equipment procurement, 1991/2
THE PEACE DIVIDEND
There are several sources such as Deger (1981), Dunne and Smith (1983), Hartley 
and Hooper (1987) which consider that military expenditure imposes a substantial 
burden on the nation and that reduced military expenditure will contribute to the 
"Peace Dividend" of higher economic growth.
The trade union discussion document, Defence Employment Briefing (March 1992) 
calculated a predicted peace dividend for the UK as 30,550 million pounds over the 
ten year period from 1990 to 2000.
The calculated peace dividend is shown in Table 3.1.
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TABLE 3.1 Peace dividend
YEAR PREDICTED 
DEFENCE 
BUDGET,MILLI 
ONS POUNDS 
(1)
GDP
DEFLATOR
(2)
LEVEL FUNDING 
TO 1990-91 
EQUIVALENT (3)
PEACE
DIVIDEND (4)
MILLIONS
POUNDS
1990-91 21,800 21,800
1991-92 22,850 8.5 % 23,650 800
1992-93 24,180 7.0 % 25,310 1,130
1993-94 24,520 4.5 % 26,450 1,930
1994-95 24,800 3.8 % 27,450 2,650
1995-96 25,350 3.0 % 28,275 2,925
1996-97 25,900 5.0 % 29,690 3,790
1997-93 26,450 5.0 % 31,175 4,725
1998-99 27,000 5.0 % 32,730 5,730
1999-2000 27,500 5.0 % 34,370 6,870
TOTAL
PEACE
DIVIDEND
(5)
30,550
Note 1. Defence budget figures up to the year 1994-95 are taken from the 1991 Autumn Statement. 
After that date the figures are based on approximately equal cuts resulting in a 20% cut in 
real terms on the 1990-91 figure by 1999-2000. This figure is based on a projection made 
by UBS Phillips and Drew (Financial Times 23 July 1990).
Note 2. The GDP deflator figures shown up to 1994-95 are taken from the 1991 Autumn Statement. 
From 1996 to 2000 a notational 5% figure is used.
Note 3. The level funding figures represent the 1990-91 defence budget maintained in real terms.
Note 4. The "dividend" for each year is calculated as the level funding figure for that year (column 
3) less the predicted cash figure (column 1).
Note 5. The total dividend over the ten year period 1990 to 2000 is calculated as 30.55 billion 
pounds, which the source equates to 21.9 billion pounds at 1990-91 values. This compares 
to the widely reported cut of 17 billion pounds sought by the MOD Procurement Minister, 
Alan Clark in June 1990, prior to the Options for Change announcement. The grand total 
is therefore seen as a realistic figure.
SOURCE: Adapted from table "The Peace Dividend" given in IPMS, MSF and
GGWU, Defence Employment Briefing, March 92, p. 4.
An example of a "Peace Dividend" often quoted is the economic growth in Japan,
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where the constitution imposed at the end of World War II required that military 
expenditure be limited to a maximum of one per cent of its GNP. Dunne and Smith 
(1983) have considered a reduction in UK military expenditure from 5% to a 
European average of 3% of GDP, if matched with a compensating increase in public 
expenditure would result in increased employment and improved economic growth.
A contrasting view was expressed by Chan (1985), who surveyed several studies into 
the impact of defence spending on the economy. He found that there was no general 
agreement in the studies and reported significant variations between data sources for 
the same countries in the same time periods. The USA did not appear to benefit 
from a peace dividend at the end of the Vietnam war according to Benoit (1973a) 
who points out that the 1969-1971 recession in the USA was in fact blamed on the 
US withdrawal from the Vietnam war and the resultant decrease in defence spending. 
Defence cuts after the Vietnam war were viewed with trepidation by the US defence 
industry. Peet, Max and Bengston (1965) in a Battelle Report had warned of 73% 
job cuts in the defence electronics sector and made recommendations on programmes 
of readjustment which should be made to manage the effects of the cut-backs. 
Benoit (1973a) considered that the 1969-71 recession was caused by the failure of 
the US government to manage the decrease in defence spending and failure to 
implement a compensatory programme to stimulate demand. Benoit (1973b) 
analyzed the economic growth and defence expenditure of forty-four developing 
countries and concluded that it was not possible to associate high defence expenditure 
with lower economic growth.
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3.2 IMPACT ON INDUSTRY AND EMPLOYMENT
A major and instantaneous impact of defence cuts on the defence industry is the 
reduction in orders and ensuing loss of jobs. The IPMS union released figures 
showing that nearly 95,000 or one-sixth of the UK's 570,000 defence jobs were lost 
during the eighteen months from mid-1990 to end 1991 (Electronics Times, 16 
January 1992) and a further 20,000 civil service jobs were expected to be lost over 
the following three years. The SIPRI Yearbooks detail how there have been 
previously reductions in UK military expenditure and the defence industry has 
responded to the changes, e.g. after World War II, after the Korean War, after HMG's 
Defence Reviews 1957, 1965-68, 1975, 1981 and in the period 1985 to 1989.
Some companies have tried to sell their defence businesses, for example Thom EMI 
tried to sell its defence arm business in 1990 (Electronics Times, 16 January 1992, 
p. 11). In 1992 the EC commissioned a study by the Economists Advisory Group 
Ltd (1992) on the impact of changes in defence expenditure and on the dependence 
of the regions within the EC on defence activities and their vulnerability to 
reductions in defence spending. The report concluded that past trends were unlikely 
to be a reliable guide to the future as defence policy and defence spending were 
changing. They cited data from the SIPRI Yearbook 1991 which showed that over 
two decades from the early 1970s to the late 1980s the level of defence spending as 
a percentage of the GDP, in the European Community had declined from 3.7% to 
3.3% . Real growth in defence spending had stagnated in the late 1980s to a level 
of about 128 billion ECU and is predicted to fall from 1991 to 1995 by 10% and by
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at least 25% by the year 2000. The study considered regional dependence on defence 
expenditure as the share of the labour force in that region which is directly employed 
in defence, either in the defence industry or in the military or in both categories. 
Any region was assessed as being dependant where the level of defence employment 
was at least twice the average for the EC. Table 3.2.1 shows the average defence 
related employment figures for the EC.
TABLE 3.2.1 Average defence employment within the EC
NUMBER OF 
PERSONNEL 
EMPLOYED
NUMBER OF 
PERSONNEL AS A % 
OF TOTAL 
WORKFORCE
NUMBER DIRECTLY 
EMPLOYED IN THE DEFENCE 
INDUSTRY
680,000 0.55 %
NUMBER EMPLOYED BY THE 
MILITARY 2,300,000 1.87 %
NUMBER EMPLOYED IN 
DEFENCE INDUSTRY AND IN 
MILITARY
3,000,000 2.41 %
Source: table generated by present author from data presented by Economists Advisory Group Ltd 
(1992)
It was established that within 183 regions of the EC there were 19 regions which 
were employment-dependent on the defence industry. Four other regions were 
identified as having above average defence industry employment. The 23 regions 
employ over one half of the defence industrial workforce. 32 regions were found to 
be dependent on employment by the military and 24 regions were dependent on total
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defence related activity. Other areas outside the dependent regions were also 
identified.
It was found that the largest defence companies had been following both strategies 
of streamlining by concentrating on core military business and simultaneously 
diversifying into related civil markets, usually in high technology. There was 
evidence that the companies in different nations were reacting in different ways. The 
French and Italian companies were striving to maintain their defence market positions 
in contrast to the German and British companies which were adjusting to the changes 
in other ways. German companies were more aggressive in diversification into civil 
business areas, whereas British companies were pursuing a safer strategy of plant 
closures, laying-off staff and sale of facilities.
The defence dependent regions are highly vulnerable to increases in unemployment. 
The study determined where employment cuts had already been implemented or were 
likely to be enforced in the short term by a survey of defence companies. The 
companies emphasised that industrial employment cuts were determined by 
commercial considerations and that industrial adjustment would take at least five 
years. It was impossible to predict defence company site and military base closures 
as the subject of defence procurement cuts and employment readjustment was highly 
controversial at local and at national level.
It was predicted that some regions of the EC would experience reduction in scale and 
closure of military bases. This would be seen in those regions in Germany with a
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high proportion of foreign forces and where the withdrawal of many foreign forces 
is scheduled.
It was reported in the EC news sheet, "The Week in Europe" 10 December 1992, that 
the EC Regional Policy Minister, Bruce Milan, noted that about half the regions 
likely to be severely affected by the defence cuts were not eligible for EC structural 
funding under the EC’s regional policy. Table 3.2.2 shows the regions in the UK 
with the highest levels of military related employment.
TABLE 3.2.2 Regions of the United Kingdom with high level of employment in the 
defence industry, or in the military, or in defence industry and the 
military
UK Region Employment share % in 
defence industry only.
EC Average = 0.55 %
Employment share % in 
military only.
EC Average = 1.86 %
Defence related 
employment share % in 
industry and military. 
EC Average = 2.41 %
Cumbria 6.40 0.95 7.35
Essex 2.78 1.14 3.89
Lancashire 2.35 0.27 2.62
Cornwall and Devon 1.55 5.32 6.81
Avon, Gloucestershire and 
Wiltshire
1.26 4.25 5.48
Hampshire and Isle of Wight 1.18 7.83 8.95
North Yorkshire 0 6.25 6.25
East Anglia 0.18 4.34 4.51
Lincolnshire 0 4.10 4.10
Berkshire, Bucks and 
Oxfordshire
0.36 3.98 433
Source: Table by present author, from data presented by Economists Advisory Group Ltd (1992).
The study omitted the county of Hertfordshire which has a concentration of defence 
industries:
British Aerospace, Hatfield (previously DeHavilland Aircraft)
Page 83
Chapter 3
British Aerospace, Stevenage (Space and Defence Electronics)
Lucas Aerospace 
Hunting, at Hoddesden 
Rolls Royce, Leavesden 
Marconi Instruments, St Albans
Prior (1993) reported that the University of York had carried out the original research 
and study for the EC Economists Advisory Group (1992), and in 1993 Hertfordshire 
County Council contacted the University of York for a study to be carried out on the 
impact of defence cuts on the industry of Hertfordshire.
The regions studied, for example Cumbria, in the EC Economists Advisory Group 
(1992) report are very large in comparison to the areas, such as Barrow-in-Furness, 
of defence-intensive activity which those regions contain and the report does not 
consider the highly localised and therefore severe employment cuts which might 
occur in these areas. For example the working population of the region Hampshire 
and the Isle of Wight is given as 664,100 and the number employed in the defence 
industry is 7831, (or 1.18% of the working population) and the number employed in 
the military is 54,674 (or 7.83% of the working population). The concentration of 
defence related employment within Hampshire lies in a number of industrialised areas 
such as Portsmouth, Fareham, Aldershot and Famborough, (Jordan and Sons Surveys, 
1984) and defence cuts are likely to impact these centres more severely than the 
whole of the Hampshire region.
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The EC news letter, The Week in Europe 26 September 1991, has reported that some 
areas of the UK, Barrow-in-Furness, Merseyside, Preston, Kirklees and Strathclyde, 
where large military installations are being converted from military use, have 
benefitted from EC grants targeted at regions with fragile economies.
The EC Commission Vice President, Martin Bangeman, reported (The Week in 
Europe 26 March 1992) that financial aid to regions suffering from defence cuts 
would be difficult to justify as defence companies were often based in the more 
prosperous regions of the Community. Richman (1992) reports that it is commonly 
believed that employment cuts due to cuts in defence spending tend to occur in 
affluent areas but he believes there are several examples where the opposite is true. 
Richman (1992) considered that town centres which are culturally rich are often 
surrounded by a "doughnut of deprivation", which in turn is surrounded by the 
"affluent leafy suburbs" and Richman (1992) pointed out that whilst the head offices 
of major defence prime contractors are often in prestigious surroundings, the 
defence/engineering/electronics factories tend to be located in more deprived areas.
3.3 INDUSTRIAL BEHAVIOUR IN DECLINING MARKETS
DECLINE IN THE DEFENCE MARKET
The UK Ministry of Defence have published their estimates of the value of the 
annual averages of world-wide defence contracts placed or to be placed, over the 
period 1988 to 1997 (MOD DESO Newsletter, issue 3, February 1993). The MOD 
estimates are summarised in Table 3.3.
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TABLE 3.3 Value of defence contracts placed annually worid-wide
PERIOD OVER WHICH THE VALUE OF 
THE DEFENCE CONTRACTS ARE 
AVERAGED.
AVERAGE VALUE OF DEFENCE 
CONTRACTS PLACED OR TO BE 
PLACED PER YEAR WORLD-WIDE, 
BILLIONS US DOLLARS
1988-1992 USS48B
1992 USS43B
1993-1997 US$40B
SOURCE: Table by current author from data presented in MOD
DESO Newsletter, issue 3, February 1993, p. 3.
The change in annual value of new contracts represents a decline of 20% over the 
period 1988 to 1997. The MOD also reports that the pattern of defence spending and 
defence equipment trade will continue to change:
Countries of the Pacific Rim which includes the countries of Australasia and 
East Asia are expected to increase their defence procurement spends by up to 
35%.
The countries of the Middle East are expected to remain the world's largest 
regional market, with annual defence import levels decreasing by 25% from 
1993 to 1997, to $16 to $17 billion US dollars p.a.
The level of European defence exports is expected to fall from the 1988-1992 
level by 17% by the year 1997.
The level of North American defence exports is expected to follow a similar 
trend with decline of 27% by the year 1997.
The proportion of allocation of funding between land, sea and air is not 
expected to change significantly over the period 1993 to 1997. There is 
expected to be a decline in the platform market, for example ships, tanks and
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aircraft and more emphasis on electronics to improve platform capabilities and 
effectiveness.
Miggiano et al (1992) have reported that arms industries are having to restructure as 
their national and export markets decline in many parts of the world. He points out 
that many companies in Western Europe and in North America had scaled down their 
defence capacity even though they were in 1992 continuing production on orders 
secured before the end of the Cold War and in future with completion of these 
programmes the companies would have to consider reducing their production 
capacities further.
Defence companies are facing a declining but never the less substantial world arms 
market of $40B annually. Companies choosing to exit or to stay in the armaments 
business would be able to perform successfully in a declining market by employing 
shrewd analysis and choice of strategy.
BEHAVIOUR AND STRATEGIES FOR DECLINING BUSINESSES
Harrigan (1980) investigated behaviour and strategies for declining businesses. None 
of the sixty companies investigated by Harrigan (1980) were in the defence industry 
but it is useful to examine her findings. She uses an analogy from the game of chess 
by referring to the strategies in declining markets as "endgames" and the declining 
industrial environment as the "endgame environment". According to her analysis, 
market decline is characterised by a reduction in the number of competitors, a 
narrowing of the products on offer, the relinquishing of smaller customers and
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markets and a reduction in promotional and development expenditure. Kiely (1990) 
in his study of the defence industry outlined the same characteristics in the defence 
markets of the western world i.e.
i) a reduction in the number of competitors. This has been seen in Europe and 
in the USA where the market is being dominated by fewer but larger 
companies.
ii) a narrowing of the products on offer and the relinquishing of smaller 
customers and markets. Companies are seeking to rationalise their range of 
products and technology, mainly to reduce the level of investment required 
to sustain the necessary threshold in a range of technologies.
iii) a reduction in promotional or development expenditure. The governments of 
the Western World and the former Soviet Union are severely cutting military 
research and development budgets.
Harrigan's hypothesis (Harrigan, 1980) was that there is no single strategy applicable 
to all declining markets but that the appropriate strategy depends on a number of 
factors in the endgame environment. She classifies possible strategies into those 
where the company wishes to stay in the market and those where the company 
wishes to exit the market as profitably as possible.
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3.3.1 Options for Companies Wishing to Stay in a Declining Maiket
According to Harrigan (1980), a company wishing to stay in a declining market has 
the following options :
1. It can increase investment in order to obtain market dominance by acquiring 
exiting competitors or by pursuing the niche markets that are likely to remain. 
A company making such an investment does so because it is committed to 
remain in the industry and to protect the long term strategic position. 
Expenditure may be directed to the following: i) to ensure a degree of 
stability in the endgame environment, ii) to acquire exiting competitors or iii) 
to persuade or assist competitor companies to exit sooner. A company might, 
for example, initiate a "price-war" by cutting the price of goods or services 
to exert pressure on higher cost competitors.
The strategy of increasing the investment would be considered where it is 
judged that pockets of demand will endure in the endgame.
2. It can adopt a defensive strategy of holding its investment level in order to 
wait and see how the market develops in preference to seeking future 
dominance in the market. This may be appropriate where the company 
possesses certain competitive strengths in terms of customer loyalty in which 
case the level of demand is likely to remain steady or where the company has 
niche products, or where one of its competitors is seen as a strong threat. A
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defensive strategy can also be appropriate in the case where the declining 
business is important to the company and the company has reasons to stay in 
that area of business. Harrigan (1980) considered that a company which has 
already made substantial investment and wished to protect the investment 
would be expected to try to hold its market share by making only 
maintenance reinvestment. Harrigan (1980) also considered that companies 
adopted a defensive strategy when there was a degree of uncertainty on how 
rapidly or in which specific market areas the decline would occur. There is, 
however, always the possibility with this strategy that the company which 
hesitates may lose an opportunity.
3. The company can chose to "shrink selectively" by trying to capture remaining 
niche markets and exiting the other markets. The company can attempt to 
become firmly established in the potentially profitable market segments and 
create customer loyalty in these niche areas. A supplier company has first to 
make a judgement concerning which customer companies will be least likely 
to abandon old products and convert to newer products or technologies and 
then to position itself to benefit from the expected demand for the endgame 
products. The success of this strategy may depend on sound assessment of 
the markets.
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3.3.2 Options for Companies Wishing to Exit the Declining Market
A company wishing to exit the market, but which is unable to obtain a satisfactory 
return on its assets and must therefore stay in the market until it can, has two options 
(Harrigan, 1980):
1. Harrigan (1980) uses the phrases "milk the investment" and the "harvesting 
strategy" to describe the policy of diverting as much cash and resources as 
possible to other projects.
2. The company can divest immediately. It is critical that this action should be 
taken at the right time, in order that the best return on assets can be obtained.
3.3.3 Successful Performance in the Endgame
Harrigan (1980) determines success in the endgame as being when a firm remaining 
in the market earned above average profits, with a reasonable degree of certainty that 
it could continue to do so, whilst retaining the choice of exiting satisfactorily in the 
future. For an exiting company, success was categorised as the ability to exit without 
significant loss or interference with the company's other business activities. 
Conversely, a company was said to have performed badly in the endgame if it tried 
to stay in the market and lost money consistently, with the result that it was unlikely 
to be able to remain in the market, or an exiting company made a considerable loss 
and its other business interests were severely affected.
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3.3.4 Factors Influencing the Choice of Strategy in a Declining Maiket
The factors that influence a company’s choice of strategy were analyzed by Harrigan 
(1980) in terms of the following variables :
1. Market characteristics - The perceived reasons for and rate of decline of the 
market and whether there exists areas of the market where demand is 
maintained and how the company’s expectations concern the demand.
2. Structural traits of the industry - These are broken down into :
product characteristics. Is the product differentiated, that is it significantly 
different to other products on the market ?
buyer characteristics. Is the product bought by a only a few large customers 
who may exert pressure to cut prices ?
supplier characteristics. Is the product important to ’’upstream’’ firms who 
might therefore be expected to aid the producer by cutting price or by 
improving efficiency ?
economic exit barrier characteristics. These include the factors deterring a 
company from exiting because of unacceptable losses and the "volatility" of 
the competitive market such as whether the market becomes unstable by price 
warfare .
3. The effects of corporate strategies - whether the company is important to the 
corporate image, whether it supplies other parts of the parent company.
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4. The companies internal strengths - whether it has advantages over the 
competition in terms of marketing skills, design and engineering skills, 
finance or methods of production.
3.3.5 Conditions Likely to Enable Success in a Declining Market
The sixty firms studied by Harrigan (1980) were classified according to a matrix of 
three variables :
1. Concentration/fragmentation - determined by the number of competitors in 
the market.
2. Differentiated traits/commodity traits - whether the product was markedly 
different to others in the market.
3. High/low exit barriers.
She found that her main hypotheses, that appropriate strategies varied with the 
industrial environment and characteristics and corporate requirements, were 
confirmed. She also established that by shrewd analysis and choice of strategies, a 
company could perform well in the endgame environment.
The key sensitivities and characteristics identified by Harrigan (1980) are summarised 
in Table 3.3.5.
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TABLE 3.3.5 Key sensitivities and characteristics in declining maikets
FAVOURABLE UNFAVOURABLE
BUSINESS
ENVIRONMENTS
1. Demand somewhat price insensitive
2. Replacement units needed for predictable future period
3. Pockets of demand likely to endure indefinitely,even at 
a lower level.
1. Demand highly price insensitive, competitor price 
cutting becoming volatile.
2. Demand drops abruptly, causing sizeable write-offs 
for companies forced to exit from business.
3. Requirement for substantial re-investment forces 
companies to exit prematurely.
4. Great uncertainty about duration of demand.
INDUSTRIAL
CHARACTERISTICS-
ANALYSIS OF DEMAND
Certainty of demand
1. Which sectors/pockets of demand would decline first.
2. How rapidly market would decline
3. if  demand would revitalise
Uncertainty of demand
1. Whether demand would revitalise and when.
2. Generally few companies exit business in uncertainty, 
thus creating excess capacity. Companies are likely to 
operate plant at low capacity for years.
Rate of declining demand due to technological changes 
are in general easier to forecast, particularly where the 
manufacturing company also produce the replacement 
product
Rate of decline due to non-technological change, (for 
example demographic, cultural, or fashion change) is 
more difficult to forecast.
CUSTOMER TRAITS Fragmented customer groups appear relatively price 
insensitive.
Concentrated customer groups appear more price 
sensitive.
PRODUCT Differentiable products (differentiable by patents, brand 
name identification,good service record) have more 
staying power in a declining market, avoid competition by 
fulfilling a customer niche.
Brand loyalty erodes more rapidly, the higher the 
primary demand for a physical feature.
SUPPLIER BEHAVIOUR If supplier to a company in a decline is relatively 
dependant on that company, then the supplier is more 
likely to help that company by financing/advertising/price 
discounts or other co-operation. Suppliers are not 
generally dependant on one company.
ECONOMIC EXIT 
BARRIERS
A company wishing to exit a declining business, may be 
reluctant where the company investment would be 
irretrievably lost, e.g. where there are new and 
undepreciated assets, or recent technology investment.
STRATEGIC EXIT 
BARRIERS
Corporate image barriers, to exit can exist in single- 
business companies, or in historical pioneers.
Customer linkage
Short term reporting goal barriers.
SOURCE: Summarised by the present writer from Harrigan (1980),
Chapters 2, pp 13 to 43, and Chapter 11, pp 367 to 393.
The conditions most likely to enable a company to succeed in a declining market 
were :
1. Demand for the product was not particularly price-sensitive.
2. The replacement market was fairly secure.
3. Niche markets existed which could be easily exploited.
4. The reasons for the decline were well understood and the rate of decline 
predictable.
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5. Differentiated markets were less likely to be invaded.
All these factors made for a stable competitive situation which was advantageous for 
those involved. The uncertainties created by a volatile market produced a turbulent 
environment in which no-one benefited. Harrigan (1980) suggests that in a declining 
market it would perhaps be beneficial for competitor companies to have some form 
of co-operative association, it being in everyone's interest to have an orderly market.
None of the companies examined by Harrigan (1980) were defence companies.
The literature has not examined the defence companies manoeuvring into favourable 
environments as seen in those companies who forcefully pursued export markets to 
the third world in the 1970s and 1980s to compensate for the diminishing domestic 
markets. Regional conflicts and arms races created a favourable market environment 
for the exporter because the demand was not highly price sensitive, there was a 
steady market for replacement units and niche markets were established (SIPRI Year 
Books, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990). Towards the end of the 1980s there was 
decline in these niche markets as the conflicts ended and the third world countries 
began to establish their own defence industrial base.
An example of a niche maiket, cited by Struck (1991), is the $2.54B market for 
military semiconductor components and integrated circuits, which is predicted to have
11.3% annual growth rate. Struck reports that arms control agreements will lead to 
increasing markets in surveillance and verification systems and protection weaponry
Page 95
Chapter 3
such as anti-missile systems, cruise missiles and smart weapons. These niche 
markets appear to be strongest in the Pacific Rim and in the Middle East, as reported 
by Forecast International (1990).
The tank industry is experiencing severe negative market trends which vividly 
illustrates the characteristics of the unfavourable environment identified by Harrigan 
(1980):
1. The Sipri Year Book 1990, Chapter 13, describes how the CFE Conventional 
Forces in Europe agreement requires that 2000 tanks in NATO Europe will 
be scrapped. This indicates an unfavourable market where the demand for 
new tanks drops abruptly.
2. Tanks demand highly expensive and advanced technology incorporating 
electronics technology at approximately 50% by value, requiring substantial 
investment by the tank manufacturer. This is an example of an unfavourable 
business environment where there is the requirement for substantial 
investment can force companies to exit from business.
3. There is considerable uncertainty in the level and timing of demand.
4. There are five tank producers in Europe, Krauss-Maffei, GIAT, Vickers, Oto- 
Melara and Santa Barbara, but only two countries Great Britain and France 
are expected to have a requirement of any quantity (SIPRI Year book 1991).
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An example of dependant and therefore co-operative supplier behaviour as identified 
by Hanigan (1980), is seen in the defence industry in the behaviour of suppliers of 
defence electronics systems and subsystems to the builders of warships where the 
defence system consists of high technology electronics such as missiles, anti-missiles, 
command and control, sensors, radars, counter-measures such as decoys, artificial 
intelligence and automated threat response. This dependence of the naval electronics 
systems companies on the ship-building concerns has led to close collaborations 
between ship builders and electronics companies, for example GEC, VSEL and DCN 
companies.
3.3.7 Divestment
Coyne and Wright (1987) studied corporate divestment, covering the adjustment 
process, the way in which divestments are carried out, the range of divestments from 
partial to complete severance and the routes by which they occur.
CATEGORIES OF DIVESTMENT
Coyne and Wright (1987) described divestment as
" the sale by an organisation of one part of itself to another party".
Table 3.3.7 shows how they classified six types of divestment by (1) the level of 
ownership severance, (2) the relative frequency of that type of divestment and (3) 
the type of resultant ownership of the divested segment of the company.
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TABLE 3.3.7 Types of coiporate divestment
TYPE OWNERSHIP
SEVERANCE
RELATIVE FREQUENCY NEW FORM OF 
OWNERSHIP
FRANCHISING Complete, limited period Frequent Subsidiary or independent
CONTRACTING OUT Complete but trading 
relationship remains
Frequent Subsidiary
SELL-OFF Complete, usually 
permanent
Small sell-offs frequent, 
part of a series. Large 
sell-offs, function of crisis
Subsidiary
MANAGEMENT/ 
LEVERAGE BUY-OUT
Usually complete and 
permanent, parent may 
retain equity interest
Small- frequent 
Large- becoming more 
frequent in UK frequent in 
USA
Independent
SPIN-OFF/ DEMERGER Split rather than severance, 
may involve dilution of 
ownership, usually 
permanent
Small- frequent especially 
in high technology where 
management takes equity 
stake
Quasi-independen* <
ASSET SWAP/ 
STRATEGIC TRADE
Complete but exchange 
involved so size of parent 
maintained
Unusual, small asset-swaps 
may arise in anti-trust 
divestitures. Large asset 
swaps voluntary.
Subsidiary
Source: Aadjusted from Coyne and Wright (1987), p. 203, Table 15.1
Coyne and Wright described the forms of divestment as follows:
1. Franchising commonly involves a competition for the exclusive production or 
service rights in a particular area for a specified period.
2. Contracting-out involves the supply of goods or services to the parent 
company.
3. The third type of divestment described by Coyne and Wright is the sell-off 
which varies in scale from the sale of small parts or units of the parent 
company, to the large sell-off.
4. In the case of the management or leverage buy-out to a consortium of 
institutions the resultant unit becomes independent of the parent company.
5. A new company formed by "spin-off' becomes a separate legal entity but 
remains owned by the same shareholders as the parent company. The spun-
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off company is quasi-independent in the sense that it is able to define its own 
management and raise its own finances.
6. Asset-swap or strategic trade involves two companies exchanging assets 
without the exchange of funds. This type of divestment is unusual.
EFFECTS OF DIVESTMENT ON PERFORMANCE
Coyne and Wright (1987) have considered the effects of divestment on company 
performance measured in terms of the effects on shareholder wealth. The types of 
divestment examined were voluntary sell-offs, voluntary spin-offs and demergers and 
involuntary actions or enforced divestitures resulting from competitors policies. 
Coyne and Wright (1987) developed the hypothesis that as the reasons for divestment 
varied, the effects on shareholders wealth also varied. Their examination of the 
literature found that in the case of enforced divestiture, the existing shareholders 
would lose if the company had been in a monopolistic position.
Divestments or sell-offs were regarded as involving unsatisfactory performance or 
misfit with the parent company activities. Where the aim of the sell-off is to create 
wealth, there may result an upward movement in share prices. Alexander et al. (1984) 
cited by Coyne and Wright (1987) found that sell-offs are usually announced after 
a period of negative abnormal returns whereas spin-offs are announced after a period 
of positive abnormal returns.
Demergers or spin-offs are associated with the problems of success. Coyne and 
Wright (1987) reviewed three studies on spin-offs and in all three found positive
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abnormal gains to shareholders and further, that large spin-offs, involving more than 
10% of the parent company, resulted in a greater positive impact on share prices. The 
gains in shareholder wealth were attributed to increased efficiency resulting from 
reduction in diversity in the parent company and the increased ability for the new 
separate entities to pursue their own separate interests.
Examination of the literature by the present author has not identified any studies of 
divestment in the defence industry,although several articles report individual cases. 
The Economist, 25 January 1992, reports that one of the largest USA defence 
companies, General Dynamics, has a plan to stay in markets where it is leader and 
to either expand or sell-off the less successful product areas.
3.4 THE PERFORMANCE OF USA AND EUROPEAN DEFENCE 
COMPANIES
Finnegan (1993) reported on the performance of the world's largest 100 defence 
companies and compared their performance in 1991 and 1992. He reported that of 
the largest 100 defence companies, 50 were USA companies, 67% of which were 
profitable and on average relied on defence for 46% of their sales. Of the world's 
largest 100 defence companies, 35 companies were European, of which 56% were 
profitable and on average relied on defence for 41% of sales. The figures presented 
by Finnegan (1993) showed that for the 50 largest defence companies the average net 
income in 1991 was $216.5M and in 1992 the average net income had decreased to 
$55.5M. He reported that the major defence companies were staying profitable by
Page 100
Chapter 3
downsizing and merging. The companies had very much reduced capital investment 
and research and development activities because of lack of new programmes. The 
companies that had adjusted quickly to the reduced defence budgets were profitable 
and also had increased their market shares by mergers and acquisitions.
3.5 CONCLUSIONS
1. The defence market in the western world is exhibiting the characteristics of 
market decline:
i) a reduction in the number of competitors. This has been seen in Europe 
and in the USA where the market is being dominated by fewer but larger 
companies.
ii) a narrowing of the products on offer and the relinquishing of smaller 
customers and markets. Companies are seeking to rationalise their range of 
products and technology, mainly to reduce the level of investment required 
to sustain the necessary threshold in a range of technologies.
iii) a reduction in promotional or development expenditure. The governments 
of the Western World and the former Soviet Union are severely cutting 
military research and development budgets.
2. A major impact of the defence cuts has been the reduction in orders and loss 
of jobs in the defence industry. A number of companies are divesting of their 
defence related business areas and the majority of companies are 
restructuring.
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3. Companies are trying to manoeuvre into favourable markets. This is seen in 
the companies who have forcefully pursued defence export markets in the 
Middle East and in the Pacific Rim to compensate for diminishing domestic 
markets.
4. Companies are attempting to become established in niche markets such as 
surveillance and electronics.
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Chapter 4
Impact of changes in equipment procurement 
policy and the influence of the Independent 
European Programme Group
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4. IMPACT OF CHANGES IN THE EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT POLICY 
AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE IEPG
Bittleston (1990) noted that the need for change in the structure of defence industries 
and the way in which Western European governments carried out defence 
procurement had been covered extensively in the literature. Budgetary pressures and 
developments in arms reduction were the major force of change. Edward Heath is 
quoted in Bittleston (1990) as commenting on European unity that "In time there will 
come a common defence and procurement policy with a common foreign policy as 
its basis".
Moravcsik (1989) proposed a three-tiered plan for defence procurement in Europe 
which involved i) collaborative projects for large research and development intensive 
projects, for example to provide a next-generation weapon system, ii) a selection 
procedure of competing consortia for medium size projects and iii) free international 
trade for smaller procurement projects. Moravcsik (1989) reported that the most 
potentially effective initiatives concerning European defence procurement policy had 
come from the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG). The IEPG was 
formed in 1976 (Parry, 1991) and is composed of the European members of NATO 
except Iceland and is independent of NATO and the Eurogroup. The IEPG’s goals 
include the formation of a competitive integrated European defence market and 
industry and agreement on common operational requirements. Moravcsik (1989) 
briefly summarised the main points of an IEPG Action Plan proposed in 1988 with 
IEPG designated as the major organisation for the co-ordination of European defence
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industrial co-operation and a proposed programme for the introduction of a common 
European arms market. The plan called for:
i) open bidding procedures,
ii) a standard reporting mechanism for international contracts,
iii) aid for the defence industries of Greece, Turkey and Portugal,
iv) the creation of a secretariat in Lisbon, and
v) the open competition for contracts, subject to the gains from all projects 
being balanced over an appropriate period of time. The principle of Juste 
Retour provides that the costs and received benefits are in proportion to the 
percentage finance provided and the numbers of equipment procured by each 
participating nation.
Moravcsik (1989) reported that the plan put forward by the IEPG was more strongly 
supported by smaller defence companies such as the French company MATRA. The 
smaller companies saw the IEPG plan as helpful in avoiding being taken over by the 
large national companies. McIntosh in RUSI (1993) considers that the IEPG had 
made modest progress towards the abolition of protectionist barriers to defence trade 
within Europe. The IEPG has no formal or legal charter and its policies and 
recommendations are not legally binding on the member countries. Moravcsik (1989) 
noted that international organisations such as the IEPG can do little more than create 
the environment for international co-operation.
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4.1 COMPETITIVE TENDERS
The Statement on the Defence Estimates (1991) outlines the British Government’s 
drive to a more commercial approach to defence equipment procurement. The 
proportion of contracts placed competitively has increased from 37% by value in 
1983 to 67% in the year 1989/90, the aim being to achieve better value for money 
for the Government. Several publications such as Hartley(1987a), Hartley (1987b), 
Smith (1988). and. Dunne and Smith(1983) reported the expected benefits to tbs 
country's economy of a competitive defence procurement policy. RUSI (1996) 
addressed the cost implications for the firms bidding: the cost of preparing a bid is 
typically 5% of the value of the tender, e.g. a bid cost of fifty thousand pounds on 
a bid valued at one million pounds. The firms have to evaluate and select very 
carefully which contracts to pursue. This may lead to firms becoming more selective 
and more specialised resulting in fewer firms bidding and then less competition for 
defence contracts.
The DMS consultant report, Forecast International (1990), considers that competitive 
tendering was introduced indiscriminately with the intention of enforcing efficiency 
in the defence industry and breaking the perceived undesirably close relationship 
between the government procurement agencies and industry. The Forecast 
International (1990) report concluded that competitive tendering has lead to the 
process of selection of the lowest cost, compliant bid. The procedure neglects other 
important considerations such as the ability of the contractor to ramp up to surge 
capacity in a time of crisis, the capacity of the company to hold sufficient stock to
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cater for bottlenecks in component supplies and the capacity of the company to 
maintain a product support facility and an adequate research and development base.
RUSI (1996) considers the use of two other methods of non-competitive tenders 
which the MOD continued to use: "No Acceptable Price, No Contract" (NAPNOC), 
and Target Cost Incentive (TCI). McIntosh in RUSI (1993) explains that NAPNOC 
requires a price is formulated and agreed prior to contract placement. NAPNOC has 
been introduced for major contracts valued at over £10 million. The price is derived 
from an analysis of historical financial data by the MOD and costing details from the 
companies selected to tender. The TCI method results in the contractor and the 
MOD sharing the risk of overruns in cost and savings against the agreed negotiated 
price. The TCI method involves the contractor providing detailed actual costings to 
the MOD before contract placement and during the period of the contract.
The nature of a competitive tender requires that there exists a specification of the 
item or service required and when the contract has been placed the prime contractor 
company is responsible for project management, with reduced project management 
by the Government. As competitive procurement become the norm the defence 
industry's project management is becoming less interactive with Government. The 
published literature has not examined the implications of the firm-fixed price, the 
firm-fixed contractual requirement for the firm-fixed technical specification and the 
Government's (i.e. the customer's) need to change the technical requirement as the 
programme of work progresses in the defence industry (i.e. to change the purchase 
order as the goods are being designed or produced by the supplier).
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The payment terms for both competitive and non-competitive contracts are also 
becoming influenced by the Governments more commercial approach, with payments 
being related to attainment of specific milestones or successful completion of 
identified work packages. By 1990 the "costs plus percentage" contractual 
arrangements as opposed to firm fixed price contracts had been reduced to 4% by 
value of UK defence contracts to industry (Statement on the Defence Estimates, 
1991).
A major consideration for industry which is not covered in the literature and which 
results from the increased competitive aspect is the ownership of intellectual property 
rights associated with an equipment which has had substantial investment for 
development. There are increasingly instances of firms paying for and developing 
high technology defence equipment, the ownership of their intellectual property rights 
is established and the Government will not allow the sale and export of that 
equipment. The published literature has not addressed this issue.
4.2 THE IEPG AND COLLABORATIVE PROGRAMMES
In the publication "Towards a Stronger Europe", the Independent European 
Programme Group, IEPG, has reviewed the national defence equipment requirements 
and identified areas for collaboration. An aim is to permit the most efficient use of 
funding for research and development and procurement. For example by avoiding 
unnecessary duplication and by encouraging standardisation and interoperability of 
equipment.
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The recommendations of the IEPG include:
The creation of a more open competitive defence market in Europe.
Support of international mergers of European defence industries, to assist in 
the rationalisation and restructuring of the industrial base.
Agreement on common operational requirements.
Systematic cooperation between European countries in military research and 
development and production.
Assistance to less developed European nations to develop defence technology 
and industrial capability.
Smith in RUSI (1993) reports that the formulation of a European Defence Union 
which would introduce competitive purchasing or centralised procurement, would 
save 20 per cent on arms purchases which represents a saving of $10 billion a year 
for the Western European Union countries.
Defence suppliers are entering into European joint ventures and collaborations, an 
example being the German, Italian and UK initiative to develop and produce the 
Tornado multi-role combat aircraft. The Eurogroup publication (1988) lists the major 
collaborative projects within NATO in 1988 and these are shown in Table 4.2.
RUSI (1996) and RUSI (1992) examined the advantages and disadvantages in 
collaboration on defence equipment procurement. RUSI (1996) noted that the 
arrangements for UK participation in collaborative defence contracts are 
unsatisfactory in several respects. Weston in RUSI (1993) pointed out that in a
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national emergency, such as in the Falklands crisis and the Gulf conflict, British 
industry's ability to provide rapid engineering modifications was crucial, and that a 
domestic industry was able to provide a more effective response to crisis than was 
likely to be achieved by an overseas manufacturer. Weston in RUSI (1993) also notes 
that in the cases where US and UK forces were active together then US 
manufacturers would assign priority to the needs of the US forces before those of the 
UK forces.
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TABLE 4.2 Major collaborative projects within NATO in 1988
EQUIPMENT COLLABORATIVE
PROGRAMME
COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING
NAVAL EQUIPMENT IN PRODUCTION TRIPARTITE MINEHUNTER, 
PARIS SONAR,
SEA GNAT DECOY
BE/FR/NL
LAND EQUIPMENT IN PRODUCTION FH70 HOWITZER, GE/IT/UK
SCORPION BE/UK
RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE, BE/FR
RITA COMMUNICATIONS, 
MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET 
SYSTEM.
FR/GE/IT/UK/US
AIRCRAFT IN PRODUCTION JAGUAR, FR/UK
TORNADO, GE/IT/UK,
LYNX HELICOPTER, FR/UK
PUMA HELiCOPTER, FR/UK
GAZELLE HELICOPTER FR/UK
MISSILES IN PRODUCTION MARTEL AIR TO SURFACE, FR/UK/,
MILAN ANTI-TANK, FR/GE/UK,
SIDEWINDER AIR-TO-AIR. GE/IT/NO/UK/US
NAVAL EQUIPMENT RESEARCH AND MINESWEEPER, BE/NL,
DEVELOPMENT NATO FRIGATE 
REPLACEMENT.
CA/FR/GE/IT/NL/SP/UK/US.
LAND EQUIPMENT RESEARCH AND COBRA COUNTER BATTERY FR/GE/UK,
DEVELOPMENT RADAR,
MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET 
SYSTEM PHASE III.
FR/GE/UK/US
AIRCRAFT RESEARCH AND EUROPEAN FIGHTER GE/IT/SP/UK
DEVELOPMENT AIRCRAFT, IT/UK,
EH101 NAVAL ASW IT/NL/SP/UK,
HELICOPTER,
A129 LIGHT ATTACK 
HELICOPTER, 
PAH2/HAC ANTI-TANK 
HELICOPTER
FR/GE
MISSILES RESEARCH AND TRIGAT THIRD GENERATION FR/GE/UK,
DEVELOPMENT ANTI-TANK GUIDED GE/NO/UK,
WEAPON, BE/FR,
BE=BELGIUM ADVANCED SHORT RANGE CA/FR/GE/IT/SP/UK/US.
CA=CANADA AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE,
DE=DENMARK MISTRAL SHORT RANGE
FR=FRANCE SURFACE-TO-AIR,
GE=GERMANY MODULAR STAND-OFF
IT=ITALY
NL=NETHERLANDS
NO=NORWAY
SP=SPAIN
UK=UNITED KINGDOM 
US=UNITED STATES
WEAPON.
SOURCE: NATO Eurogroup (1988), p. 11
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4.3 COLLABORATIONS AND COMMONALITY OF EQUIPMENT
The operational need for commonality and interoperability of defence equipment was 
pointed out in the Defence Committee's July 91 report "Preliminary Lessons of 
Operation Granby". This requirement applies to joint operations where more than 
one of the Services (army, navy, airforce) of the same nation participate and to 
combined operations where the forces of various nations work together.
Hartley (1987), considers that collaborative programmes are not necessarily the most 
cost-effective strategy for governments. He points out that (i) collaborative 
agreements incorporate work-sharing between the participating countries, which 
reduces the economies of scale that the collaboration tries to achieve, (ii) there is an 
additional administrative cost of collaborating and (iii) there is compromise of 
operational requirements between the countries. Difficulties in defence equipment 
collaboration have been illustrated (Electronics Times, 23 January 1992, p. 10) in the 
European Fighter Aircraft, EFA project and in the ASRAAM/AMRAAM missile 
systems collaboration. In the case of ASRAAM/AMRAAM, a Memorandum of 
Understanding was agreed in 1980 between the USA who would develop an 
Advanced Medium Range Anti-air Missile, AMRAAM and Europe who would 
develop the Advanced Short Range Anti-air Missile, with 45% for the UK, 45% for 
Germany and 10% for Norway. The Memorandum of Understanding provided the 
separate USA and European developments of the two systems followed by the right 
to purchase the other's system. After ten years the USA had completed the 
development of the medium range AMRAAM missile, but the European ASRAAM
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development had not started because the governments of the UK, Germany and 
Norway were not able to reach agreement on the specifications. The USA have 
advised it wants to withdraw from the 1980 MOU agreement. Similar difficulties 
have been experienced (Electronics Times, 11 June 1992, p. 14) on the European 
Fighter Aircraft collaboration between Italy, Germany, UK and Spain, where the 
countries have different operational requirements, timing of requirements and budget 
priorities. The different and often changing requirements of the customers i.e. of the 
government of the countries in a collaboration, lead to difficulties for the 
collaborating suppliers, i.e. the defence industries participating in the collaboration.
Greinke (1992) reported that international collaboration in production of armaments 
had been successful up to the end of the Cold War, but the financial world-wide 
recession current in 1992 and political instability were encouraging national 
protectionism. He pointed out that the USA were actively pursuing collaborative 
programmes on armaments research, development and production with Canada, 
European NATO countries and other close allies, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Korea and 
Australia. He quantifies the benefit of collaboration in terms of a "power factor" 
defined as the value added to a project by carrying out the project through 
international collaboration.
Moravcsik (1989) described the options for the procurement of weapon systems in 
order of increasing national independence as (1) the import of weapons from a 
supplier country, (ii) the co-production of weapons under license from a foreign 
country, (iii) the co-development involving design and production of weapons in a
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co-operative arrangement with another country and (iv) the domestic design and 
production of the weapon. Moravcsik (1989) pointed out that European countries 
procured the majority of weapons at home despite the associated high costs for 
example the UK and France purchasing 70 to 80% domestically together with 5 to 
10% imports and 15 to 20% licensed production mainly from USA and international 
(mainly European) co-development projects. The preference for domestic production 
was supported by preferential arrangements including subsidies to domestic 
companies and was justified on military, political and economic grounds.
Creasey in Creasey and May (1988) found that in economic terms the most 
successful European collaborative programmes in defence procurement had not been 
genuine joint ventures but were primarily concerned with production and marketing 
arrangements, and excluded the precompetitive research and design phase. She points 
out that maximum economic benefit from collaboration in defence procurement 
would be realisable from collaboration in research and development. Agreements 
for collaborative programmes were frequently based on the existing level of market 
share of the companies involved rather than on the product design and development 
which resulted in the cooperative agreements being twenty or so years out of date 
because the markets were product led.
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4.4 COLLABORATION IN EUROPEAN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Moravcsik (1989) reported that some European collaborative projects particularly 
between France and West Germany were set up partly for diplomatic benefits for 
example the Franco-German wish to accelerate reconciliation in the 1950s and the 
plan outlined by Helmut Schmidt and Valerey Giscard d'Estaing to strengthen 
security collaboration during the 1970s.
Difficulties and impediments to international collaborations have been studied at the 
NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors. Parry (1991) has described 
how in 1989 the European members of NATO gave approval to a collaborative 
research and development initiative, European Cooperation for the Long term 
Defence EUCLID, recommended by the Independent European Program Group. The 
IEPG recognised that there were deficiencies and duplication in defence spending 
within the European NATO countries. The IEPG sought to overcome the difficulties 
experienced in previous research collaborations and with industrialists and 
governments the IEPG drew up the EUCLID Memorandum of Understanding which 
was signed by the nations' defence ministers. EUCLID is divided into eleven major 
technology areas, known as Common European Priority Areas or CEP As. Parry 
(1991) has noted that the areas defined as CEP As coincide with the priority 
technology research areas defined by the USA Department of Defence.
The Common European Priority Areas as listed in Table 4.4, are assigned a leading 
coordinating nation, which acts as a convener within the participating countries.
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TABLE 4.4 The common European priority areas within EUCLID
TECHNOLOGY CONVENER NATION
CEPA 1 Modem Radar Technology Germany
CEPA 2 Silicon Microelectronics France
CEPA 3 Composite Structures Netherlands
CEPA 4 Modular Avionics None allocated by 1991
CEPA 5 Electric Gun United Kingdom
CEPA 6 Artificial Intelligence France
CEPA 7 Signature Manipulation Spain
CEPA 8 Opto-electronic Devices Italy
CEPA 9 Satellite Surveillance Technology Norway and France
CEPA 10 Underwater Detection and 
Related Technology
United Kingdom
CEPA 11 Human Factors Technology Not identified
Source: Table summary by present author from text of Barry (1991)
The general terms and conditions for EUCLID projects were outlined in the 
Memorandum of Understanding. Each priority area contains a number of research 
and technology projects, RTPs, each RTP having a lead nation with a group of 
international collaborators. Each nation funds its own industrial and laboratory 
participants. The agreement provided by the Memorandum of Understanding states 
that results of the research are made available for evaluation and for use by the 
governments within the IEPG.
Haystead (1991) has concluded that EUCLID has not succeeded due to nationalism 
and that the technologically leading European countries will not risk the development
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of any critical defence technology to another nation. He reports that the leading 
European industrialists, encouraged by their own governments, have persued research 
programmes independently from the EUCLID initiative. Unattributable sources in 
UK industry report that the high cost of progress reporting and the complexity of 
EUCLID project administration are deterrents against participating in EUCLID.
4.5 CONCLUSIONS
1. The change in equipment procurement policy of governments in the West has 
resulted in companies becoming more selective and more specialised, 
resulting in fewer firms bidding and less competition for defence contracts.
2. It is becoming almost impossible for individual countries to solely fund 
research and development for new products because the costs are prohibitive. 
Companies in Europe, encouraged by government initiatives, are increasingly 
pursuing collaborations and joint ventures, in both technology research and 
in major weapon system development and production. A disadvantage is that 
nations may find it necessary to compromise their own national requirements 
to fit a common development end product, for example the European Fighter 
Aircraft.
3. Alliances such as NATO are seeking commonality and interoperability 
between equipments of different countries' forces. This is another factor in 
encouraging collaborations and joint ventures between nations.
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5. DIVERSIFICATION
Johnson and Scholes(1988) investigated diversification as a corporate strategy and 
broadly classified the different forms as backwards, forwards and horizontal 
diversification and the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing a diversification 
policy. They were not examining the defence industry, but their observations apply 
to the diversification activities being pursued by the defence industry :
1) Backward diversification - development of activity of inputs to a company's 
current business, for example raw material supply or component supply. An 
example of this is seen in the defence industry where GEC purchased Plessey 
and gained the strategically important gallium arsenide semiconductor 
component business. An advantage of such a diversification is the control of 
supply of a strategically important component.
2) Forward diversification - development of activity associated with the output 
of a company's present activity, for example a subsystem supplier becoming 
involved in a system business activity, or a servicing activity. There are very 
few examples of forward diversification in the defence industry, because 
generally defence equipment suppliers do not have the resources to progress 
into the business of building military platforms such as aircraft, tanks or 
ships. An exception is GEC who have purchased a ship building company, 
Yarrow Shipbuilders. The defence companies, both equipment and platform 
companies have always carried out servicing of their products. As defence
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budgets decrease, countries will maintain their high value equipment rather 
than replace them, so the servicing and maintenance sector may become 
proportionally more important to defence companies than previously.
3) Horizontal diversification - development of activities which are competitive 
with or complementary to the company's current activities. Several defence 
companies are diversifying their product ranges into the civil markets. 
Defence companies will find it difficult to diversify horizontally into new 
defence technology areas such as stealth and anti-stealth, millimetre wave 
radars, monolithic microwave circuitry, lasers or infra-red technology, where 
they have not already invested in the necessary 10 to 20 year lead-in 
development phase. This is the generally accepted timescale to ramp up a 
technology into a military product. Companies can manoeuvre into a new 
military business area by taking up a technology transfer licence from another 
company, by acquisition of a specialist company or by a joint venture to 
obtain the technology.
5.1 CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION
E.R.Biggadike, as a Ph.D. student at the Harvard Business School, studied forty 
corporate diversification business activities and his thesis was published as a book 
by the Harvard University Press (Biggadike, 1979). The study covered the entry by 
established corporate companies into product markets where they had not previously 
competed.
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5.1.1. Importance of diveisification for corporate growth
Biggadike (1979) cites Penrose (1959) in his assessment that corporate diversification 
is an important source of future growth and profitability and that diversification has 
provided corporate continued growth over periods up to fifty, seventy-five and eighty 
years. Biggadike (1979) cited the example of the USA company General Electric 
which started in the 1890s with a single product of incandescent lamps and had risen 
by diversification into more than seven hundred product markets, achieving a sales 
level of $17.5B per annum in 1977.
Salter and Weinhold (1979) summarised the reasons for companies considering 
diversification:
Companies wish to balance out the effects of decline or cycles in sales and 
profits of existing mature businesses.
There may be a wish to benefit from the business ideas and technologies 
generated by or evolving from the parent company's research and 
development.
There may be a desire to more fully use the company's resources, for example 
the company may wish to diversify in order to make more use of the business 
skills of the top management, or the company may wish to market a new 
range of products through an existing distribution system.
A company may seek to diversify in order to avoid a takeover.
Competitive pressure or the desire to more fully serve existing customers may 
lead to diversification.
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Companies wishing to expand may be prevented by government anti-trust 
laws from expanding into business areas too closely related to their core 
business activities and therefor the companies may seek diversification as an 
alternative route to growth.
Conglomerates may wish to diversify by acquisition in order to build a 
balanced portfolio of businesses.
5.1.2. The difficulty of eoiporate diversification
The study carried out by Biggadike (1979) followed forty diversification activities 
over the first two, four and eight years after entry. He found that on average a 
diversification business would take eight years to reach profitability and by 
extrapolating the results of the first eight years he concluded that it would take 
twelve years to achieve the level of profitability of a mature business. A summary 
of the financial performance measured by Biggadike (1979) is shown in Table 1. He 
pointed out that the samples studied were the survivors after the initial two, four and 
eight year periods and the results showed that corporate diversification is extremely 
difficult. He presumed that a study of the performance of all corporate 
diversifications attempted, including closed and surviving diversifications, would 
yield even worse results.
Biggadike (1979) noted that in the samples studied, there was a lack of entrants into 
mature markets. He cited Marris (1964) who noted that the reason given by 
companies for avoiding diversification into mature markets is that the conflict with
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the incumbent competitors would be too intense and that managers perceive higher 
risks in entering mature markets.
TABLE 1. Summary of financial performance of forty entrant businesses over the 
first eight yean and comparison of financial performances of entrant businesses with 
established businesses.
Financial measure, 
per cent 
Mean values
Years 1 and 2 Years 3 and 4 Years 5 and 6 Years 6 and 7 Established 
businesses, 
average age 
18 years
Pretax return on 
investment
-78 -43 -5 5 21
Pretax return on 
sales.
-94 -35 -13 1 10
Ratio cash flow / 
sales
-127 -50 -10 -5 2
Ratio gross 
margin / sales
12 26 22 24 27
Source: table by current author adapted from table by Biggadike (1979) p. 56.
The business activities studied by Biggadike (1979) were those where the business 
units entered product markets new to the parent company. He points out that there 
are several examples in the public domain of corporate ventures taking about eight 
years to become profitable and he cited
the case of Singer who tried unsuccessfully for ten years to diversify into 
business machines. The business activity was still unprofitable in 1975 and 
the business area was closed.
National Cash Registers reported $60M losses in 1972 primarily due to its 
entry into the computer business.
in 1972 General Foods wrote-off $39M as a result of its entry into fast-food 
chains.
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Biggadike (1979) reported that he carried out a second study covering a different 
sample of nearly thirty corporate diversifications and he found very similar results 
to those reported in his first study.
5.1.3. Performance
Biggadike assessed financial performance of diversification businesses in terms of 
return on investment, cash flew over investment, gross margin over sales revenues 
and return on sales. Market performance was measured in terms of absolute and 
relative market share.
He found that the performance of corporate diversification businesses varied 
depending on the following characteristics:
relatedness between the new entrant business and that of the parent company, 
the market entered, 
the entry strategy and
the reaction of competing companies already in that business.
A major conclusion was that diversification businesses should seek a high share of 
the served market. In particular he demonstrated that entrant businesses which had 
set higher prices than those of competitors had poorer financial performance than 
those that had matched competitors' prices. Biggadike (1979) cited the work of 
Buzzel,Gale,and Sultan (1975) and Fruhan (1972) which showed that those businesses
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with high market share had higher return on investment than those businesses with 
low market share, but market share building is accompanied by poor short term 
financial performance.
The benefits of higher market share summarised by Buzzel, Gale and Sultan (1975) 
and cited by Biggadike (1979) were:
The profit on sales rises sharply with increasing market share, but at the same 
time an increasing market share had small impact on the investment turnover. 
Businesses with high market share have a lower purchases to sales ratio than 
businesses with a low market share.
The marketing to sales ratio declines with increasing market share. 
Businesses with higher market share were able to sell their products at higher 
relative prices than businesses with lower market share. The high market 
share businesses offered higher quality products and services than low market 
share businesses.
5.1.4. Relatedness between the new entrant business and that of the parent company 
and the impact on performance.
Biggadike (1979) classified five different types of relatedness based on functional 
skills, between the new entrant business and the parent company: 
technology, 
scale economy,
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marketing,
vertical integration, and 
conglomerate relatedness.
Technology relatedness. Biggadike (1979) considered that corporate research often 
created additional business opportunities and therefore is a most likely basis for 
diversification. An example quoted was the entry by Hewlett-Packard into the hand 
held calculator business.
Scale economy relatedness. Some manufacturing processes and manufacturing 
plants can be modified or extended to allow entry in similar markets and examples 
are commonly seen in paper, textile and clothing industries. Biggadike (1979) cited 
the examples of Kimberly-Clark’s diversification into diapers with paper diapers and 
the entry of chemical companies into the chlorine business.
Marketing relatedness. Biggadike (1979) noted that a high level of expertise has 
been developed in some companies in marketing, for example in
serving a particular type of customer
differentiating their products
low cost distribution and servicing
exploitation of famous brand names and in the use of mass-media 
communications.
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Examples of diversifications through market relatedness were Gillette's entry into 
disposable lighters and felt-tip pens, which were marketed through Gillette's mass 
merchandising outlets.
Vertical integration relatedness. Biggadike (1979) described vertical integration as 
resulting from adding a stage of production or service to the company's original 
business operation. Vertical integration has the potential advantages of lower costs 
through technology sharing, better distribution through supplementing ’he established 
distribution markets and higher added-value by assembling an end-product rather than 
a component of that product. Biggadike (1979) cited the example of Texas 
Instruments who were the world's largest supplier of semiconductor integrated circuits 
and who extended their business by vertical integration to the hand-held calculator 
business.
Conglomerate relatedness. Biggadike (1979) considered that financial skills resident 
in conglomerates have been the source of much diversification activity, as opposed 
to the technology, manufacturing and marketing skills in industry. The 
conglomerates will enter into a new business because the parent conglomerate has 
funds available for investment and because the new business shows attractive growth. 
The entry may also be to complete the conglomerate's portfolio of businesses. The 
entrant business is tied into the conglomerate in the use of central management 
services and in investment funding, rather than in commonality of technology, 
manufacturing or marketing operations.
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Biggadike (1979) found commonality in forward integration entrants and technology 
entrants in that they were early entrants into a product market and were therefore 
strongly involved in market development:
both had probably entered markets at an earlier stage than marketing entrants, 
both were in more rapid market growth areas.
both offered incremental innovations, whereas marketing entrants offered 
products very similar to their competitors.
both groups showed high research and development costs to sales ratios.
Despite the similarities listed above it was found that the forward integration entrants 
performed poorly in comparison to the technology entrants. Differences were found 
between forward integration entrants and technology entrants;
Forward integration entrants provided the lowest quality, the highest 
marketing to sales ratio, negotiated the worse price/cost contracts, provoked 
the highest level of competitor reaction and held the lowest utilisation of 
capacity.
Forward level integration entrants were likely to be seen as competitors by 
former customers and therefore provoked the highest level of competitor 
reaction.
Forward integration entrants do not benefit from technology knowledge within 
the parent company and have less knowledge of the technology and 
manufacturing skills and have less marketing experience in their chosen
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market, than the technology entrants.
Biggadike's conclusion (Biggadike, 1979) was that the marketing knowledge on 
design, pricing, servicing and selling the product in the chosen market is a more 
important factor in achieving good performance than a very detailed knowledge of 
an input component in the chosen product area.
Biggadike (1979) referred to the conclusion of Rumelt (1974) that corporate 
companies which pursued a strategy of dominant vertical integration performed less 
well financially than highly diversified corporate companies. Biggadike observed that 
the strategy of dominant vertical integration would result in the highest level of 
frequency of vertical integration entrants.
5.1.5. The market entered and the impact on performance.
Biggadike (1979) considered how the type of market entered had an impact on 
performance. His observations are summarised here:
1. Markets with a low number of established sellers are characterised by a
heightened sense of rivalry and the established competitors, feeling more
directly threatened may react to restrict the entrant business.
2. Biggadike (1979) examined the stages of maturity of the markets being
entered, the introductory, growth, maturity and declining stages and the 
characteristics of diversification into those markets :
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Introductory stage. Twenty eight per cent of the sample of entrants studied 
entered markets at the introductory stage, where the median market growth 
rate was estimated to be 13% per annum. The entrants faced a market 
development task rather than a market penetration task. The performance 
showed a higher marketing to sales ratio and a higher research and 
development cost to sales ratio, than entrants into more mature businesses. 
It was considered that primary demand for the product was just starting and 
that potential users would not be familiar with the product.
Growth stage. Thirty-seven per cent of the sample of the entrants studied 
entered markets at the growth stage, which has the benefit of market 
momentum, with an estimated total market growth rate of 15% per annum. 
Biggadike (1979) considered that the risks were lower than at the introductory 
stage, because the risks of innovation had passed, for example in the 
uncertainty of manufacturing technology and in the uncertainty of product 
acceptance. Companies also considered that the sales price in a growth 
business was more elastic than the sales price in a mature business and that 
the planned volume share should be easily attained because there was not the 
need to win custom from current incumbent businesses. It was considered 
that the technology and the market competitive structure were still changing.
Maturity. Fifteen per cent of the sample of entrants studied entered mature 
markets and the median total growth rate was estimated to be 3% per annum. 
Entrants faced the disadvantage that the demand is fairly price inelastic. The
Page 130
Chapter 5
entrant is addressing a market penetration task in a mature market, in contrast 
to a market development task in the introductory stage. It was considered 
that potential users would be familiar with the products and that the 
technology and the competitive market structure is stable.
Declining market. None of the entrants studied by Biggadike(1979) was 
attempting to enter a market in decline.
5.1.6. The entry strategy and the impact on performance
Biggadike (1979) found that companies which sought a low initial market share in 
their diversification business performed badly in terms of achieving market 
objectives, in comparison with those businesses which sought high market share. In 
terms of market performance most (75%) low-market-share entrants did not achieve 
their market share objective, whereas fifty per cent of the high-market-share entrants 
did achieve their market share objective.
Biggadike (1979) found that entrants pursuing a strategy of shorter product lines, 
narrower served market segments, lower marketing budgets, higher prices and higher 
quality than established competitors achieved lower market shares than their 
competitors.
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5.1.7. The reaction of competing companies already in that business and the impact 
on performance.
Biggadike's financial and market performance analysis (Biggadike, 1979) showed that 
the level of reaction by competitors is strongly linked to the entrant’s performance. 
The entrants which experienced no competitor reaction showed better financial 
performance but poorer market performance than those experiencing high levels of 
competitor reaction. The level of reaction by established companies was determined 
by the magnitude of their market share loss to the new entrant.
Biggadike (1979) noted that the marketing entrants experienced the lowest level of 
reaction by competitors. The reasons for this were summarised :
marketing entrants generally do not set new standards of products or services 
which offered incremental innovation and which established competitors 
might perceive as a threat.
market entrants entered later in the product cycle than forward integration or 
technology entrants and the median growth rate of the market they entered 
was at a lower growth rate, 25%, compared to 35% and 39% growth rates of 
the markets entered by forward integration and technology entrants. The 
established competitors appeared less likely to perceive a new entrant as a 
threat in a lower growth rate market.
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marketing entrants entered with the lowest scale of production. The 
established competitor considered that the maximum threat to his turnover 
was related to the scale of production of the new entrant and in the case of 
the marketing entrant this was not perceived to be significant.
5.2 DIVERSIFICATION INTO CIVIL MARKETS
Defence companies are examining the options of diversifying into civil markets with 
varying degrees of success. Major problems to be overcome can be lack of 
distribution networks, back-up servicing structure and commercial brand recognition. 
The existing high fixed overhead in defence companies required to support the 
complex administrative requirements of defence contracting are not compatible with 
the civil side of civil/military business. Kiely (1990) has observed that a number of 
major defence companies intend not to diversify from their established markets and 
he cited Lockheed of Canada which will continue with electronic warfare business 
and Yarrow Shipping which has no intention of diversifying from building warships 
and developing military products.
Several defence companies are applying military technology to civil products and 
applications :
satellite communications for television, direct broadcast by satellite, 
e.g. GEC Marconi (NEDC 1992) 
global positioning by satellite
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encryption for secure communications 
fibre optics communications 
robotics
autonomous guidance e.g. GEC Autoguide (Sunday Times 28-10-90, p. 11) 
surveillance and security e.g.Racal (NEDC 1992) 
intelligent systems e.g. Sira (NEDC 1992)
aerospace and aeronautics e.g. GEC Avionics (Electronics Times 16-1-92,p. 11) 
radars and collision avoidance
e.g. GEC Marconi (Evening Standard, 20-2-92 article by Sarah Fairbaim)
5.3 DIVERSIFICATION IN THE UK DEFENCE INDUSTRY
The National Economic Development Council in London carried out a survey in 1991 
on the diversification activities of British defence companies. The report, National 
Economic Development Council, 1991, summarised the lessons learned by the 
companies and presented case studies of diversification by ten defence companies: 
British Aerospace Enterprises 
British Aerospace Military Aircraft Limited 
The Dowty Group 
Easams Limited 
GEC Marconi Limited
Integrated Networks (Northern Telecom Limited)
Logica
Racal Avionics Limited
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Redifon Limited 
Sira Limited
The diversification activities of the companies reported in the National Economic 
Development Council publication are shown in Table 5.3 .
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TABLE 5.3 Diversification activities of ten UK defence companies
BRITISH DEFENCE COMPANY DIVERSIFICATION ACTIVITY
British Aerospace Enterprises Ltd.
Turnover of parent company Bae. f  10540M in 
1990.
A management company co-ordinating 
activities in Bae operating companies.
Part acquisition, 49% ownership, of Kelsey Instruments. 
Manufacture of test and simulation equipment.
New company formed, Spectrum Technologies, whose business is 
based on laser excimer technology, for branding cables etc.
Promotion and financing of diversification activities in die British 
Aerospace companies.
British Aerospace Military Aircraft Ltd 
25,000 employees
Increased military exports.
Project management of total turnkey systems such as air defence 
systems.
Commercialisation of the company's own computer aided 
manufacturing system.
Provision of a test range, North Sea Combat Range, for hire to 
military forces.
Flying college.
Training aids and facilities, for example cockpit procedure trainers.
Dowty Group 
Turnover £7767M p.a. 
13000 employees
Solid lithium batteries, based on battery technology for military 
applications such as for sonobuoys.
There are plans to approach consultants to find markets for high 
technology pumps developed for aircraft engine afterburners.
Easams Limited 
Turnover £60M p.a.
1200 employees of which 310 were in non­
defence.
Custom software development, extension of military software 
capability, with applications in: 
leisure information stock control 
flight monitoring transport 
Eurobond transactions order processing
GEC Marconi Limited
Comprises 27 companies ,each self accounting. 
Turnover £2.85B in 1990/91 
Employees 57000
Direct broadcast satellite receivers for television, Design and 
manufacture were based on military technology and capability 
Marketing was through other companies well-established retail 
outfits.
Video telephone product was based on advanced technologies, 
ranging from microelectronics, data compression, man/machine 
interfaces.
Several other diversification activities, particularly in 
communications, are in the operating companies of GEC Marconi.
Integrated Networks (Northern Telecom Ltd) 
Turnover S1.92B in 1990/91
In 1992 die current military business was in military radio 
equipment and toughened strain cables for use in undersea mine 
detection. Diversification activity is directed towards finding civil 
markets for these products, for example communication networks 
in civilian shipping, emergency communication networks in times 
of disaster or national emergency.
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Logica Space and Defence Ltd 
Turnover £40M in 1990/91.
Defence business accounts for less than 60% 
of turnover.
The parent company Logica has turnover 
£198M in 1990/91.
UK and European space business, for example civil satellite 
command and control systems, com m and and control centre.
Verification consultancy for security systems, for example 
computer security evaluation.
Air traffic control and management systems.
Information technology for national and local government, for 
Customs etc.
Racal Avionics Limited 
Turnover £2.IB in 1990/91 
30000 employees
Acquisition of Chubb in 1984, whose business is security systems, 
safes, locks etc.
Civilian cellular communications, Racal Vodaphone.
Satellite communications for civil aircraft
Redifon Ltd 
Turnover £21M 
320 employees
The company was formed by management 
buy-out in May 1988 and the company 
business is in communications equipment, 
systems and services.
Design, manufacture and supply of high performance professional 
communications systems targeted at world markets:
Military radio communications.
Radio communications for transport, e.g. inductive loop warning 
systems for railways.
Data broadcasting, monitoring and control using radio 
communications.
Sira Limited
Turnover £10M in 1990/91
Sira specialises in development of high technology, high 
performance, unique systems.
Dynamic stress analysis equipment developed for military use e.g. 
for stress analysis of radar masts, is being applied to civil use for 
motor cars, engines, weld testing, airframe stress testing.
Laser pattern imager for measuring vibration in vehicles and 
power plants.
Testing night vision equipment, thermal imaging equipment for 
die armed forces.
Materials inspection systems for high throughput electronics 
manufacturing
etc.
Source: table by present author from National Economic Development Council (1991)
The findings from this British study were very similar to those by Degrasse 1987, 
who studied the diversification activities of six defence companies in the USA in the 
1960s and 1970s. The US report gave details of failures as well as successes in 
diversification but the British study detailed successes and then-current attempts at 
diversification. Kiely (1990) mentions some failures of British companies attempts 
at diversification such as manufacture of tractors and teapots, but made no analysis
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of the causes of failure.
The National Economic Development Council observed that successful diversification 
was based on the companies existing knowledge of the market area and or the 
technology or product. They cited only one example of diversification into a new 
market or technology, which was Easams who were part of the GEC Marconi 
Company and who launched a fourth generation language business area based on 
their existing software capability.
The main criteria for successful diversification stressed by the companies surveyed 
were the needs for :
cultural change
adequate financing for diversification
full understanding of the market and its requirements
CULTURAL CHANGE REQUIRED FOR DIVERSIFICATION FROM MILITARY 
TO CIVIL
The companies surveyed by the National Economic Development Council strongly 
emphasised the need for cultural change. In the military business the priorities had 
always been on meeting the technical specification, followed by meeting time-scales 
and with the least emphasis on completing the contract to cost. Even under fixed 
price military contracts the engineers derived job satisfaction from offering the most 
excellent solutions to complex technical problems. In civilian business the emphasis
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is on the best commercial deal which is available on time.
The following actions were identified as being characteristic of the cultural changes
needed.
1. New top level management was required to carry out changes in the timescale 
required. At the shop floor level existing facilities and personnel were used.
This is in contrast to the American study by Degrasse, 1978 who found that
a large proportion of staff and capital were not transferred to the civil 
diversification activity.
2. Dedicated civil project teams were set up.
3. Civil project teams were located separately from defence project teams to aid
project management and to promote the necessary change in culture.
4. Training in civil market demands.
5. Willingness to transfer existing key staff from military to civil projects and
recruitment of key staff where the posts could not be filled internally.
REQUIREMENT FOR ADEQUATE INVESTMENT FOR DIVERSIFICATION TO 
CIVIL BUSINESS
The companies surveyed by the National Economic Development Council, 1992 
reported that the diversification initiative required substantial investment. The key 
issues associated with the high level of investment were as follows.
1. The board of directors have to be committed to the strategy of diversification.
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2. All levels of the workforce should generate ideas for diversification, but the 
selection of ideas to pursue must be rigorous.
3. A thorough business case including the costs of the cultural change of the
company and the characteristics of the new market area must be rigorously 
analyzed and vetted by the company and by the financial backers.
4. The board should budget for the requirement in skills, to be acquired by 
training or recruitment.
5. While the diversification project is underway the board should monitor the 
technical progress and the cost-to-completion. In the case where the project 
is running over budget the board has to consider the consequences of 
additional finance and how the market is developing.
6. The board should regularly review the project management to determine the
optimum route for the project, for example in-house or contracted out 
development or production. Where projects do not fit into the company’s 
core-business the board must consider setting up a different business 
organisation.
7. Corporate corporations should benefit from the ability to act quickly and 
innovatively and simultaneously have access to the resources of a large 
contractor.
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REQUIREMENT TO UNDERSTAND THE DEMANDS OF THE NEW NON­
MILITARY MARKET
The National Economic Development Council 1992 report concludes that companies 
undertaking diversification into civil markets had to have thorough understanding of 
the new market demands. The report identified the following areas.
1. The company should have or acquire contacts and influence in the civil 
market that it is addressing. Acquiring contacts can be by the use of 
consultants, or by forming an alliance or joint venture with a company 
already experienced in the civil market. The National Economic 
Development Council 1992 noted that many of the UK companies surveyed 
had recruited senior marketing staff for their civil business.
2. The company must assess the rate of production that will be required and be 
prepared to subcontract production if necessary.
3. The company must have good competitor intelligence. It is very difficult for 
a company to compete in a new market against established competitors.
4. Defence companies often have a good understanding of quasi-govemmental 
customers and markets such as transport departments or police forces and 
therefore can succeed in these markets. Degrasse (1987) in studying 
diversification in US companies in the 1960s and 1970s made the same 
observation in that the US defence companies were familiar with the 
bureaucratic complexity and often technical complexity of federal contracting 
and found success in addressing federal markets such as air traffic control.
5. There are growth areas within the defence markets which should be assessed.
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An example given by the National Economic Development Council 1992 was 
the opportunity provided by the UK Ministry of Defence decision to 
contractorise repair and maintenance.
6. All the companies surveyed emphasised the need for staff training and the 
development of skills. An example of a necessary skill cited by the National 
Economic Development Council was the cosmetic design of products which 
has higher priority in civil rather than in military products.
GENERATION OF IDEAS FOR DIVERSIFICATION INTO CIVIL BUSINESS
The techniques used by the companies surveyed by the National Economic 
Development Board to generate ideas on diversification were : 
brainstorming,
formation of forward looking teams, 
employment of external consultants and
incentive schemes for senior management related to the success of their sector 
of the company.
Many defence companies have very strong research centres and the NEDC survey has 
reported that the companies' research centres have been the source of many ideas for 
diversification.
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5.4 PROPOSALS FOR A UK DEFENCE DIVERSIFICATION AGENCY
Proposals for a UK Defence Diversification Agency have come from the Labour 
Party (Electronics Times, No 633, 2 April 1992, p. 140) and the trade unions. The 
proposals began by suggesting setting up "altemative-use committees" at plant, 
district and regional levels. Interest in diversification was revived with the ending 
of the Cold War and the almost simultaneous realisation that the defence industry 
was suffering high levels of;job losses. Diversification became more attractive 
politically and was given a very high profile at the 1992 Labour Party Conference - 
although there was very little discussion as to how a DDA would operate. Three 
unions, the TGWU, IPMS and MSF and combined to make proposals for 
diversification. The Labour Party has been rather silent about the prospects for a 
DDA, seeming to prefer only low-key discussion.
The IPMS proposes a UK Defence Diversification Agency whose primary roles 
would be:
Providing assistance with product planning.
Assistance with the identification of new business opportunities. 
Encouraging private sector capital for diversification. Underwriting part of 
the risk on particular projects.
Provision of direct financial support, conditional on employment guarantees, 
the formation of joint diversification committees, profit sharing with DDA or 
regional authorities. Support for an EC agency for defence diversification is
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implicit.
A role in the direction of MoD and DTI research and a "clearing house" role 
in providing access to technological advice and enabling technologies.
The IPMS propose the DDA should be funded by a separate Vote under the Cabinet 
Office, split between diversification and administrative costs. Savings from the 
defence budget would be used to fund the DDA for a period of up to ten years. An 
assessment of the cash available has been calculated on the basis of a twenty percent 
reduction in defence spending by the year 2000, giving a figure for the Peace 
Dividend of £30.55 billions by the year 2000 (£21.9 billions at 1990-91 pounds).
5.5 DEFENCE DIVERSIFICATION IN USA
The technical press (for example IEEE Spectrum November 90, Defence News etc.) 
presents United States defence industry as currently reorganising and restructuring 
with much of the impetus for these developments coming from industry itself. The 
USA defence budget is expected to decline from its 1992 level by around 4 percent 
each year from 1993 to 1997, by which time it will have declined by 37 percent from 
its 1985 peak.
A literature survey (The Boston Study Group 1982, R.L.Kuhn 1984 and J.E.Lynch 
1987) shows that defence diversification activity in the USA is co-ordinated at the 
federal level, with federal agencies and legislation and also at the state level.
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USA FEDERAL AGENCIES
The Department of Defence, Office of Economic Adjustment and the Department of 
Commerce, Economic Development Administration are the two federal agencies that 
provide support and assistance to local communities affected by military base 
closures or reductions in military expenditure and do not directly support defence 
contractors seeking diversification (LYNCH 1987).
THE USA DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF ECONOMIC 
ADJUSTMENT
John E. Lynch, Associate Director of Economic Adjustment, Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, has edited a review of the USA defence diversification activity and the 
role of the DOD Office of Economic Adjustment from 1969 to 1987 (Lynch, 1987). 
The review found the defence spending was highly concentrated in specific locations: 
St Louis, Los Angeles, San Diego, Fort Worth, Seattle, Sunnyvale, Cincinnati, 
Bethpage, Marietta GA and Norfolk VA.,etc. and defence cut-backs have seriously 
impacted specific local communities. These findings correspond to results seen in 
the UK where defence industry cut-backs and military base closures have had heavy 
impact on local communities, such as Strathclyde (shipbuilding), Bristol and Wharton 
(British Aerospace) etc. In examining the recovery programmes of four communities 
which had experienced defence cut-backs, Wichita Ks., Huntsville Al., Taunton Ma. 
and Hagerstown Md. and one hundred communities in re-using former military bases, 
the review found that each location was unique in terms what was economically and 
politically possible and that federal support had to be flexible and appropriate to each 
situation.
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Within Lynch's review, Degrasse in Chapter 6 examined corporate conversion and 
diversification during the 1960s and 1970s in six defence companies in the USA, 
Kaman Aircraft, Acurex, Litton-Ingalls, Raytheon, Boeing-Vertol and Rohr Industries. 
He found that in general :
1. planning for diversification did not begin until after the companies had a 
reduction in defence orders and the planning did not involve those members 
of the workforce directly affected::
2. a large proportion of the existing staff and capital were not transferred to the 
civil diversification activity;
3. there were very few successes in establishing competitive positions in the 
civil markets;
4. the application of existing corporate technology to civil markets was an 
important technical factor in achieving success;
5. market research and planning improves the chances of successful 
diversification;
6. defence contractors tend to lack some skills of civilian industry such as cost- 
engineering, high volume production, commercial marketing, distribution and 
commercial customer service support such as installation and product 
servicing and maintenance. It was often necessary to gain these skills by 
methods of acquisition of companies or by recruitment of staff;
7. without a government assistance programme the process of diversification into 
a civilian market takes five to ten years before becoming profitable;
8. in general civilian products developed by defence companies tended to be
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over-designed and inadequate testing lead to quality/reliability problems.
These observations of defence industry behaviour in the 1960s and 1970s are still 
recognisable in the diversification activities in the 1990s (Kiely, 1990). Degrasse's 
study covered diversification from military into civil business and did not include the 
strategy of diversification into wider military export markets. An important and 
significant observation by Degrasse is that government subsidy can be a source of 
instability in anticipating future civilian markets. This observation would appear to 
re-enforce a comment by the UK Secretary of Defence, Tom King, who was reported 
as opposing the proposal for a UK Defence Diversification Agency and considered 
that the defence industry would have thought of civil products to be made and would 
have implemented any practical ideas without government influence (Electronics 
Times, p. 14, 2 April 1992).
The primary purpose of the Office of Economic Adjustment is to provide assistance 
to the community where there are military base closures. In the UK the USA Office 
of Economic Adjustment have been actively involved with the UK government's 
Scottish Office via the Highlands & Islands Enterprise Initiative to address the 
problems which are likely to arise as a result of the closure of the US Navy base at 
Dunoon in the Cowal area (Cowal Task Force, 1991). The recommendations being 
made in 1992 closely follow those outlined in Lynch's review and call for community 
and regional initiatives rather than central government action. The recommendations 
are centred on the setting up of a central Task Force together with a number of 
subcommittees or working groups to consider specific issues such as human
Page 147
Chapter 5
resources, housing, environmental impact, economic development, education and 
training.
USA STATE SUPPORT FOR DIVERSIFICATION
Both Democrat and Republican state legislation provides support for defence 
diversification. There is no consistent pattern in the types of support being offered 
by the separate states. Friedman and Culbertson (in Chapter 12 of Lynch 1987) have 
detailed some of tbs state economic development programmes.
The state of Connecticut has probably been the most successful state in planning for 
defence cut-backs. The Connecticut Product Development Corporation was 
established in 1972 in response to the defence cuts at the end of the Vietnam War. 
In 1989 this organisation was transformed into a non-profit development agency, the 
Connecticut Innovations Inc. The State has provided $2 million via Connecticut 
Innovations Inc to assist the defence industry to diversify. An example of a 
diversification programme under the scheme is the civil market application by the 
company Dataproducts of a computer-based military communications equipment.
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5.6 SWORDS INTO PLOUGHSHARES
Some notable examples of diversification, of turning "swords into ploughshares" 
(Bible, Isaiah, 45:18) have been vividly illustrated in the media, for example Daily 
Mail, 31 October 1991, p. 7, which described how Hungarian fire-fighting machines 
were successfully used to put out oil well fires in Kuwait at the end of the Gulf War. 
The retreating Iraqi troops had set fire to hundreds of oil wells in Kuwait and teams 
of fire-fighters from the USA, including the famous team lead by Red Adair, were 
tasked with dealing with the problem. An Hungarian team brought firefighting 
equipment built from a Russian T.34 tank chassis and two Russian MiG-21 jet 
engines and powered by 800 gallons of aviation fuel. The engines blasted atomised 
water jets at 600 m.p.h. and spectacularly extinguished the oil well fires in 4 seconds 
to 4 minutes.
IEEE Spectrum, November 1989, mentions that Czechoslovakia has a programme to 
scrap 100 tanks (T-55 type) into tractors for farming co-operatives. The Pepsi Cola 
company in New York accepted a negotiation for a cruiser and 17 submarines for 
scrap metal in partial payment for cola soft drink production at 22 factories in the 
USSR.
As more defence companies begin to consider diversification, a higher proportion of 
industry's self-funded R&D budget is being diverted from defence technology to more 
commercial technology and short term commercial development.
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5.7 ADDRESSING THE UPGRADE PROGRAMME MARKET
As countries are following a strategy to maintain and upgrade rather than to replace 
their high value military platforms such as tanks, ships and aircraft, the defence 
industry is turning more attention to the expanding military upgrade market (Kiely, 
1990). Kiely (1990) also reports that defence companies seeking to diversify into new 
markets for existing products are seeking international business opportunities. This 
has been seen in the aggressive thrust into European markets by the USA defence 
companies. A major arms trade has built up in exports from the Developed World 
to the Third World and the Emerging Nations.
Defence publishing houses have predicted an interest by industry in the upgrade 
market and there are new journals (such as Defence Systems Modernisation published 
by Granville Publications Ltd of Southampton) aimed at announcing the status of 
nations' upgrade programmes.
5.8 TREATY VALIDATION INDUSTRY
Some defence companies are addressing the opportunities provided by treaty 
verification. The scrapping and conversion of military equipment and capability has 
been of particular interest after the Gulf War. Adam (1988) has described several 
different types of sensor and inspection technology used for treaty validation.
Zorpette (1992) described how surveillance technology identified one of Iraq's most
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important nuclear sites at A1 Tarmiya. During the Gulf War the building at A1 
Tarmiya was lightly damaged by two Hellfire missiles. Within a few days aerial 
surveillance showed intense activity of hundreds of people repairing the site, which 
confirmed the strategic importance of A1 Tarmiya. A few days later the site was 
deliberately targeted by B-52 bombers. Since the end of the Gulf War, Iraq was 
found to have violated the Non Prolification Treaty by making nuclear material. 
Through the efforts of treaty validation teams, it was believed that most nuclear 
^weapon facilities in Iraq have been identified and dismantled.
TABLE 5.8 shows there were seventeen major multilateral arms control agreements 
at 1 January 1990.
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TABLE 5.8 Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements at January 1990
AGREEMENTS NUMBER OF PARTIES
1925 Geneva Protocol 125
Antarctic Treaty 39
Partial Test Ban Treaty 119
Outer Space Treaty 93
Treaty of Tlatelolco 23
Additional Protocol 13
Additional Protocol 115
Non-Proliferation Treaty 141
NPT safeguards agreements (non-nuclear 
weapon states)
82
Sea-Bed Treaty 83
BW Convention 112
Enmod Convention 55
"Inhumane Weapons" Convention 32
Treaty of Raretonga 11
Protocol 1 0
Protocol 2 2
Protocol 3 2
Source SIPRI Yearbook 1990, p. 638-9
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5.9 CONCLUSIONS
1. Studies in corporate diversification have shown that industrial diversification 
is extremely difficult and that on average a diversification activity takes eight 
years to become profitable and twelve years to achieve the level of 
profitability of a mature business. Poor results of diversification businesses 
are often due to attempting to enter the market on too small a scale and 
failing to set sufficiently aggressive goals.
2. Most defence companies have attempted to diversify into new markets. In 
civil business some military companies are attempting to apply military 
technology to federal markets such as anti-drugs, customs control, flre-
• fighting, crime prevention, aviation and communications. Defence companies 
are familiar with the complexities of dealing with the requirements of 
government administration and therefore consider that they may have an 
advantage in winning government business.
3. Defence companies seeking to diversify into new markets for existing 
products are seeking international business opportunities. This has been seen 
in the aggressive thrust into European markets by the USA defence 
companies. A major arms trade has built up in exports from the Developed 
World to the Third World and the Emerging Nations.
4. Defence companies seeking to diversify into niche defence markets,
Page 153
Chapter 5
have found new military applications such as treaty validation and 
new military opportunities such as ship and aircraft upgrade 
programmes.
Chapter 6
Chapter 6 
Mergers, acquisitions and restructuring
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6. MERGERS, ACQUISITION, RESTRUCTURING
Virtually all the western defence companies have been restructuring and cutting jobs 
in reaction to the changes in defence spending. Anthony et al (1990) has reported 
that in the arms-producing companies in USA and in Western Europe there is an 
increasing number of mergers and acquisitions, mainly nationally but also at an 
international level. Corporate divestment and acquisitions have been studied by Bing
(1978) and by Salter and Weinhold (1979) and although their studies were not 
directed to the defence industry it is useful to study their findings.
6.1 Corporate Divestment
Corporate divestment has been studied by Bing (1978). Bing (1978) found that a 
significant number of mergers and acquisitions are achieved as a result of corporate 
divestment, i.e. as a result of the sale by a corporate business of a subsidiary, a 
division or a product line. Divestment differs from the sale of an independent 
business in that the seller remains in business, continues as an employer and does not 
become an employee.
Bing (1978) considered that the reason most commonly given by the seller for 
divestment, that corporate management have identified the need for a realignment of 
resources and a change in the nature of the business, is an oversimplification. Bing 
reported that divestment is often a way out of a problem and he outlined the events 
and conditions which may lead to the decision for corporate divestment:
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1. The corporate management may wish to cast off a recurring problem or a 
marginal operation which is in difficulty.
2. The divestment may be a single event to give the corporate business new 
focus, for example by eliminating a product group or the businesses in a 
specific geographical location.
3. A strategy of divestment or plant closure may be pursued by new
management to demonstrate dynamism and as a means to wipe out previous 
management errors.
4. Strategic long term planning, in that the seller may be making basic changes 
in business strategy and may no longer wish to remain in a particular area 
of business, may play a role in the decision to divest, but often the divestment 
is a single event associated with a failure in financial performance. The seller 
may need greater liquidity, or may need lower financial obligations.
5. The corporate management may decide that a business area will become too 
difficult or unattractive to retain , for example in connection with :
new environmental regulations, or trade regulations.
difficulty with labour relations, worker participation, productivity, or
pay-role.
lack of confidence in the long term future of the business.
6. A government may force a sale of a business area as a result of anti-trust
proceedings, which oppose trusts, monopolies and cartels which the 
government consider to be not in the country's best interest. Anti-trust 
proceedings are commonly seen in the U.S.A.
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6.2 Acquisitions
Salter and Weinhold (1979) have studied the strategies of diversification through 
acquisition. The timescale to complete a diversification through acquisition is 
measured in weeks or months, whereas a diversification through internal development 
takes typically eight years to become profitable. Table 6.2 compares diversification 
through internal development with diversification by acquisition.
Table 6.2 Comparison of diversification by internal development 
and diversification by acquisition.
DIVERSIFICATION BY INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT DIVERSIFICATION BY ACQUISITION
The diversification activity takes typically eight years to 
become profitable.
An acquisition can be completed in months.
Development of a new business area takes years of 
sustained detailed planning.
The decision to proceed with an acquisition is made 
relatively quickly, typically within weeks or months. 
Acquisition candidates become available without 
advanced notice. Favourable environmental conditions 
for acquisition can emerge and disappear in extremely 
short timescaies.
Companies wishing to diversify must overcome entry 
barriers by committing resources to establish key 
success variables: specialist managerial and technical 
skills, exclusive distribution, product image and brand 
recognition, copyright, trademarks and patents.
Cost to entry and time to entry may be lower because a 
number of the key variables may already be highly 
developed or in place.
Source: Table by current author from analysis by Salter and Weinhold (1979)
Salter and Weinhold (1979) studied economic research publications covering 
acquisitions in manufacturing industries in the USA during the period 1895 to 1978. 
They found that acquisition activities were cyclical and the peaks of the cycles 
coincided with peaks in economic activity or stock prices:
1894 to 1905, Merging for Monopoly.
There was a peak in the number of mergers and acquisitions during
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the period of economic expansion from 1895 to 1905 following ten 
years of economic stagnation. The mergers were mainly horizontal 
integrations initiated to achieve market dominance. Several US 
industrial giants originated in this period, for example US Steel, 
General Electric, Eastman Kodak, Du Pont. Salter and Weinhold
(1979) cited Stigler (1950) who described the wave of activity as 
merging for monopoly.
1920s, Merging for Oligopoly.
Stigler (1950) documented a second wave of mergers and acquisitions 
during the 1920s which he called merging for oligopoly. Most of the 
mergers and acquisitions involved market share additions or vertical 
integration and the result was the formation of strong competitors to 
industries previously dominated by a single large company, 
particularly in the electricity, gas and water holding industries. 
Examples of companies originated in this period are Allied Chemical, 
Continental Can and Kraft.
Post World War II, Merging for Growth.
The third cycle of merger and acquisition activity described by Salter 
and Weinhold (1979) started after World War II and involved mainly 
small to medium size companies as the acquirers of small to medium 
companies in unrelated business areas and thereby generating 
diversified companies. These mergers and acquisitions brought
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corporate growth.
In examination of acquisitions since 1970, Salter and Weinhold (1979) have noted 
that in acquisitions of US companies, American acquirers tended to purchase 
unrelated businesses, in contrast to foreign acquirers which pursued acquisitions 
related to the existing businesses.
They also found that widely diversified companies performed poorly relative to 
industry averages, particularly in productivity of capital and in lower returns on assets 
and equity and that related-business companies consistently outperformed unrelated 
business companies.
6.3 RESTRUCTURING IN THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY
Anthony et al (1990) reported that there had been an increasing number of 
acquisitions and mergers in the defence industry, mainly nationally but also 
internationally.
Walker and Gummet (1989) have studied Britain and the European armaments market 
and reported a trend towards further industrial concentration within nations resulting 
in fewer and larger defence contractors and consequently less competition for defence 
contracts and loss of flexibility in the scope of technical solution to a contractual 
requirement. Where a nation may have only one supplier for a major programme, 
the nation can increase competition for that programme by encouraging international 
bids. Europe has been encouraged by the IEPG to promote an open defence market.
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Defence contracts bulletins announcing details of defence procurement plans are 
published and exchanged by the UK, Turkey, Norway, Netherlands, Italy, Germany, 
France, Denmark and Belgium.
6.3.1 National Mergers and Acquisitions
Many major contractors have left the defence business or have been merged: 
Hazeltine, Sanders, Gould, Argo and Tracor; Daimler-Benz acquired Messerschmitt- 
Bolkow-Blohm; the UK General Electric Company and Siemens have acquired 
Plessey; GEC has also acquired Ferranti. The Sipri Yearbook 1990 points out how 
there has been a trend to national concentrations of industrial strengths in defence 
capabilities as demonstrated in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3 Helicopter companies
Number of companies able 
to build helicopters
Year 1968 Year 1988
In USA 18 10
In France 2 2
In UK 5 2
Source : table by present author from data presented by SIPRI , 1990 .
Miggiano et al (1992) have pointed out that the world’s two leading weapons 
manufacturers are pursuing opposite strategies in that McDonnel Douglas, with half 
its sales in military systems, has decided to strengthen its civil business, whereas 
General Dynamics, with 80% of its sales in military systems, is selling off some of 
its civil businesses and is attempting to strengthen its military operations.
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FIGURES 6.3.1 a, b and c
Figures showing the mergers and acquisitions in the evolution of the aviation 
industries in France, Germany and the United Kingdom from 1940 to 1990.
Figures by present author, adapted from figures presented by Ambos (1992).
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Ambos (1992) cited the increasing importance of technology and the increasing 
complexity and size of defence systems and defence projects as leading to strategic 
industrial alliances. In his study of the defence and aerospace industry he showed the 
same trend over the period 1940 to 1990 to industrial concentration by merger and 
acquisition, in Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Figures 6.3.1 a, b and c 
show the striking similarity in the reduction of numbers of companies in the 
evolution of the aviation industry in France, Germany and the United Kingdom
Miggiano et al (1992) in their study on arms production found that the arms sales of 
the 100 largest arms producers in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, OECD, increased by 6% from 1989 to 1990, from $172B per annum 
in 1989 to $182B in 1990 despite a decline in world military expenditure. It was 
reported that the large companies have been able to increase their share of the 
declining arms market and it was identified that in a number of these cases the 
increases were as a result of mergers or acquisitions of other arms producing 
companies. Miggiano et al (1992) reported that of the leading 100 defence 
companies, more companies had increased their arms sales from 1989 to 1990, than 
had decreased sales. Examples of companies which had increased the level of annual 
sales by more than $400M p.a. were GEC, British Aerospace, GIAT, Thomson, 
Bremer Vulcan, Loral and Aerospatiale which had all acquired military divisions of 
companies or complete companies. Honeywell and Ford had decreased the level of 
military sales by $1040M p.a. and $400M p.a. from 1989 to 1990, partly due to 
divestment of some military business operations. Sir Raymond Lygo, chief executive 
of British Aerospace, had predicted this phenomenon in 1989 (Reed, 1989) when he
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said
" ... the big dogs will eat the little dogs, spit the bones out and we 
will have a centralised defence industry”.
6.3.2 International Alliances, Meigere and Acquisitions
Anthony et al (1990) reported that during the previous two years, 1988 and 1989, 
there had been international mergers (Table 6.4) and acquisitions (Table 6.5) 
involving large arms producing companies.
Table 6.4 International mergers in the arms production industry
COMPANY NAME OF MERGED 
COMPANY
YEAR OF MERGER
CAP Group UK 
Sema-Metra France
Serna Group 1988
Hybrid Memory Products UK 
Dense Pack Microsystems US
Dense Pack 1989
Sagem France 
Sepa Italy
Italiana Sistemi Ineiziala 1989
Source: adapted from table by Anthony et al (1990), SIPRI Yearbook 1990, page 337.
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Table 6.5 International acquisitions in the arms production industry
PURCHASING COMPANY PURCHASED COMPANY YEAR
Bombadier Inc Canada Short Brothers PLC UK 1989
CAE-Link Coip. Canada Singer Link divisions USA 1988
Matra France Fairchild Space, USA 
Communications and Electronics, 
and Control Systems divisions
1989
SNECMA France FN Moteuis Belgium 1989
Thomson CSF France HSA Netherlands 1989
Thomson CSF France Ocean Defence Coip USA 1988
Alcatel France ACEC Space, Defence Belgium 
and Telecommunications division.
1989
Thomson-Brandt France Forges de Zebiugge Belgium 1988
Siemens Germany (FRG) Plessey Radar and Defence UK 1989
Diehl Geimany (FRG) Bodenseeweik Geratetechnick USA 1989
Elsag Italy Bailey Controls USA 1989
Nobel Industries Sweden Philips Elektronikindus trier Holland 1989
Astra UK BMARC Switz. 1989
Astra UK Poudrieie Reunie Beige Belgium 1988
Plessey UK Leigh Industries Canada 1988
Dowty UK Palmer Chenaid Industries USA 1989
General Motois USA Rediilusion Simulation UK 1988
RJO Enteiprises Inc USA ASA UK 1989
Source: Adapted from table by Anthony et al (1990), SIPRI Yearbook 1990, page 336
Anthony et al (1990) found that whilst there was a long history of international 
acquisitions and mergers in civil business, the phenomenon of international mergers 
and acquisitions in the arms producing companies was new. It was reported that 
weapon system manufacturers had previously operated within their own national 
boundaries, or in the case of the most expensive weapons systems developments such 
as in the aerospace business, manufacturers had previously operated in international 
teams without significant cross-border investments.
Ambos (1992) considered that three factors were influencing the defence industrial 
base resulting trend towards international cooperations and strategic alliances:
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trade and investment barriers were vanishing, for example 1) the 
single market of Europe 1992 and 2) the opening of markets with 
Eastern Europe.
competition across national borders and industries has 
increased.
the level of investment and the financial risk required to carry 
out defence business were beyond the resources prepared to be 
committed by individual companies,and sometimes by 
individual nations.
Dickerson (1992) has reported that the US Congressional Conference Committee took 
decisive action to control foreign ownership of US defence companies. Foreign 
governments and foreign owned companies are not permitted to purchase 36 of the 
largest US defence companies, or any companies working on black (US secret) 
programmes. The Committee also set up the requirement that the Pentagon must i) 
monitor all contractors of foreign ownership, ii)monitor any accumulation of any 
critical technology by foreign owners and iii) monitor exports to assess the risk of 
diverting military technology. The attempted take-over of the US company LTV by 
the French company Thomson-CSF was strongly resisted (Schneider, 1993) not only 
to provide national protection of critical technology but also because there was 
concern over the market consequences of Thomson’s state ownership.
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6.3.3 Alliances in the Defence Industry
Moravcsik (1989) reported that an extremely important aspect of European and US 
defence planning was the level of internationalisation of the defence industries. 
Moravcsik (1989) found that potential cost saving from using competitive 
procurement amounted to less than 10% of the equipment costs and that further 
saving was limited by inadequate production runs. Moravcsik (1989) reported that 
governments had in the few years preceding 1989 begun to encourage forms of 
international co-operation in the form of procurement of foreign systems, in 
international mergers and acquisitions, transborder investments and international 
collaboration in launching common products. Moravcsik (1989) reported a trend in 
transatlantic rather than European mergers and acquisitions. Moravcsik (1989) noted 
that mergers and acquisitions tended to involve the purchase of electronics companies 
which resulted in increased vertical integration rather than horizontal integration 
which would result in increased economies of scale and improved efficiency. 
Moravcsik (1989) considered that the trend to vertical integration in the defence 
industry suppressed competition which could result in reduction of efficiency. The 
trend to increased internationalisation reported by Walker and Gummet (1989) 
continued through 1990 and 1991 according to Finnegan (1993) and Anthony (1993) 
but international mergers and take-overs are becoming less frequent than international 
alliances and joint-ventures according to Verret (1991). Verret (1991) pointed out 
that only two large scale international defence industrial mergers had materialised, 
Siemens with Plessey and Thomson-CSF with Signaal. Alliances are often set up to 
address a specific project or the development of a specific family of weapons as
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industry finds relatively fewer problems in dissolving an alliance in the event of the 
project cancellation or postponement by governments (Verret, 1991). McCard (1992) 
reported on USA/European alliances
6.3.4 USA/European Acquisitions, Collaborations and Alliances
McCard (1992) has briefly traced the history of the "two-way street" of defence trade 
between the USA and Europe. He noted that the strong Anglo-American partnership 
was founded in World War II with the establishment of a Combined Chief of Staff. 
He noted that the memoirs of the military leaders revealed problems relating to lack 
of interoperability of equipment. In order to overcome problems interoperability was 
driven by the countries' leaders and as a result Anglo-American industrial 
partnerships were developed. Industrial collaborations strengthened the NATO 
Alliance during the Cold War. McCard (1992) reported that during the period 1976 
to 1980 the United States initiated four major cooperative efforts relating to defence 
trade:
Memoranda of Understanding were agreed between the USA and individual 
European countries which allowed defence markets to open between the USA 
and each country (McCard, 1992) .
The revision of the USA Arms Export Control Act allowed co-operative 
programmes with allies without surcharge (McCard, 1992).
USA designed military equipment was allowed to be manufactured in Europe 
under licence, for example the Sidewinder and Maverick missiles (McCard,
1992).
Page 171
Chapter 6
There was USA and European agreement to develop the "Families of Weapon 
Systems" whereby the USA and Europe would separately develop weapon 
systems and cross licence production to the other partner (McCard, 1992).
McCard (1992) reported that the results in terms of trade to the USA which resulted 
from these initiatives was disappointing to European industry. The level of defence 
trade from the USA to Europe is about twenty times higher in value than the defence 
trade from Europe to the USA.
Europe continued to seek access to the USA defence market by industrial teaming 
arrangements, for example the Hawk trainer aircraft programme and by acquisition 
and investment by European companies, particularly by British and to a lesser extent 
German and French companies, in USA defence industry. McCard (1992) has pointed 
out that the success of European companies in the USA defence market has been 
achieved mainly by the vehicles of teaming, acquisitions and investment and not so 
much by direct trade.
6.4 INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIONS, OFFSETS AND TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFERS
Glasse (1990) has noted that whilst the world defence market contracts, the defence 
budgets of several Third World countries may be increasing and that the markets of
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the former Warsaw Pact countries which were previously closed to the West may 
become available to them. Glasse (1990) reported that many West European 
contractors will find it necessary to enter into collaborations. Kiely (1990) reported 
that there had emerged a trend where foreign buyers were seeking contractual terms 
and conditions involving through-life aspects of maintenance, repair, training, offset 
arrangements and manufacture abroad. Western companies have found it necessary 
to establish in-country capacity to serve these markets. Glasse (1990) also noted that 
with the benefits of technology transfers, the newly industrialised countries such as 
South Korea, China, Brazil, Israel and South Africa are emerging as major 
international defence suppliers, resulting in an increased level of competition in an 
already highly competitive market.
6.5 RESTRUCTURING IN THE US AND IN THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE 
INDUSTRIES.
Finnegan (1993) has reviewed the status of restructuring in the defence industries of 
the USA and Europe in his study of the world's top 100 defence companies ranked 
in order of defence sales.
USA
Finnegan (1993) reported that USA companies dominated the list of the world's 
defence companies in size and in number. He found that the US defence 
procurement budget had been cut but the US research and development budget had 
been held level over recent years. US companies had been more aggressive than the
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European companies in closing facilities and in cutting workforces. Finnegan reported 
that the next phase of restructuring of the defence industry would he consolidations 
and that the industry would shrink as a result of further acquisitions
EUROPE
In his observation of the European defence industries, Finnegan (1993) reported that 
European companies were ahead of US companies in terms of consolidation, but 
while the companies of the United Kingdom had cut costs, there had not been 
marked cost saving in Italy and in France. Finnegan reported that the defence 
procurement and the defence research and development budgets were continuing to 
be cut.
UNITED KINGDOM. Anthony (1993) has reported on the privatisation of the major 
defence companies initiated by the former UK Prime Minister's (Margaret Thatcher's) 
denationalization programme. The UK defence industry has been characterised by 
acquisitions and downsizing.
ITALY. Politi (1993) reported a proposal by the Italian government for the leading 
Italian aerospace and defence companies to form a major defence conglomerate 
which would constitute more than 96% of the Italian defence industry.
FRANCE. Schneider (1993) has described how the French government is financing 
global direct investment in the world's defence industry, particularly in the missile 
and defence electronics industries. Table 6.5 shows that during 1988 and 1989 six
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major international defence acquisitions were carried out by France, four by the UK, 
two by Canada, Germany and the USA, and one each by Italy and Sweden. France 
has chosen to retain state ownership of its major defence companies and has blocked 
foreign investment in strategically important French defence companies (Schneider
1993).
GERMANY. Anthony (1993) reported that Germany's arms industry is small in 
comparison to other German industries. Since the 1970s Germany has undertaken 
several armaments programmes under collaborative projects with other NATO 
countries. During the 1980s there was a concentration of the German defence 
companies.
Finnegan (1993) reported that in general consolidation had already taken place in the 
European aerospace industry and therefore further consolidation would probably be 
achieved by cross-border alliances.
Finnegan (1993) found that the overall profitability of the 50 largest defence 
companies had reduced from 1991 to 1992, despite having a larger market share and 
concluded that the leading defence companies of the developed world had been able 
to stay profitable by downsizing and merging. The companies have substantially 
reduced capital investment and research and development because of the lack of new 
defence procurement programmes. The companies that had adjusted quickly were 
profitable and had increased their market share by merger and acquisition. The 
companies remaining in the defence industry can now seek new growth by winning
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business in the emerging and developing world.
6.6 CONCLUSIONS
1. There has been a trend in USA and European defence companies towards 
mergers and acquisitions, resulting in USA and European defence activity 
being dominated by fewer and larger companies. These major defence 
companies, which are the established traditional suppliers, are staying 
profitable by downsizing and merging. The companies have very much 
reduced their capital investment and research and development expenditure 
because of the lack of new programmes.
2. The companies that have adjusted quickly are profitable and have increased 
their market shares by mergers and acquisitions. The companies that remain 
have access to a substantial world market and therefore can be successful 
profitable companies, but they can only now grow by winning business in the 
growth markets of the emerging and developing world.
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7.1 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE LITERATURE REVIEW
7.1.1 The Defence Maiket
The review of the literature carried out in Chapter 1 showed that for several decades 
following the end of World War II the Western and Soviet defence industries had the 
benefit of largely stable and steadily growing markets. This was based on the 
"military balance" and the policy of deterrence between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 
There was increasing scale of investment in defence procurement and increasing scale 
of sophistication in military technology. In the United Kingdom, the relationship 
between government and industry has traditionally been that between supplier and 
principal and sometimes only customer, the Ministry of Defence. The relationship 
began to change in the mid-1980s with the introduction of competitive tendering and 
the government actively seeking a wider choice of supplier, including foreign 
suppliers. Similarly, the defence industries sought to widen their customer base to 
include foreign governments.
In 1989 the end of the cold war was brought about by diplomatic and political 
changes in the East and West and the defence industries were faced with a long term 
decline in domestic and world markets. The break up of the Warsaw Pact and the 
removal of Soviet control in Eastern Europe has led to an unprecedented level of 
ethnic violence and civil strife. The world has become extremely unstable with 37 
major armed conflicts in 1990 and an increasing number of countries developing or 
purchasing highly advanced weapons systems capabilities including chemical, nuclear
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and biological weaponry. The proliferation of arms sales to warring factions by 
countries hungry for foreign currency, particularly US dollars, is a serious issue and 
is leading to increased levels of violence. The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 
showed that Third World countries are building up substantial weapons arsenals. 
Whilst defence expenditure in the west has been decreasing since 1987 to the present 
(1996), defence expenditure in the Far East and in the Middle East has risen.
7.1.2 Defence Trade
Examination of the world military expenditure data measured in 1988 US dollars 
(presented by Wulf, 1993) shows that over the decade 1981 to 1991 the world 
military expenditure rose from $1.6M per minute ($825B per annum) in 1981 to a 
peak of $2M per minute ($1000B per annum) in 1987 and then fell back to the 1981 
level again in 1991.
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 showed that in the decade 1981 to 1991 nearly 
90% of defence exports into the Third World and the emerging nations have been the 
products of just six nations, the USA, the former USSR, France, UK, China and 
Federal Republic of Germany. A large number of Third World countries will only 
enter into military equipment purchases if the supplier provides offset and technology 
transfer arrangements. Countries such as those in the Pacific Rim with emerging 
economies and a growing technology base, are no longer willing to accept western 
equipment without some form of counter trade. They want to "catch up" with Europe 
and North America and believe they have the bargaining edge to do so. Supplier
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countries are being asked to enter into technology transfer agreements, offset and 
counter trade and technical assistance in setting up in-country manufacture. The 
Third World countries are emerging as manufacturers and exporters of military 
equipment and military technology in the Third World is becoming increasingly 
sophisticated.
7.1.3 Industrial Response to Defence Maiket Decline
The defence market in the western world is exhibiting characteristics of market 
decline:
i) a reduction in the number of competitors. This has been seen in Europe and 
in the USA where the market is being dominated by fewer but larger 
companies.
ii) a narrowing of the products on offer and the relinquishing of smaller 
customers and markets. Companies are seeking to rationalise their range of 
products and technology, mainly to reduce the level of investment required 
to sustain the necessary threshold in a range of technologies.
iii) a reduction in promotional or development expenditure. The governments of 
the Western World and the former Soviet Union are cutting military research 
and development budgets.
iv) Examination of the data (presented by Finnegan, 1993) on the worlds leading 
defence suppliers in the year 1992 shows that 55 companies had increased 
their turnover since the previous year 1991, 41 had decreased turnover, one
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company had the same turnover and three new companies had been created. 
Of the top 100 companies fifty were American, thirty-five European, six 
Japanese and the other nine Canadian, Israeli and South African.
A major impact of the defence cuts has been the reduction in orders and loss of jobs 
in the defence industry. The majority of companies are restructuring and a number 
of companies are divesting of their defence related business areas. Those companies 
retaining or strengthening their defence businesses are trying to manoeuvre into 
favourable markets. This is seen in the companies who have forcefully pursued 
defence export markets in the Middle East and in the Pacific Rim to compensate for 
diminishing domestic markets. Several companies are attempting to become 
established in niche markets such as surveillance and electronics.
7.1.4 National and International Collaboration in Weapons Systems
It is becoming almost impossible for individual countries to solely fund research and 
development for new products because the costs are prohibitive. Companies in 
Europe, encouraged by government initiatives, are increasingly pursuing 
collaborations and joint ventures, in both technology research and in major weapon 
system development and production. A disadvantage is that nations may find it 
necessary to compromise their own national requirements to fit a common 
development end product, for example the European Fighter Aircraft. Another factor 
in encouraging collaborations and joint ventures between nations is that alliances 
such as NATO are seeking commonality and interoperability between equipments of
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different countries' forces.
7.1.5 Meigers and Acquisitions
There has been a trend in USA and European defence companies towards mergers 
and acquisitions, resulting in USA and European defence activity being dominated 
by fewer and larger companies. According to literature reviewed in Chapter 2 the 
level of high technology being demanded in several types of major weapon systems . 
favours large suppliers with substantial technology resources, or specialist companies 
with capabilities in niche technologies. Companies wishing to gain access to 
specialist technologies in other organisations can gain those technologies in a realistic 
timescale by mergers, acquisition or by joint venture.
The literature reviewed in Chapter 6 reported that the major defence companies, 
which are the established traditional suppliers, are staying profitable by downsizing 
and merging. The companies have very much reduced their capital investment and 
research and development expenditure because of the lack of new programmes.
The companies that have adjusted quickly are profitable and have increased their 
market shares by mergers and acquisitions. The companies that remain have access 
to a substantial world market and therefore can be successful profitable companies, 
but they can only now grow by increasing market share or by winning business in 
the growth markets such as those of the emerging and developing world.
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7.1.6 Diversification in the Defence Industiy
Studies in corporate diversification reviewed in Chapter 5 showed that industrial 
diversification is extremely difficult and that on average a diversification activity 
takes eight years to become profitable and twelve years to achieve the level of 
profitability of a mature business. Poor results of diversification businesses are often 
due to attempting to enter the market on too small a scale and failing to set 
sufficiently aggressive goals.
According to the literature reviewed in Chapter 5 most defence companies have 
attempted to diversify into new markets. Failed attempts at diversification and the 
associated costs were not widely reported in the literature. Defence companies 
seeking to diversify into niche defence markets, have found new military applications 
such as treaty validation and new military opportunities such as ship and aircraft 
upgrade programmes. Defence companies wishing to diversify into new markets for 
existing products sought international business opportunities. This was seen in the 
aggressive thrust into European markets by the USA defence companies. A major 
arms trade has built up in exports from the Developed World to the Third World and 
the Emerging Nations.
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7.2 DISCUSSION
Defence industries are undergoing profound change as a result of the decline in 
defence procurement budgets and changes in the patterns of defence trade, including 
an intensification of international competition. There has been a major downsizing 
and restructuring of the defence industry and a set of dominant defence companies 
are emerging. At the same time several defence companies have attempted to 
diversify into civilian business areas such as transport, telecommunications and 
environmental systems.
The defence companies seeking to consolidate their position as defence equipment 
suppliers have had the option of increasing investment in order to obtain market 
dominance by acquiring exiting competitors and by pursuing niche markets that are 
likely to remain. The pattern of mergers and acquisitions has been seen in America 
and in Europe where the defence industry has become dominated by large defence 
contractors.
Since the downturn in defence spending which began in 1988 to the present, 1996, 
there has been limited opportunity for defence market growth in the developed world 
and the main instrument for growth in the west has been by acquisition to increase 
market share. The main area for defence market growth since 1988 has been in the 
developing world where there has been growth in indigenous arms production and 
in the Middle East and Far East where military spending has continued to rise.
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An imbalance in the military equipment trade has existed for many years and 
continues to apply. The third world and the emerging nations have been equipped 
to a large extent with the products of relatively few nations. In recent years attempts 
have been made to redress this imbalance by the introduction of offset agreements, 
technology transfer programmes and counter trade agreements, but an imbalance 
probably still exists. Western suppliers have been required to provide licensed 
production arrangements in the emerging nations and there has been a gradual 
increase in the level of domestic arms production in these countries, including a levd 
of indigenous production.
7.3 HYPOTHESIS
The relationship to be explored is that the setting up of licensed production in­
country by exporting nations results in the recipient nation undertaking indigenous 
production. Licensed production is the manufacture of the system in the recipient 
country to the design and specification provided by the supplier country. Indigenous 
production is the complete design and domestic manufacture of the system in the 
country being studied. The literature review has shown that the emerging nations 
have used both types of domestic arms production and the study examines the 
relationship between the two.
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7.4 THE RESEARCH STRATEGY
The strategy employed was to test the hypothesis with:
(1) a macro analysis of twelve countries over 25 years (Chapter 8)
(2) case studies of ASEAN, Israel, Australia and Japan (Chapter 9)
(3) a survey (Chapter 10), and finally
(4) validation interviews and consultation with experts in the defence industry 
and arms trade.
7.4.1 The Macro Analysis
The measurement of the level of indigenous production over a period of time when 
licensed production arrangements have been provided to the importing country will 
show whether a relationship exists. If the result shows a correlation between the 
values and if there exists a meaningful time lag between licensed production and any 
resultant indigenous production then the existence of the relationships will be 
supported. If it is the case that there is no relationship between the value of licensed 
and indigenous production or if there is no meaningful time lag then the relationship 
will not be supported. A reasonable time lag might be five to ten years. The 
literature review showed that the time scale to set up a diversified production activity 
in industry was about 5 years. The Japanese have established production in about 
ten major weapons types in the fifty years from 1945 to 1995, i.e. about 5 years per 
indigenous production type.
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The relationships to be explored can be expressed mathematically as:
IIndigenous Production — f(hLicensed production)
The units to be measured for the LLicensed production and llndigenous Production variable 
are a measure, valued in constant year US$, of the value of licensed and indigenous 
arms production in the countries being examined: Data banks are readily accessible 
on.the world trade in arms. Publications listing arms and military trade figures for 
virtually all countries include those by SIPRI, USA Congressional Research Service, 
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
THE UNITS AND THE SETTING TO BE STUDIED IN THE MACRO ANALYSIS
The units to be studied are the arms production figures for the emerging nations over 
a timescale of twenty-five years through the use of records and historical data. There 
are limitations on the accuracy of the data because the sensitivity of the information 
is such that it is unrealistic to expect governments to disclose information fully. 
Multinational defence databases are compiled by estimate and judgement of defence 
trade reports in several publications, for example the source of the SIPRI database 
is information from approximately 200 publications covering newspapers, periodicals, 
journals, books, monographs, annual reference documents, national documents, 
documents published by international organisations and documents published by 
intergovernmental organisations. A key assumption made in this project is that the 
validity of assessing trends in the defence trade is dependant on consistency in the
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measurement and counterchecking of defence trade rather than in the absolute 
accuracy of the data.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (SIPRI), maintains databases 
of the values of deliveries of defence equipment in each year. The figures do not 
indicate accurately the prices paid. The price being paid on each contract would 
reflect the level of inclusion of spare parts, training, support, offset arrangements and 
international military aid and grants. In the case of production under licence in the 
importing country, the SIPRI data bases include an estimate of the imported share of 
equipment. Access to the SIPRI databases for the researcher has been provided by 
SIPRI.
7.4.2 Case Studies
The case studies examine the nature of defence production in countries in a variety 
of situations. This project proposes to investigate records of national defence 
budgets, export military equipment sales, technology transfers and offset 
arrangements. From the study trends in the countries' domestic arms production will 
be analysed and inferences drawn on how indigenous production of arms is 
established.
The Case Studies will examine records from industrialists, industrial consultants, 
government and research agencies. Sources of data include:
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The Defence Export Services Organisation of the UK Ministry of Defence 
publish data from their database covering the value of new business or new 
orders placed in a particular year. The data base includes a consideration of 
a nation's published equipment procurement budget and a judgement is made 
on the inclusion of part of those published budgets in the defence market 
statistics for example for air bases, buildings, or for part federal use in anti­
drugs, anti-smuggling or anti-slavery. Care has to be taken in interpreting the 
figures from the DESO database: (a) DESO measure orders received and 
there are no inputs of negative figures to reflect cancellations of orders, (b) 
industry tends to measure values of payments on the date of transfer of legal 
ownership from the supplier to the purchaser and (c) the UK MOD generally 
measure exports in terms of payments.
The US Government Printing Office in Washington DC publishes an annual 
reference book entitled World Military Expenditure and Arms Trade.
The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) publishes 
an annual report containing detailed data on the world's military expenditure 
and arms trade.
7.4.3 Survey
The country case studies examine secondary sources of data. The strategy in the 
survey was to examine the nature of domestic defence production by analysis of 
information collected from prime sources, i.e. from arms dealers, defence 
industrialists, military and government authorities in the countries studied, Australia,
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Israel, Japan and ASEAN and also arms dealers in Europe and in USA.
7.4.4 Validation Interviews
The purpose of validation interviews with key persons in the strategic weapons 
procurement business and related fields is to go beyond analysis of data and to seek 
insights into why certain decisions and trends have been observed.
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Chapter 8
Macro Analysis: a mathematical analysis to 
investigate the relationship between licensed and 
indigenous production.
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8.1 DATA
Data was taken from the SIPRI database (SIPRI, 1993) on the value of trade, licensed 
production and indigenous production of major weapons over a twenty-five year 
period. The countries covered were twelve emerging nations, which are listed by 
SIPRI as developing countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Indonesia, 
Israel, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea and Taiwan. The twenty-five 
year period was from 1965 to 1990.
The set of SIPRI data was derived in a study by SIPRI using one pre-defined process 
involving a judgement of value being allocated by SIPRI to each weapon system 
licensed, imported or indigenously manufactured by each of the twelve countries over 
25 years. The data is summarised in Table 8.1.
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TABLE 8.1
Table of values of arms production and imports for twelve countries, showing (A) 
indigenous production, (B) licensed production, (C) imported arms and (D) A+B+C, 
the total value of arms domestically produced and imported. The values were 
estimated over twenty five years from 1965 to 1990. The values are estimated in 
constant 1990 year US million dollars and are taken from the SIPRI arms data base.
Source: table of data by Ian Anthony, SIPRI (1993).
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8.2. ANALYSIS
The purpose of the analysis is to determine if there exists a correlation between the 
value of indigenous production in a particular year and the value of licensed 
production which had taken place before that year (i.e. 0 years previously, 1 year 
previously, 2 years previously, etc).
The method used was implemented on commercially available Mathcad statistical 
software. The following procedure was used to examine the data for each of the 
twelve countries:
Analytical procedure:
1. The data was transposed from rows into columns.
2. The average value of each set was calculated and subtracted from each 
element in the set.
3. EO represents indigenous production values, less the average value. 
El represents licensed production, less the average value
E2 represents imported major weapons, less the average value.
E3 represents the sum E0+E1+E2 .
4. The aim is to look for a correlation between a current year indigenous 
production and the licensed production "p" years back from that year.
5. A new set of variables fO, fl, f2, f3, is generated which ensures that 
only positive values of p are examined.
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6 . A variable B is generated. B1 (subscript m) is the average of all the
elements in El except for the last m of them. B1 (subscript p) is the
average value of El except the last p of them.
7. A variable X is generated, such that XO is a measure of the variance
of EO. The covariance is the average product of the deviations of two 
variables from their respective means (Berry and Lindgren, 1990).
8 . The correlation coefficient is the unitless measure obtained from the
covariance by dividing it by the product of the standard deviations 
(Berry and Lindgren, 1990).
D efin ition  o f  correlation coeffic ien ts
The calculation uses correlation coefficien ts, C, de fined  as fo llo w s:
CO is the correlation co e ffic ien t and is the vecto r  containing the correlation  
coeffic ien ts f o r  0 years back, 1 y e a r  back, 2 years back, etc.
CO is the correlation betw een EO and E l , ,i.e. betw een  indigenous and  
licensed production.
C 0 ( subscrip t p  )  is essentially an expected  value o r  an estim ate o f  the va lue  
o f  the average o f
(  each in the series f o r  the indigenous production  m inus its average )
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tim es
(  each term in the series f o r  licensed production m inus its average )  
d iv id ed  by
(  an estim ate o f  the standard deviation o f  the series ) .
9. The numerator of this C0( subscript p ) is the covariance of the two 
series. The denominator is the square root of the product of the two 
variances.
8.3. CALCULATIONS FOR EACH COUNTRY
The calculations were carried out for each of the twelve emerging nations. The 
correlation coefficient algorithms used in the calculation were provided by Marconi 
Space and Defence Systems Ltd.. The calculation for one country, Argentina is 
shown in Annex 8.3. as an example.
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8.4. RESULTS
8.4.1 Table 8.4.1 presents the values of correlation coefficient between indigenous 
production and licensed production, when the indigenous production is measured N 
years after the licensed production.
Table 8.4.1 The values of correlation coefficient between indigenous production and licensed 
production, when the indigenous production is measured "N" years after the licensed production.
Number of 
years, N 
years
0 years lyear 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 7years
Argentina 0.941 0.325 0.223 0.174 0.291 0.130 -0.079 -0.219
Brazil 0.482 0.178 0.183 0.444 0.403 0.265 0.160 -0.060
Chile 0.747 0.846 0.728 0.724 0.606 0.567 0.483 0.123
Egypt 0.965 0.790 0.590 0.416 0.391 0.374 0.182 -0.067
India 0.788 0.614 0.487 0.415 0.228 -0.042 -0.275 -0.239
Indonesia 0.922 0.833 0.776 0.792 0.691 0.624 0.544 0.431
Israel 0.461 0.409 0.289 0.195 0.114 0.047 -0.046 -0.101
Pakistan 0.666 0.600 0.557 0.202 0.059 -0.077 -0.206 -0.328
Singapore 0.679 0.309 0.089 0.271 0.323 0.352 0.190 0.155
S.Africa 0.436 0.436 0.277 0.206 0.107 0.079 -0.038 -0.010
S.Korea 0.960 0.877 0.739 0.568 0.370 0.304 0.103 -0.038
Taiwan 0.875 0.558 0.294 -0.027 -0.238 -0.311 -0.317 -0.296
Source: Table by current author showing values of correlation coefficients calculated using
Mathcad analytical software.
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8.4.2 Examination of the results
For each of the twelve countries there are striking similarities. The value of 
indigenous production correlates to the current year or recent years licensed 
production, and the correlation tails off to insignificance i.e. below the value 0.4, by 
seven years in eleven of the twelve countries, the exception being Indonesia.
The highest value of correlation is seen with the current year, i.e. N = zero in eleven 
of the twelve countries, the exception being Chile. In the case of Chile the chrrent- 
year correlation is never the less high (measuring 0.747), and a one year gap, N=l, 
gives the highest correlation for that country, at 0.876.
A conclusion is that in the emerging nations the value of the indigenous production 
of arms is not dependent on the value of licensed production in previous years, but 
is related to the current year value of licensed production.
8.4.3 Characteristics of indigenous production
In order to investigate why indigenous production would correlate with licensed 
production, data was collated in Table 8.4.3 on characteristics of indigenous 
production on each country, and a record made of:
a) the aggregate value of indigenous production, 1965 to 1990, measured in 1990 
year values of US$ millions. The data was taken from the SIPRI arms trade 
data base cited in SIPRI,1993.
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b) the highest value of correlation coefficient for each country, presented in table
8.4.1
c) The number of different weapons categories from ten categories, built 
indigenously by the country by the year 1990. This record provides a measure 
of the diversity of the arms industry. The ten categories of weapon are jet 
aircraft, propeller driven aircraft, helicopters, guided missiles, main battle tanks, 
armoured vehicles, large calibre artillery, radar, surface warships and submarines. 
The data was taken from the SIPRI arms trade data base eked in SIPRI, 1993.
d) The first year of production of large calibre artillery by that country. This 
record provides a measure of the maturity of the arms industry. The data was 
taken from the SIPRI arms trade data base cited in SIPRI,1993.
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Table 8.4.3 Characteristic data of indigenous production of twelve countries
Correlation
coefficient
between
indigenous and
licensed
production
Average value 
of indigenous 
production, 
USSmillions
Number of
different
weapon
categories built 
indigenously
First year of 
indigenous 
production of 
large calibre 
artillery
Argentina 0.941 2,997 6 1978
Brazil 0.482 6,334 7 1969
Chile 0.747 425 2 -
Egypt 0.965 1,673 3 1981
India 0.788 20,483 8 1980
Indonesia 0.922 975 1 -
Israel 0.461 13,204 7 1968
Pakistan 0.666 69 1 1990
Singapore 0.679 4,921 1 1986
S. Africa 0.436 8,517 7 1979
S.Korea 0.960 4,858 4 1976
Taiwan 0.875 682 4 1976
Source: table by current author from data taken from SIPRI arms trade data base cited in 
SIPRI,1993.
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Figure 8.4.4 First year of indigenous production of large calibre artilleiy plotted 
against correlation coefficient between indigenous and licensed production.
(Source: figure by current author)
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Figure 8.4.5 Number of different weapon systems categories indigenously produced 
plotted against correlation coefficient between indigenous and licensed production. 
(Source: figure by current author)
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Figure 8.4.6 Average value of indigenous aims production over the period 1965 to 
1990, measured in millions US $, plotted against coirelation coefficient between 
indigenous and licensed production.
(Source: figure by current author)
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8.4.4 The correlation coefficient and the age of the industry.
In order to see if the correlation between indigenous and licensed production was 
dependent on the age of the defence industry in a particular country, Figure 8.4.4 of 
the first year of indigenous production of large calibre artillery, was plotted against 
correlation coefficient between licensed and indigenous production.
The result showed no strong trend. 1
A conclusion is that the correlation between the value of indigenous production and 
of licensed production is not dependent on the maturity of the arms industry 
measured in terms of age of the industry.
8.4.5 The correlation coefficient and the diversity of the defence industry
In order to see if the level of correlation between indigenous and licensed production 
was dependent on the diversity of the defence industry of a particular country, Figure
8.4.5 of the number of different weapon systems categories indigenously produced 
was plotted against the correlation coefficient between licensed and indigenous 
production.
The figure showed no strong trend.
A conclusion is that the correlation between value of licensed and indigenous
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production is not dependent on the maturity of the arms industry in terms of the 
number of weapon system categories indigenously manufactured.
8.4.6 The correlation coefficient and the value of indigenous production
In order to see if the level of correlation between indigenous and licensed production 
was dependent on the value of indigenous production, Figure 8.4.6 of the average 
value of indigenous production over the period 1965 to 1990 and measured in 1990 
millions US dollars was plotted against the correlation coefficient between indigenous 
and licensed production.
The figure showed a general trend in that the lower the value of indigenous 
production, the higher the correlation between indigenous and licensed production. 
An exception to this trend is India, which has a high level of indigenous production 
and high level of correlation between indigenous and licensed production.
A conclusion is that in countries which are developing an arms industry the higher 
the value of indigenous production, the lower the correlation between licensed and 
indigenous production. A parallel conclusion is that in the countries which are 
developing an arms industry, the lower the value of indigenous production, the higher 
the correlation between indigenous and licensed production.
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8.5 CONCLUSION
The macro-analysis failed to support the hypothesis that licensed production of arms 
measured by value results in indigenous production of arms measured by value.
The macro-analysis showed that the value of the indigenous production of arms is not 
dependent on the value of licensed production in previous years, but is related to the 
current year value of licensed production. This showed that the value of indigenous 
arms production is not a result of the value of licensed production, but rather the 
values of indigenous production and licensed production are both the result of another 
cause.
If the value of indigenous production had resulted from the value of licensed 
production then there would have been a meaningful time lag between the value of 
licensed production and a later value of indigenous production.
The analysis also showed that in the countries with very low values of indigenous 
production there was very high correlation between licensed and indigenous 
production. This result would appear reasonable in that countries with highly 
progressed arms industries and high levels of indigenous production would have 
industries not so dependent on licensed production and a correlation would be 
weaker.
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Case studies of the development of arms production 
in three countries, Australia, Israel, Japan and in
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9. CASE STUDIES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARMS PRODUCTION IN 
THREE COUNTRIES, AUSTRALIA, ISRAEL, JAPAN AND IN ASEAN.
This section examines the setting up of arms production in three countries Australia, 
Japan, and Israel and the countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations, 
ASEAN. The countries examined provide a range of military settings, from a 
country with no major threats to a country in an almost perpetual state of war and 
to an area overshadowed by an arms race, from a major industrial power to countries 
with limited industrial development and from financially secure countries to countries 
with struggling economy.
Australia does not face major military threats but has to be aware of the growing 
economic and military strength of South East Asia, India, Japan and China. Australia 
was ranked sixteenth in the world in the level of countries' military expenditures in 
1991 (U.S.Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1992).
Japan is one of the world's major industrial powers and has the capability to 
manufacture nearly all of its military equipment. Japanese industry produces aircraft, 
ships, engines, military vehicles, small arms, missiles and electronic equipment 
(Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, 1991). Japan is 
a pacifist nation under Article 9 of its constitution but has become a major military 
power and in 1991 had the eighth largest military expenditure and twenty-fourth 
largest number of armed forces in the world (U.S.Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, 1992).
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Israel has been in an almost perpetual state of war since its independence in 1948, 
having fought the Egyptians, Jordanians, Syrians, Palestinians, Lebanese and Iraqis 
(Europa World Yearbook, 1991). Israel, surrounded by hostile neighbours has 
accumulated one of the largest military arsenals in the world with highly 
sophisticated weapon systems. In 1991 Israel had the 25th largest military 
expenditure in the world (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1992).
The ASEAN countries are among the world's most highly successful emerging and 
newly developed nations (Europa World Yearbook, 1991). The military expenditure 
has followed the economic progress of the area and the countries have expanded and 
improved their military inventories (Cloughly, 1995). The Asia-Pacific region has 
in the 1980s and 1990s became strategically unstable with long-standing territorial 
disputes which showed no signs of being resolved and with problems of insurgency 
and piracy. The growing arms procurements have been described as countries' 
military modernisation programmes (Cloughly, 1995, Kamiol, 1995) but many 
sources have described the build up of arms inventories in Asia as an arms race 
(Huxley, 1995, Klare, 1993, and Richardson, 1995 as sited by Willet, 1996).
9.1. AUSTRALIA
Australia is a parliamentary democracy in which the British monarch has executive 
powers of the Federal Government (Europa World Yearbook, 1991). The country has 
not faced major military threats either internal or external since World War II 
(Lonhardt, 1995). Australian national security is strongly linked with the military
Page 209
Chapter 9
status of the neighbouring countries of southern Asia and particularly Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore (Australian Government, 1989).
During World War II Japanese forces swept through Asia and although they failed 
to breach the US and Australian defences and did not invade Australia, they made 
more than fifty bombing raids on Darwin in the Northern Territory between February 
1942 and November 1943 (Lonhardt, 1995). Japan was eventually defeated in 
Myanmar (previously Burma), Borneo and Papua New Guinea and the threat to 
Australia decreased. There was minimal military activity in Australia during the cold 
war years following World War II. Australian forces were deployed overseas in the 
1950s to Korea and then to Vietnam in the 1960s (Europa World Yearbook, 1991). 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s the importance of defence of Northern Australia 
was again brought to focus. In 1969 the US President Nixon made an announcement 
that the US allies in the Asia-Pacific region would have to mount their own defences 
against future military threats (Cheeseman, 1993). At that time the government 
realised that most of Australia's military equipment was imported from USA and it 
was decided that effort should be directed to reduce the level of dependence on 
military imports and increase the level of domestic defence production. Various 
strategies including offsets, technology transfers, government subsidies and equipment 
procurement policies were pursued to achieve a viable domestic defence industry.
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9.1.1 Offsets
Cheeseman, 1993 described how in the 1970s and early 1980s there was emphasis 
on offset deals in order to develop military industrial skills in Australian companies. 
Australian industry complained that offset deals resulted in very little benefit because 
the overseas suppliers directed effort to minimising offset obligations and the cost of 
satisfying them and by structuring the offset deal such that Australian industry could 
not meet the offset requirements, foreign companies set up local subsidiaries and 
would undertake technology transfer only to their own subsidiaries and not to 
Australian companies which they perceived as potential competitors. In the 1970s and 
1980s the Australian government took steps to monitor the success of offset deals and 
also revised its offset policies which did lead to slight improvement (Table 9.1.1a). 
Table 9.1.1a shows the value of offset orders placed on Australian companies by 
overseas suppliers. Table 9.1.1b shows the level of offset deals negotiated by the 
USA on military sales to five countries including Australia. The table shows that the 
offset deals negotiated by Australia provided a proportionately lower level of offset 
business than the deals negotiated by other countries, Canada, Israel, Spain and the 
United Kingdom. There was great disappointment as the expected benefits of offset 
programs to Australian industry failed to materialise. Table 9.1.1c shows the steps 
taken by the government in an attempt to increase the benefit of offset deals.
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Table 9.1.1a: Value of offset orders placed on Australian industiy by oveiseas 
suppliers.
YEAR VALUE OF OFFSET ORDERS 
PLACED AS PERCENTAGE OF 
OFFSET OBLIGATIONS.
VALUE OF OFFSET ORDERS 
PLACED AS PERCENTAGE OF 
ELIGIBLE CONTRACTS VALUE
1970 To 1984 25% 7%
1980 To 1986 29% NOT STATED
1981 to 1988 36% 10%
Source: table by current author from data presented by Cheeseman (1993)
Table 9.1.1b: Value of offset deals set up by USA on USA military sales to 
various countries including Australia, showing the value of the sales over a five year 
period, 1980 to 1984, the value of the offset obligation and the value of offset 
actually implemented as a percentage of the offset obligation.
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY
VALUE OF USA 
MILITARY SALES, 
$ MILLIONS, 
FROM 1980 TO 
1984
VALUE OF OFFSET 
OBLIGATION, 
$MILLIONS, & AS 
PERCENTAGE OF 
VALUE OF THE 
SALE
VALUE OF OFFSET 
IMPLEMENTED, $ 
MILLIONS, & AS 
PERCENTAGE OF 
THE OFFSET 
OBLIGATION
Australia $3366.5 M $1156.7 M (34%) $121.6 M (14%)
Canada $2632.1 M $2810.6 M (107%) $785.8 M (30%)
Israel $4163.4 M $1477.4 M (35%) $413.1 M (28%)
Spain $2906.1 M $2404.0 M (82%) $113.5 M (5%)
United Kingdom $ 265.7 M $224.0 M (85%) $111.9 M (50%)
Source: table by current author from data presented in the Offset Report 1986 by the Executive Office 
of the President, The White House, USA, 1986.
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Table 9.1.1c: Recommendations and actions by the Australian Government to 
improve the success of offsets.
YEAR ACTIONS
1984 The 1984 Report of the Committee o f Review on 
Offsets(the Inglis Committee ) reported on the 
level o f offsets in the period 1970 to 1984. 
Proposed that offsets should encompass 
technology transfers, research and development 
and training. Recommended regular offset policy 
updates by government, and stronger enforcement 
of offset commitments.
1986 Government implemented main body of  
recommendations of Inglis Committee..
1987 Joint Committee o f Public Accounts published the 
Implementation o f the Offsets Program, and found 
the compliance o f offset obligations had improved 
only to 29%.
1989 Government revised guidelines on offsets as part 
of a broad review on its defence industrial policy.
Source: table by current author from data presented by Cheeseman((1993)
There was limited success in offsets despite the efforts by government and Australian 
industry. Overseas suppliers were fulfilling only one third of their offset obligations 
in the period 1981 to 1988 as shown in Table 1.1a and in Table 9.1.1c. The 
Australian government's Defence and Industry Policy report (Department of Industry, 
Technology and Commerce, November 1992) pointed out that in the 1980s there 
were first unenforceable offsets, then enforceable offsets and finally an industry 
involvement program with only a minor element of offset involvement.
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9.1.2 Government Policy on Defence Industiy
The Australian Department of Defence report entitled Defence Policy and Industry, 
November 1992, stated that Australia's defence policy was based on self reliance and 
Australia's defence industry was considered as the fourth arm of defence after the 
three armed services of the Navy, Army and Air Force. The report pointed out that 
Australian industrial involvement in defence procurement contracts had tripled in the 
previous decade from A$476 million p.a. in 1982/83 to A$1400 million p.a. in 
1991/92.
Dibb (1992) in his report entitled Strategic Priorities for Australian Industry pointed 
out that Australia had not based its defence policy to meet the threat of the Warsaw 
Pact countries, and with the end of the cold war had no requirement for a peace 
dividend of reduced military expenditure. Australia had recognised the uncertainties 
of dependence on allies for military combat support and the need to build up military 
self-reliance. The 1990 Strategic Planning Document stated that the defence 
relationship with South East Asia and improvement of the defence relationship with 
Indonesia in particular were important policy issues for the next decade. Table 9.1.2a 
summarises the Government's activity relating to its defence industrial policy, and 
Table 1.2b summarises the Government assistance to the defence industry to increase 
the level of exports. In 1984 the Department of Defence opened the Office of 
Defence Production (ODP) to make government owned manufacturing operations 
more competitive. The government had to take action to protect projects and 
capabilities which were identified as essential but which were not commercially
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viable, and in 1985 a funding scheme was provided for uncompetitive contracts 
relating to repair and refurbishment work, strategically important contracts, and 
contracts which would subsequently lead to valuable export contracts. In 1986 the 
Australian government set up a support structure to assist defence exports. The 
Department of Defence facilities and personnel were allocated to assist in marketing, 
evaluation and testing of equipment, the provision of spares and other support 
functions. In 1988 new policy guidelines were introduced to simplify defence 
equipment export approval. The administration of export approval was simplified 
and streamlined to a faster process,
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Table 9.1.2a: Government Activity relating to Policy on the Australian Defence 
Industiy
Date Activity
1984 The Department of Defence opened the Office of Defence Production 
(ODP) to make government owned manufacturing operations more 
competitive.
1985 to 1989 Government funding was provided for uncompetitive contracts relating to 
repair and refurbishment work, strategically important contracts, and 
contracts which subsequently lead to valuable export contracts.
1986 1986 report published by Paul Dibb "Review of Australia's Defence 
Capabilities", recommended
1) Maximise self-sufficiency in repair and maintenance, and software 
support.
2) Maximise self-sufficiency on high usage spares and ammunition when 
there is not excessive cost penalty.
3) Retain indigenous manufacture where i)it is competitive, ii) for unique 
Australian requirement, or iii)the manufacturing activity will provide the 
capability in subsequent maintenance and upgrade.
1987 The main body of recommendations in Dibbs 1986 review were 
encompassed in 1987 Government White Paper which defined the 
government policy for the defence industry. In particular government 
defence manufacturing facilities were to be rationalised, run on a 
commercial basis or privatised, and Australian industry would be 
encouraged to increase its share of domestic and world arms markets. 
Australian civilian manufacturing industry would be encouraged to 
establish and maintain an arms manufacturing capability in preference to 
setting up a highly subsidised defence industry.
1986 to 1987 The government owned Aerospace Technologies of Australia(ASTA) took 
over the Government Aircraft Factories. A private consortium, Australian 
Marine Engineering Corporation, AEC, purchased the Williamstown 
Dockyards. AEC won the highly profitable contract in 1989 to build the 
ANZAC frigate under licence from Germany.
1989 The Government Office of Defence Production (ODP) became an 
independent company Australian Defence Industries (ADI) which was 
tasked with becoming commercially viable.
1989 The government announced i) a A$25billion defence equipment 
procurement budget over the following 15 years ,ii)submarines , frigates 
and other developed items were to be manufactured under licence in 
Australia and not imported, and iii)contracts for naval craft would be 
placed for significant numbers and not ordered in ones and twos.
Source: table by current author from data presented by Cheeseman(1993)
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Table 9.1.2b: Government support to increase the level of defence exports
Year Activity
1986 Government Department of Defence facilities and personnel were 
allocated to assist in marketing, evaluation and testing o f equipment, and 
the provision of spares held in stock and support of equipment purchased 
and in-service.
1988 New export policy guidelines were published by the government. The 
1988 guidelines for arms exports relaxed the 1975 guidelines 
considerably. The 1988 guidelines gave responsibility for export policies 
to the Department o f Defence, and not to both the Department of 
Defence and the Department o f Foreign Affairs and Trade as previously. 
The admiristration of export approval was simplified and streamlined to 
a faster process, and the DoD was required to justify any refusal o f export 
licences on a case-by -case basis.
Source: table by current author from data presented by Cheeseman((1993)
Several of the world's leading arms suppliers opened subsidiary or joint venture 
companies in Australia in order to retain a share of the Australian defence market 
(Jane's International Defence Directory, 1996). Examples are
British Aerospace Australia Ltd, ( subsidiary of British Aerospace ,UK) 
Caterpillar of Australia Ltd (Caterpillar Inc , USA)
Cray Communications Ltd (Cray Electronics Holdings Ltd, UK)
Ericsson Defence Systems Pty Ltd, (Ericsson Radio Systems, Sweden) 
GEC-Marconi Australia Pty (General Electric Company, UK)
General Motors - Holden Automotive Ltd (General Motors Corp, USA) 
Hawker de Havilland Ltd, (BTR pic, UK)
Hewlett-Packard Australia Ltd (Hewlett Packard Corp, USA)
Pains-Wessex (Australia) Ltd, (Chemring Group, UK)
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Rockwell Systems Australia Pty Ltd (Rockwell International, USA)
Raychem AustraliaLtd( Raychem Corp, USA)
Siemens Ltd (Siemens AG, Germany)
Trimble Navigation Australia (Trimble Navigation, USA)
Varian Australia Pty Ltd (Varian Associates, USA)
Westinghouse Electric Australia Ltd (Westinghouse Electric Corp, USA)
9.1.3 Licensed and Indigenous Defence Production
The Australian defence equipment expenditure over the decade 1984 to 1993 
remained steady at around A$2250 million per annum but the proportion 
manufactured in Australian industry increased from 30% in 1983/4 to 65% in 1992/3, 
an improvement directly resulting from Government industrial policy according to the 
Department of Defence report, November 1992. The largest sector of defence 
expenditure was naval, which represented 32% of total defence expenditure in 
1986/87. The Department of Defence report, November 1992 did differentiate 
between imported and Australian manufactured defence equipment, but did not detail 
the share between indigenous and licensed production.
Examination of shipbuilding records shows that in the thirty years up to 1995 about 
one third of Australian major warships were imported but from 1995 all current and 
future Australian naval warships were being or were to be built in Australia. Sharpe 
(1995) in his Jane’s World Warship Construction Special Report showed that of 
twenty warships under current construction in 1995 and of twelve planned Australian
Page 218
Chapter 9
warships, none were imported and all were being or were to be constructed in 
Australia. Examination of the operational warships (and therefore procured before 
1995) shows the proportion of naval vessels which had previously been imported 
was about one third for the main warships and about one tenth for the smaller ships 
(survey ships, general purpose, service forces ships and army watercraft). This data 
which has been summarised in Table 9.1.3a confirms that Australian industry is 
increasing its share of its home defence market (by measure of the numbers of items 
of equipment being built). This finding is supported by examination of the 
Australian Department of Defence report (November 1992) which measured an 
increase in the domestic share of the home defence market by value and not by 
numbers of equipment being built. The defence equipment expenditure in Australian 
industry increased from $600 million per annum (27% of equipment expenditure) in 
1984-85 to $1600 million (60% of equipment expenditure) in 1992-93.
Page 219
Chapter 9
Table 9.1.3a Australian naval warship construction, Australian built and imported.
Australian Naval Warships Quantity 
Australian Build
Quantity imported
Planned future builds, after 1995 12 0
Current builds in 1995 20 0
Operational naval ships in 1995,( detailed in Jane's 
Fighting Ships 1994-95)
Major warships:
Submarines Collins 1 0
Submarines Oberon 0 5
Destroyers DDG-2 0
Frigates FG-7 1 4
Frigates River Class 1 0
Light Forces 16 1
Mine Warfare Forces 2 2
Amphibious 8 0
Smaller warships:
Survey ships 4 1
General Purpose 1 0
Service forces ships 16 5
Army watercraft 33 0
Source: table by current author from data presented by Sharpe, 1995 (Jane's World Warship
Construction Special Report) and Sharpe, 1994 (Jane's Fighting Ships, 1994-95).
Table 9.1.3b shows the major licensed production agreements held by Australian 
industry between 1981 and 1989. There are three major shipping contracts, two 
aircraft and one towed gun contracts.
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Table 9.1.3b Licensed production of major conventional weapons
Date of licence Comments
1989
Quantity 10 , licence from Germany 
Meko-200 Class frigates
Design by Blohm and Voss, Germany.
Builders under license Amecon, Williamstown. 
Agreement between New Zealand and Australia. 
Quantity 8 for Australia and quantity 2 for New  
Zealand.
1987
Quantity 6, licence from Sweden 
Kockums Type-471, Collins class 
submarine
Agreement for 70% Australian industrial 
involvement. Builders are Australia Submarine 
Cc.rp., Adelaide.
1986
Quantity 65, licence from Switzerland 
PC-9 trainer aircraft
The quantity 65 covers:
2 for direct purchase 
17 for assembly
48 for local licensed production
1982
Quantity 105, licensed from UK 
Hamel 105mm towed gun
1981
Quantity 73, licensed from USA  
F/A-18 Hornet fighter aircraft
The quantity 73 included 
2 for direct purchase 
71 for licensed production
1983
Quantity 2, licensed from USA  
FFG-7 Class Frigate
Licensed production o f 2 frigates at Australian 
Marine Eng, Williamstown.
Followed a previous direct purchase by Australia 
of quantity 4 in form 1977 to 1981.
Source: table by current author from data presented by SIPRI, 1990 and Sharpe R., 1995 (Jane's 
Fighting Ships, 1994-95).
Table 9.1.3b shows that licensed production of then-current state of the art weapon 
systems has been important to the Australian defence industry in terms of 
maximising turnover and industrial skills. The manufacture under licence has not 
been merely a build-to-print exercise: the build of the Collins class submarine for 
example, which was to the Swedish company Kockums design, involved the transfer 
of responsibility of the design configuration and the resolution of production 
difficulties from Kockums to the Australian production company, Australian
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Submarine Corporation at an early stage in the programme while the first of the six 
submarines was still under construction (International Defence Review, June 1992).
The licensed production of a major military system results in the flow down of 
substantial military contracts within the country's defence industry. Examination of 
the build under licence of the Collins class submarine shows that of the total contract 
value A$4.9 billion, seventy per cent of the platform (the ship) work and forty five 
. percent of the combat system (system within the ship) work would be undertaken in 
Australia (Australian Submarine Corporation, 1994). Very advanced and complex 
systems continued to be imported for example the surface to surface Harpoon 
missiles from McDonnel Douglas in USA, the Argo radar support measures and the 
optronic masts from the UK company, Pilkington Optronics (Sharpe, 1995). 
Examples of major contracts for the Collins submarine components and systems 
awarded to Australian industry include:
steel and heat treatment for the hull sections, Bissalloy Company, 
New South Wales (International Defence Review, 1 June 1992) 
manufacture and assemble of simulators, Clough Engineering, Perth 
(International Defence Review, 1 January 1990) 
simulator system design, Computer Sciences of Australia (International 
Defence Review, 1 January 1990)
documentation for simulator, leal of Australia (International Defence 
Review, 1 January 1990)
Quality assurance and testing of simulator, Qantas of Australia
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(International Defence Review, 1 January 1990)
towed sonar array, GEC Marconi Systems Australia, and Australia
Sonar Systems (International Defence Review, 1 December 1991)
Other contracts to Australian industry evolve from major procurement programmes 
such as the Collins submarine programme, for example the Royal Australian Navy 
decided to establish a submarine support infrastructure in Western Australia 
specifically for the Collins submarines (Australian Submarine Corporation, 1994) 
including:
a submarine training and system centre 
Underwater Tracking Range 
Underwater Noise Radiation Range
Magnetic measurement Range and magnetic treatment range.
which involved substantial procurement packages awarded to Australian industry. 
Rockwell Systems Australia for example were awarded a contract value A$11 million 
for the design and supply of the magnetic test and magnetic treatment range.
In examining whether licensed production leads to indigenous production in the case 
of major defence platforms such as warships, the following points are considered:
1. A submarine designer company such as the Swedish company Kockums, designs 
a new class of submarine about every 5 years (Australian Submarine 
Corporation, 1994). The operational life of a submarine is nominally thirty years
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(International Defence Review, 1 June 1992) and a country such as Australia 
would seek to renew its fleet after thirty years, by which time submarine design 
and production would have progressed by six generations of technology. A 
country such as Australia would gain valuable state-of-the-art technology 
expertise by licensed production and following the production phase could retain 
a degree of technical advance through carrying out upgrades and maintenance 
programmes. After a time span of thirty years or so when fleet replacement is 
necessary, the country has to assess again the options of licensed or indigenous 
production or imports: it may be the case that indigenous production although 
politically attractive in terms of job creation does not provide the best option 
commercially or technically. In the case of a major platform it is not necessarily 
the case that licensed production will be followed by indigenous production on 
the next occasion.
2. In high technology production it is extremely difficult to miss out a generation 
of technology and succeed in innovative design. State of the art designs evolve 
in incremental performance steps and are supported by extensive research and 
development (Australian Submarine Corporation, 1994). The result of 
attempting bold and innovative designs in shipbuilding were seen in the case of 
stealth warships in the 1990s. The scientifically designed profiles provided low 
radar cross sections and therefore were more difficult to detect by radar, but the 
ships structures were not strong and they cracked (Forecast International, 1996). 
Examples of stealth designed major warships include the French La Fayette 
frigates and the UK Type 23 frigates (Sharpe, 1995)
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3. The Australian Department of Defence Report, November 1992, pointed out that 
cost saving was not a major factor in licensed manufacturing and some military 
procurements involved additional cost where Australian sources were chosen. 
The report considered that the additional cost was recouped by the life cycle cost 
advantages from domestic support and maintenance.
9.1.4 Conclusion
1. Following an announcement in 1969 by the President of the USA that U.S. allies 
in South East Asia would have to mount their own defences against military 
threats, it was realised that Australian forces were nearly wholly dependant on 
imports for defence equipment and the decision was made to build up the 
capability of Australian defence industry. The Government undertook a 
sequence of measures to increase self-reliance in arms. It was hoped that the 
introduction of offset deals in the 1970s on arms imports would provide benefit 
to Australian industry but the results in terms of quantity and content of offset 
work proved disappointing in terms of technology transfer or commercial gain. 
The Australian Government announced that its defence was based on a policy 
of self-reliance and the Government took steps to strengthen the domestic 
defence industry in the support and promotion of defence exports and in 
scheduling a procurement plan designed to maximise Australian industrial
©
involvement. Several of the world’s major arms contractors set up subsidiary or 
joint venture companies in Australia in order to retain or gain a share of the 
Australian defence market.
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2. Manufacture under licence has played a major role in strengthening the 
Australian defence industry. Major platforms and systems are manufactured 
under licence but highly complex systems such as missiles which are not 
available in Australia continued to be imported.
3. Within or associated with the licensed manufacture programmes there are several 
substantial indigenous manufacture and support contracts. The value of 
subcontracts which are carried out by domestic industry for a licensed production 
programme are not readily visible and therefore a database collating the value 
of indigenous and licensed production may miss a proportion of the indigenous 
content of a defence programme.
4. Australian Department of Defence figures show that following the
implementation of a self-reliance policy and continuing the policy of licensed 
production, the share of arms procurement built in Australia has increased from 
one third to two thirds in the decade from 1983/4 to 1992/3.
5. The licensed production of a major system such as a submarine or warship does
not necessarily lead to indigenous production of a similar type of system when 
replacements are due, which could be after a period of up to thirty years. The 
licensed production does provide (a) opportunities for indigenous production of 
the associated systems and subsystems such as communications, command 
systems, weapons control etc. at the same time as the main licensed production, 
(b) provides the skills and puts into place the technology infrastructure in the
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domestic industry and (c) also provides the opportunity for support, maintenance 
and upgrade work for the operational lifetime of the equipment which could be 
up to thirty years.
9.2. ISRAEL
Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional government, a president as 
the ceremonial head of state and a prime minister as executive head of government. 
The survival of Israel, surrounded by hostile neighbours, has resulted from its 
prodigious military strength. Due to the continued hostilities in the Middle East 
Israel has accumulated one of the largest military arsenals in the world with highly 
sophisticated weapon systems. Since its independence in 1948, the country has been 
in an almost perpetual state of war, the Israelis having fought the Egyptians, 
Jordanians, Syrians, Palestinians, Lebanese and Iraqis. Israel receives about $1.8 
billion annually in military grants from the USA.
The Israeli defence industry meets most of the requirements of the armed forces and 
also achieves a high level of exports, estimated at $237M per year during the period 
1985 to 1989, making Israel the world’s twelfth largest arms exporter (SIPRI, 1990). 
The arms exports have been an important foreign exchange earner, ranked third 
behind diamond export and tourism (Forecast International,!991).
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9.2.1 Embargoes
Table 9.2.1 History of arms embargoes against lsrae!
Event Embargo and reaction by Israel
1929 Arab anti-Jewish riots Jew's w'ere not able to obtain weapons but the 
Palestinian Arab population was able to procure 
weapons.
Jewish workshops started to produce small arms 
and ammunition; the network of workshops 
developed mto Ta'As which became the Israeli 
Military Industries , IMI.
1948 war.
The British terminated the Palestinian 
Mandate. Jewish leaders proclaimed the 
State of Israel. Arab states sent military 
forces into Palestine.Hostilities 
continued until a ceasefire in January 
1949.
There was a series of arms embargoes against the 
Jews before and during the 1948 war.
The USA, UK and France continued the arms 
embargo after the 1948 war. The UK continued 
to supply arms and training support to Iraq and 
Egypt.
Israel increased its efforts to import and to build 
up its arms industry.
1955, USSR began supplying Egypt 
with advanced weapons.
In 1956 Egypt nationalised the company 
operating the Suez Canal. In October 
1956 Israel attacked Egypt and occupied 
the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. 
In 1957 the USA and the UN pressured 
Israel into evacuating these areas and 
the United Nations Emergency Force, 
UNEF, was established in Sinai.
1956 to 1967 France supplied Israel with 
advanced weapons and materials for a nuclear 
reactor at Dimona.
In 1956 Israel started its aircraft industry by 
setting up aircraft maintenance facilities, Bedek. 
The armour industry also started by maintaining 
and refurbishing the Sherman tanks.
Following the Suez War in 1956 Israel started 
licensed production of aircraft, the French Fouga 
Magister jet trainer, guns and rifles from 
Belgium, aircraft engines from the French 
company Turbomeca, and mortars from the 
Finnish company Tampella. Israeli engineers 
participated in the design of aircraft and ships 
being purchased from France.
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The Six-Day War.
In May 1967 the United Arab Republic, 
Egypt, negotiated the withdrawal of 
UNEF from Sinai, and the Egyptian 
forces closed the Straights of Tiran to 
Israeli ships thus blockading the Israeli 
port, Eilat. Israel attacked Egypt and 
other Arab countries in what became 
known as the Six-Day War.
The Six-Day War in 1967 caused the French to 
impose an embargo on arms to Israel. Items of 
undelivered orders (gunboats, 50 Mirage fighter 
aircraft) were withheld. New orders were barred.
The UK supplied two Centurion tanks for 
evaluation prior to the 1967 war, but after the war 
refused to supply in quantity. West Germany 
started to supply Israel with M48 tanks but 
following pressure from Arabs an embargo was 
imposed. The USA became Israel's only supplier.
Israel decided to give increased priority to 
developing its arms industry to remove the 
undesirable dependence on foreign suppliers.
1968 to 1970.Two year War Of Attrition 
between Egypt and Israel in the Suez 
Canal zone. Ended August 1970
The USA Nixon administration withheld approval 
for the sale of aircraft to Israel while imposing 
political pressure on Israel during the War of 
Attrition.
The Yom Kippur War.
On 6 October 1973 which was the 
Jewish holy day, Yom Kippur, the Day 
of Atonement, Egyptian forces crossed 
the Suez canal to reoccupy part of Sinai 
and simultaneously Syria attacked the 
Golan Heights. There were 
disengagement agreements by 1975.
The USA Reagan administration delayed 
arms sales and deliveries to Israel in 
response to:
i)Israel's attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor, 
Tammaz-1, June 1981.
ii)Israel’s annexation of the Golan 
Heights, December 1981.
iii) Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, June 
1982.
The USA made the supply o f weapons conditional 
on the willingness of Israel to accept a ceasefire 
to the Yom Kippur War.
During the 1970s and 1980s the Israeli arms 
industry grew exponentially.
Source: table by current author from data in Steinberg, 1986 and Europa World Yearbook, 1991.
Table 9.2.1 shows the political pressures imposed on Israel which had an impact on 
arms supply and procurement and lists the arms embargoes imposed against Israel by 
the supplier countries. The origins of the Israeli arms industry are found in the in 
the Jewish workshops which produced small arms and ammunition decades before
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the proclamation of the State of Israel. In the 1929 Arab anti-Jewish riots Jews had 
not been able to obtain weapons but the Palestinian Arab population were able to 
procure weapons. The network of workshops developed into Ta’As which became 
the Israeli Military Industries, IMI (Steinberg, 1986).
Table 9.2.1 shows Israel was subjected to more than nine arms embargoes by the 
USA, France, UK and Germany in the forty years since the proclamation of Israel 
in 1948. Israel's response to the embargoes was to seek other suppliers and to 
increase the level of self sufficiency by developing and expanding its own arms 
industry (Forecast International, 1991).
By the 1990s Israel has built up a sophisticated arms industry manufacturing fighter 
aircraft, transporters, trainer aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, remotely piloted 
vehicles, fast patrol boats, missiles, tanks, military land vehicles, munitions and wide 
range of sophisticated electronic and electro-optical systems (Forecast International, 
1991). In the early 1970s Israel started to promote the export of weapons. 
Government policy was to use exports of weapons for political and economic gain 
and in the decade 1980 to 1990 Israel exported arms to more than fifty countries. 
Forecast International (1991) also reported that Israel exports large numbers of Soviet 
arms captured from the Palestine Liberation Organisation in Lebanon. The list of 
captured arms includes 290 Russian tanks, 216 armoured vehicles, 10,000 tons 
artillery, 40,000 mortars, 5,700 Katyusha rockets, 19,000 hand grenades, 24,000 rifles 
and 18,950 hand grenades.
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Israel has established a strong arms trade with China (Forecast International, 1991), 
and has exported missiles, tanks, tank barrels and military technology. Israel has 
denied reports that the electronics system for the Israeli LAVI fighter aircraft which 
was developed with USA technology was transferred from Israel to China and 
installed on the Chinese J-A-2 fighter aircraft without USA approval. Forecast 
International (1994) reported that Israel and China agreed a number of joint ventures 
in 1988. Israel was very concerned about negotiations between China and Saudi 
Arabia for the supply of 230 Chinese CSS-3 intermediate range ballistic missiles to 
Saudi Arabia and Israel attempted to influence China by agreeing to a series of joint 
developments involving the Israeli companies Elbit Computers, Elisra, Tadiran, El- 
Op, Rafael and ELTA and Chinese companies and research institutes. The joint 
developments have been described as the modification of Israeli equipment for China. 
In 1992 China and Israel agreed a series of ventures between the Israeli Export 
Institute and SIBAT, the Israeli Foreign Defence Assistance and Defence Export 
Organisation and CATIC, the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export 
Corporation. One of the transfers resulting from this agreement was the supply to 
China of Israeli ELL-8300 signals intelligence equipment which closely resembled 
a USA system installed on USA intelligence surveillance aircraft. Israel had legally 
procured USA surveillance aircraft equipped with electronic intelligence equipment. 
Unattributable sources reported that Israel back-engineered the intelligence equipment 
from the USA RC135 reconnaissance aircraft.
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9.2.2 Israeli Tank Industiy
When Israel was formed in 1948 the military had French Hotchkiss, British Cromwell 
and American Sherman tanks (Steinberg, 1986). In 1954 Israeli technicians were 
transferred to the Bourges Arsenal in France to design turret mountings for the US 
Sherman tank with a French tank gun. By 1956 Israeli workshops were building 
M50 Mark 1 Sherman tanks from M4A4 hulls and French turret castings (Foss, 
1986). These tanks were used in the 1956 war when Egypt nationalised the company 
running the Suez Canal and Israel attacked Egypt and occupied the Gaza Strip and 
the Sinai. With the benefit of combat experience the Israelis began to improve the 
tank design for their operational requirement and implemented modifications to the 
tracks and suspension and replaced the engine and the gun. Further designs resulted 
in the M51 tank which was used in the pre-1967 border conflict with Syria, the 1968- 
70 War of Attrition and the 1973 Yom Kippur war.
From their battle experience of 1967 Israel decided to direct effort first to armour 
protection, secondly to firepower and thirdly to mobility. The USA contributed over 
$100M towards the development and production of the Merkava main battle tank. 
The Merkava was first delivered in 1979 and used in battle in 1982 in the invasion 
of Lebanon. The Israelis were world leaders in the development of reactive armour 
to counter armour-penetrating missiles. The Merkava's machine gun was 
manufactured in Israel under licence from the FN company in Belgium. In the 1973 
Yom Kippur War several Israeli tanks ran out of ammunition so the design of the 
Merkava was adjusted to accommodate an increased ammunition supply space.
Page 232
Chapter 9
9.2.3 Israeli Aircraft Industiy
Prior to the mid 1950s Israel sent its aircraft to France for maintenance and servicing. 
The Israeli aircraft industry began with the setting up of maintenance facilities, 
known as Bedek Aviation which was founded in 1953 as a unit within the Israeli 
Ministry of Defence. In 1967 Bedek ceased being part of the Ministry and became 
a Government owned corporation, its name being changed to Israel Aircraft Industries 
on 1st April 1967 (Jackson, 1995).
In 1956 after the Suez War Israel began licensed production of aircraft, the Fouga 
Magister jet trainers licensed by France. Israel also provided engineers to participate 
in the design of Mirage aircraft purchased from France. After the Six Day War in 
1967 the French imposed an arms embargo on Israel, refusing to deliver 50 Mirage 
fighter aircraft which had been previously ordered. Israel's response was the 
production by IAI of a fighter aircraft, the Nesher, which was an Israeli reverse 
engineered version of the French Mirage (Jackson, 1995). The production of the 
Nesher involved obtaining forgings and pre-formed panels from USA and the 
informal procurement of drawings from France (Jackson, 1995). The next aircraft to 
be produced in Israel was the Kfir delta-wing fighter aircraft, the design of which 
was also based on the Mirage, and which contained an estimated 40% imported 
components. The aircraft's engine, General Electric J79 engine, was of USA design 
and this resulted in US export restrictions on the Israeli aircraft. In order to avoid 
the export restrictions Israel negotiated the purchase of French SNECMA engines for 
the Kfir in 1989.1srael has succeeded in exporting the Kfir to USA, Chile, Colombia 
and Ecuador( Jackson, 1995).
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Israel requested a part manufacture under licence agreement from the USA for the 
F-16 fighter aircraft but this was refused because the USA was concerned about the 
loss of technology. Yitzak Rabin, (Chief of Staff, Defence Minister and Prime 
Minister) had argued that the best strategy for Israel was the import of major 
weapons platforms such as aircraft together with fitting out the platforms with 
indigenously produced components and systems (Congress of the United States Office 
of Technology Assessment, 1991).
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9.2.4 Missiles
Table 9.2.4.1 Missile manufacture in Israel
Missile Comments
Gabriel ship launched and air launched 
missile. Developed in 1960s.
Highly successful export to more than seven 
countries.
South Africa took a licence to manufacture in 
1984. Taiwan took out a licence to 
manufacture in 1978.
Shafrir air to air missile. First production 
1965.
Exported to Chile, South Africa, Taiwan.
This is reported to have been based on the 
design of the USA Sidewinder to which there 
are close similarities.
Popeye anti-ship missile In USA negotiated licensed production of the 
Israeli designed Popeye.
Python 3 air to air missile, marketed in 1981 This design is also reported to closely 
resemble the USA Sidewinder.
Barak 1 ship defence missile, developed by 
IAI and Rafael, developed late 1980s.
ADAMS air defence missile by Rafael, 1985
Mapats portable anti-tank missile, produced 
in 1985 by IMI
The Israeli design is based on the Soviet 
Sagger missile and the USA Hughes TOW 
missile. The warhead and propulsion system 
resemble that o f the USA TOW.
Nimrod air or ground launch laser guided 
missile, developed by IAI in the 1980s
Arrow anti-tactical ballistic missile, under 
development 1990
Joint development by Israel and USA as part 
of the US Strategic Defence Initiative 
program. US funding 80 to 90 %.
Jericho ballistic missile, nuclear/conventional. 
Being developed before 1990
Source: table by current author from data in Forecast International ,1991
Table 9.2.4.1 shows the range of missiles manufactured by Israeli industry. The list 
demonstrates the sophisticated level of Israeli technology. Missile manufacturing also
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shows that Israel has used joint development and joint funding with the USA to 
develop military technology, has been capable of using state of the art technology 
from other countries to develop Israeli designs and has built up a strong export trade. 
Other countries have negotiated licensed production of the Israeli designed missiles, 
including USA, which indicates that Israeli technology is extremely advanced.
9.2.5 Conclusions
1. Israel's survival has depended heavily on its military might and Israel has given 
high priority to self-reliance and assured security of supply in weapons. The 
country's arms industry is one of its strong military assets. The series of arms 
embargoes against Israel and the political pressure exerted by the arms supplier 
countries forced Israel to develop and maintain a capable defence industry.
2. Government involvement in the industry was important particularly in dealings 
and negotiations with USA. Military grants of approximately $1.8 billion 
annually from USA directly benefit Israeli industry for procurement, 
development and research programmes for aircraft, tanks, missiles and 
electronics systems.
3. Defence manufacturing technology was built up slowly starting with 
comparatively simple technology such as the design of tank turrets in 1954 to 
the manufacture of fighter aircraft in 1990. Israeli engineers learnt skills by 
working on licensed manufacturing and by working in defence companies in
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foreign countries and bringing the skills back to Israel.
4. Other countries systems were manufactured under licence in Israel and designs 
were adjusted and improved to suit Israeli requirements. Israeli designed 
equipment has been sufficiently sophisticated that Israel has even arranged 
licence production of Israeli designed systems in USA, one of the world's most 
technically advanced countries.
5. Israel sought to support its domestic arms industry by exporting arms. Israel has 
a history of being a customer for arms with first-hand experience of the political 
pressure which can be exerted by the supplier nations' governments. Israel has 
strived to use the supply of arms technology to at least one customer country in 
order to apply political pressure to that country.
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9.3. JAPAN
Japan, a constitutional monarchy with the emperor as a symbol of the state, is one 
of the world's major industrial powers and has the capability to manufacture nearly 
all of its military equipment (Forecast International, 1993). Japanese industry 
produces aircraft, ships, engines, military vehicles, small arms, missiles and electronic 
equipment. The security arrangement between USA and Japan, as described in the 
White Paper, 1995 by the Japanese Defense Agency, consisting of the 1954 Mutual 
Defence Assistance Agreement and the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security, makes provision for equal military partnership within Japanese territory. 
As a result of the agreement, Japanese defence relied heavily on the USA for its 
defence structure including planning and equipment.
Japan promotes its image as a pacifist nation and under Article 9 of its constitution, 
the so-called "no war clause", the military priority is defence and not attack. In 
1976 the Japanese cabinet stipulated that the military budget would not exceed 1% 
of the gross national product, GNP, but this stipulation was relinquished in 1986 and 
replaced by a similar stipulation in a five year development plan (Ikegama-Anderson, 
1993). The result of this stipulation was that the arms industry had a steady and 
moderately expanding domestic market. The literature emphasises Japan's pacifist 
policies, economic success and its low level of military expenditure, but for 
completeness it is useful to examine the quantitative evidence of Japan's military 
stance. The pacifist country, Japan is sixth in the world ranking of highest military 
expenditure, with higher military expenditure for example than mainland China, Iraq
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(before the 1990 Gulf crisis), Saudi Arabia or Israel. Japan is the world's seventh 
leading arms importer, importing more than Iran, Germany, United Arab Emirates or 
Israel (SIPRI, 1993).
"The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised" is the often quoted 
passage from the Japanese constitution of 1946 (SIPRI, 1971) and the constitution 
requires that Japan would use the minimum force necessary for defence. 
Nevertheless Japan's military capability has not been entirely limited by its 
constitutional intentions. The 1995 White Paper by the Japanese Defense Agency 
points out that diplomatic efforts alone are not always sufficient to prevent arms 
aggression from foreign nations and nor can they counter agression if it takes place. 
The Paper concludes that military strength is the last resort in the defence of peace 
and security and defence capability had to be deliberately and continually built up. 
Cloughly (1996) points out that Japan has the capability of bringing major force to 
bear against an enemy. The air force is highly trained in both defence and strike 
techniques. The 1995 White Paper by the Japanese Defense Agency judges that there 
is strong possibility of any direct invasion starting with surprise aircraft and missile 
attack and that the aerial attacks would be repeated. The Paper points out that the 
Japanese defence forces would counter the attack by interception as far from Japanese 
territory as possible and at the same time by inflicting heavy damage on the enemy 
in order to make it difficult for the enemy to continue assaults. The Paper describes 
the importance of surveillance equipment (radars and airborne early warning) and 
interceptors (fighter aircraft and surface-to-air guided missiles) to counter aerial 
attack. The Japanese navy has sixteen conventional submarines which is the same
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number as has the UK Royal Navy, and the army has a comparable number of tanks 
to the UK. Thus the Japanese defence industry does have a substantial domestic 
market despite the constraints of the constitution.
Ikegama-Anderson, 1993 has pointed out that Japanese industry has pursued arms 
development and production, not because it is particularly profitable but because the 
market is stable and secure and also the technology development is attractive. 
Ikegama-Anderson, 1993 reports that Japanese industry has deliberately directed 
effort to increase its share of the domestic market in competition with US suppliers. 
Government support to the defence industry is seen in willingness to fund 
development and procure domestically produced arms at far higher cost than 
procurement by import. The high level of research investment by industry has 
resulted in industry rather than government owning the technology. Japanese 
industrialists have formed powerful lobby groups which have proposed increased 
domestic share of defence procurement (Ikegama-Anderson, 1993) and the 
government five-year plan, Shin Chuki-Bofor for the period 1991 to 1995 included 
development plans specifically aimed at reducing the reliance of Japanese industry 
on US sources.
9.3.1 Military exports
Japan has no law which says that it cannot export weapon systems, but the Japanese 
companies wishing to export m ilitary  products have to win approval from the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, MITI, which effectively disallows them 
(Ikegama-Anderson, 1993). The regulations forbidding arms exports have prevented
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Japan from building up their arms industries to the same extent as other industries. 
Japanese companies have not been totally excluded from foreign defence markets. 
Cloughly, (1996) reported that Japan provided the former USSR with advanced 
marine propeller technology applicable to submarines. Japan has exported military 
radars and a range of dual use technologies including semiconductors and electronic 
components. Japan is the world's twentieth leading arms exporter, exporting more 
than Australia, Brazil, Italy or Argentina (US Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, 1992). The level of Japanese arms exports in 1989 was $110 million, which 
is very low in terms of the total Japanese exports, i.e. it represents less than 0.05% 
of total Japanese exports. For comparison the ratio of arms exports to total exports 
for the UK and for the USA is 2%  and 3%. If Japan had a freer arms export policy 
and the ratio of arms to total exports were allowed to rise to the same level as other 
industrialised nations, then an estimate is that the level of arms exports might be 
forty to fifty times higher.
Table 9.3.1 Value in Millions US Dollais of Arms Exports in 1989.
Japan United Kingdom USA
Arms exports 110 3,000 112,000
Arms exports/total 
exports
<0.05% 2% 3%
Source: table by current author from data presented in World Military Expenditures 
and Arms transfers, 1990 by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1992.
Ikegama-Anderson (1993) considers that a share of Japanese exports is in dual use 
technology such as semiconductors and aircraft materials to be used on weapon 
systems and in aircraft manufacture in overseas companies and therefore there is
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indirect involvement of Japanese industry in international arms production.
9.3.2 The Japanese Defence Industiy
Japan shares common economic interests with the USA as both are major economic 
powers of the world (Cloughly, 1996) and Japan is one of the USA's biggest military 
customers (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1992). The Japanese 
defence industry was dismantled or requisitioned by the Allied Forces after Japan's 
defeat in World War II and renewal of the defence industry began after the outbreak 
of the Korean war, 1950 to 1953 (Ikegama-Anderson, 1993). At that time Japan was 
virtually totally dependent on the USA for the supply of defence equipment. The 
United States was instrumental in starting military production in Japan through its 
arms procurement plan for the American forces in Korea and through US special 
procurement programmes for South East Asia. The development of the aircraft, 
missile and arms industries in Japan has been based on technology transfer from USA 
and licensed production of US systems. The Japanese Defence Agency figures 
reported in Defence News (3 December 1990) indicated that by 1990 Japanese 
industry was producing 40% of the weapon requirements either indigenously or 
through licensed production and 60% was imported from the USA, and the Office of 
Technology Assessment (1991) reported that Japanese industry was producing 90% 
of Japanese defence equipment.
Ikegama-Anderson, 1993 noted that the Japanese Government has promoted 
international cooperation in research and development in defence technologies in 
order to raise the skills available in-country. From the end of World War II there was
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a flow of technology from the USA to Japan and the Japanese technology base grew. 
In the 1980s there were agreements between the USA and Japan to redress the 
imbalance in the flow of military technology and to enable Japanese technology to 
be transferred to the USA. Actions were taken to create a ’’two way street’’ and to 
set up a framework for collaboration on military technologies:
Exchange of Technology Agreements, 1983
Detailed Arrangements for the transfer of Military Technologies, 1985 
A government to government agreement in 1987 involving Japanese 
participation in the USA Strategic Defence Initiative, SDI, research project.
In March 1990 America and Japan agreed to co-operate on research and development 
of technologies which were considered critical to three areas of future US military 
systems: submarine stealth, target seeker technology for missiles and high efficiency 
rocket engines. The view expressed by the Office of Technology Assessment (1991) 
was that technical cooperation had resulted in major benefit to Japan in the build up 
of Japanese military technology and a strong defence industrial base but there had 
been a failure to produce a reciprocal flow of technology to the USA.
9.3.3 The Japanese Aircraft Industiy
The Congress of the United States Office of Technology Assessment (1991) 
considered that licensed production of several types of USA military aircraft has 
made a major contribution to the development of aerospace technology in Japanese 
companies and examples of licensed production programmes include:
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Bell UH-1H Huey helicopter
Bell AH-IS Cobra helicopter
Lockheed P-3C Orion patrol aircraft
Boeing 107 Model II helicopter
Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopter
McDonnel Douglas Model 500D helicopter
McDonnel Douglas F-4E Phantom jet fighter aircraft
McDonnel Douglas F-15J and F-15DJ Eagle jet fighter aircraft
Sikorsky S-61, S-61A and S-61B helicopters.
The Japanese FS-X programme, the Fighter Support Exploratory aircraft, was aimed 
at Mitsubishi developing an improved version of the USA F-16C fighter aircraft, and 
to replace the F-l aircraft in the Japanese inventory. The programme was being 
negotiated in 1990 as a codevelopment programme involving technology sharing with 
the US company General Dynamics, which later became Lockheed Martin, and cost 
sharing was set at 60% Japan and 40% USA. There was concern in both countries 
about the possible loss of technology lead and the level of technology transfer and 
the result was that by 1995 Japan was totally responsible for the FS-X programme 
including the funding (Jane’s All the World's Aircraft, 1994-5).
9.3.4 The Japanese Missile Industiy
Japan is a major missile manufacturer, most of the missile systems being 
manufactured by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Tokyo 
Shibaura Electric which is part of Toshiba and Kawasaki Heavy Industries (Kieman
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Chaisson, 1995). Mitsubishi Heavy Industries which is the largest Japanese missile 
producer was in 1995 continuing attempts to reduce and eventually eliminate its 
dependence on USA designed missiles and had undertaken a range of missile 
development projects. Toshiba specialises in surface to air missiles and provides a 
smaller share of the missile market than Mitsubishi.
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Table 9.3.4 Japanese missiles in development, production or use in 1995.
MISSILE
DESIGNATION
MANUFACTURER COMMENTS
AAM-1 air-to-air Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Reported to be based on the 
design of the USA Sidewinder 
missile.
AAM-2 air-to-air Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
AAM-3 air-to-air
r.
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries This is an indigenous 
replacement for the imported 
AIM-9 Sidewinder missile in 
the Japanese inventory.
AAM-4 air-to air Mitsubishi Heavy Industries This is reported to be similar to 
the AIM-Sparrow missile which 
was both imported into Japan 
and produced in Japan under 
licence.
AAM-5 air-to-air Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
AIM-7E SPARROW 
air-to-air
Raytheon USA/General 
Dynamics USA  
but co-produced by Mitsubishi 
Japan.
Production in Japan under 
licence from USA
AIM-7F SPARROW 
air-to-air
Raytheon USA/General 
Dynamics USA 
but number manufactured by 
Mitsubishi Japan.
Production in Japan under 
licence from USA
AIM-7N SPARROW 
air-to-air
Raytheon USA/General 
Dynamics USA 
but number manufactured by 
Mitsubishi Japan.
Production in Japan under 
licence from USA
TYPE 64 anti-tank ML Kawasaki Heavy Industries
TYPE 64 anti-tank MA Kawasaki Heavy Industries
TYPE 79 anti-tank Kawasaki Heavy Industries The Kawasaki Type 79 is 
reported to be very similar in 
configuration and in operation 
to the USA Hughes anti-tank 
TOW missile which Japan has 
purchased from USA.
TYPE 80 ASN-1 anti­
ship
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
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TYPE 81 surface to air Tokyo Shibaura E ctric The Japanese Defence Agency 
chose this indigenous 
development in preference to 
an imported Roland, Rapier or 
Crotale.
TYPE 87 wti-tank Kawasaki Heavy Industries
TYPE 90 SSN-1B Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
TYPE 90SSN-1B anti­
ship
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
TYPE 91 KEIHO 
surface to air missile
i
Tokyo Shibaura Electric This man portable shoulder 
launched missile is to replace 
the USA General Dynamics 
Stinger missile in the Japanese 
inventory.
Type 93 ASN-2 anti­
ship missile
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
MIM-104 Patriot Raytheon ,USA and Martin 
Marrietta
Patriot coproduction in Japan is 
by Mitsubishi.
MIM-23 HAWK 
surface to air missile
Raytheon USA Production in Japan by 
Mitsubishi
BGM-71D TOW2 anti­
tank missile
Hughes Aircraft Company Production in Japan by Nihon 
Electric
Source: table by current author from data in SIPRI data base, Jane's Air Launched Weapons(1995) 
and Kieman Chaisson (1995).
Analysis of the Japanese missile systems listed in Table 9.3.5 above shows that one 
third are licensed designs and two thirds are indigenously designed and produced. 
Japan's largest requirement for missiles is for the anti-ship role, and these are 
indigenously manufactured in Japan. Approximately one fifth by value of the 
world's anti-ship missiles are manufactured by Mitsubishi, and the company is second 
only to the Russian Federation Arsenal in the level of anti-ship missile 
manufacturing.
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9.3.5 Japanese Tank Industiy
The main purpose of tanks is to spearhead an attack into a battle zone to take the 
land quickly and allow the troops to follow up and secure the position (Foss, 1987). 
The Japanese constitution, Article 9, the "no war clause" dictates that the military 
priority is defence rather than attack and therefore the Japanese requirement for tanks 
in Japan has not been as great as the requirement for sea or air defence systems. The 
Japanese tank industry therefore has a smaller domestic market in comparison to the 
ship and aircraft industries. Examination of Table 9.3.5.1 shows that the tanks in use 
in the Japanese inventory were American in 1950, one American and two Japanese 
(with a high level of US and German features) in 1986 and all Japanese 
manufactured with no imported tanks in 1993.
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Table 9.3.5.1 Japanese tanks in deployment with the Japanese Ground Self
Defence Force
Year Tank designation Comments
1950 Sherman M4 Medium Tank. 
Manufactured in USA, American 
Locomotive Company, Baldwin 
Locomotive Works, Detroit Tank 
Arsenal, Ford Motor Company, 
etc.
Imported
M24 Chaffee manufactured in 
USA. Imported
1986 M41 manufactured by General 
Motors Corporation, USA
Imported
Type 61 manufactured by 
Mitsubishi, Jap an. Japanese manufacture. 
Similarity in design of turret to 
the USA M4 Sherman tank.
Type 74 manufactured by 
Mitsubishi, Japan. Japanese manufacture. Contains 
many features of German, USA, 
British and French tanks.
1993 Type 90 manufactured by 
Mitsubishi, Japan.
Indigenous manufacture in 
Japan except for the 120mm 
smooth bore gun which is being 
manufactured under licence 
from Rheinmetall of Germany.
Type 61 manufactured by 
Mitsubishi,Japan.
Type 74 manufactured by 
Mitsubishi, Japan.
Japanese manufacture. 
Japanese manufacture.
Source: table by current author from data in World Defence Almanac, 1993, Jane's 
Armour and Artillery 1986-87 and 1994-95.
The Japanese Ground Self Defence Force was formed in 1950 (Ikegama-Anderson, 
1993) and the USA supplied the Force with Sherman and M24 Chaffee tanks. The 
USA also supplied M47 tanks for evaluation. The American tanks were not designed 
for the small height of the Japanese soldiers and the size and weight of the tanks
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were not optimised for transportation over Japanese mountainous territory (Ikegama- 
Anderson, 1993). The General Motors light tank, the M41, which was developed 
after the M24, was exported to Japan and was the only imported tank of the three 
battle tanks in the Japanese tank inventory in 1986 (Jane's Armour and Artillery 
1986-87).
In 1954 the Technical Research and Development Headquarters of the Japanese Self 
Defence Force- began the design of the first post war Japanese tank. Four prototypes 
were produced, the ST-A3 and ST-A4 and in 1962 a standard Type 61 Main Battle 
Tank was produced by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. There is similarity to the USA 
M4 which the Japanese had in inventory, in the overhanging design of the turret of 
the Japanese Type 61 (Jane's Armour and Artillery 1986-87 and 1994-95). The Type 
61 is one of the three types of main battle tanks in deployment by the Japanese 
forces in 1993 (Table 9.3.5.1).
In 1962 the Japanese Ground Self Defence Force and Mitsubishi began to define the 
requirements of a new tank which was to become the Type 74 Main Battle tank 
(Jane's Armour and Artillery 1986-87 and 1994-95). The design contained the 
features of many other state of the art tanks being developed by other countries at 
that time:
hydro-pneumatic suspension of the MVT-60 tank, 
hull of the German Leopard tank.
105mm gun as used on the German Leopard, the USA A-60, British 
Centurion and other tanks.
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tank turret similar to the French AMX-30 tank.
The Type 74 Main Battle Tank was one of the three main battle tanks deployed by 
the Japanese forces in 1993 (Table 9.3.5.1).
In 1976 Japan started the research and development plan for a new tank, the STC, 
TK-X (Jane's Armour and Artillery 1986-87 and 1994-95). The first two prototypes 
had Japanese 120mm guns but it became necessary to replace them with the German 
Rheinmettall 120mm small bore gun. By 1987 the prototype design was complete. 
The tank was designated the Type 90 and it is indigenously manufactured in Japan 
except for the 120mm smooth bore gun which is being manufactured under licence 
from Rheinmetall of Germany. The turret is very similar to the turret of the German 
Leopard 2 tank.
The developments of Japanese tanks since the 1950s to the 1990s described in this 
section and summarised in Table 9.3.5.1 have shown that the Japanese tank industry 
has benefitted from the designs of US imported tanks and from the influence of 
European designs. More complex elements of the tank such as the suspension, the 
hull design, the turret, the gun were imported, copied or manufactured under licence 
in the 1960s. By the 1990s the new Japanese main battle tank is indigenously 
designed except for the licence produced gun.
Table 9.3.5.2 shows the 1993 tank inventories of the major tank producing countries:
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Table 9.3.5.2 Tank inventories in the year 1993 of the armed forces of major tank 
producing countries.
Country Tank inventory in 1993
Commonwealth of 37,000
Independent States
19,806
USA
1,470
France
4,070
Germany
1,198
United Kingdom
1,215
Japan
Source : table by current author from data in World's Defence Almanac 1993
The tank inventory, i.e. the domestic market of the Japanese tank industry, is an order 
of magnitude less than that of USA or CIS and is comparable to the inventory of 
France, UK and Germany. The Japanese tank manufacturers do not have access to 
export markets as do the manufacturers of other countries. The procurement of the 
indigenous Type 90 Main Battle Tank was reported to have cost 1.2 billion yen, 
which is three times as much as the USA equivalent, the M1A1 Abrams tank 
(Ikegama-Anderson, 1993).
9.3.6 Japanese Shipping
The navy has been an important part of the Japanese defence force because the main 
perceived threat to the nation was the former Soviet Union and Japan stands between 
the Russian Pacific fleet bases at Vladivostock and Sovyetkaya Cavan and the Pacific 
Ocean (Forecast International, 1991). The Japanese naval fleet is the third largest in
Page 252
Chapter 9
the world after America and Russia when measured in terms of the numbers and age 
of escort craft and conventional submarines (World’s Defence Almanac 1993).
The principle manufacturers of naval ships (Jane's International Defence Directory, 
1993) are:
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 
Kawaski Heavy Industries
Ishikawajima Heavy Industries
Sumitomo
Mitsui
Hitachi
submarines, destroyers
submarines, gas turbine engines licensed by 
Rolls Royce,
destroyers, amphibious craft 
destroyers, frigates 
destroyers, frigates 
destroyers, frigates
There are less reports of technology transfers or licensed production of ships than for 
airborne or land based weapon systems (SIPRI, 1993) but unnattributable comments 
by naval experts indicate that the indigenous Japanese designs closely resemble US 
ships.
9.3.7 Conclusion
1. After World War II the Japanese defence industry was dismantled. Renewal 
of the defence industry began in the early 1950s after the outbreak of the 
Korean War mainly through the setting up of USA special procurement
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programmes based on technology transfer and licensed production of US 
systems. Japan seized the opportunity to use licensed manufacturing as a 
mechanism to upgrade the skill of its workforce. Licensed production of US 
designed equipment has been key to enabling Japan to re-establish its arms 
industry. As the Japanese defence industry became established industrial and 
Government policy was directed to reducing dependence on USA sourced 
technology. The level of self sufficiency of arms rose from 0% in 1950 to 
between 40% and 96% in the 1990s.
2 Japan has a highly diversified industrial base and is one of the world's major
industrial powers. The country is sixth in the world ranking of highest 
military expenditure and therefore the domestic market for Japanese defence 
industry is substantial in world terms.
3. The limited access to arms exports and Japan's pacifist policies indicate that 
the potential for earning foreign exchange and gaining influence on customer 
nations is not an important issue in the strategy to build and retain a defence 
industry.
4. The USA has expressed concern over the transfer of technology to Japan and 
the loss of technology lead. This was demonstrated in the negotiations of the 
joint development of the Japanese FS-X aircraft in the early 1990s and 
resulted in Japan taking full responsibility for the programme which 
demonstrated Japan's requirement for improved self-reliance and security of
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supply.
5. The extra cost of indigenous production over the cost of imported arms 
demonstrates that short term cost reduction is not as important as other issues 
relating to the promotion of a domestic arms manufacturing capability.
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9.4 ASEAN
The Association of South-East Asian Nations, ASEAN, was formed by Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in August 1967 (Europa World 
Yearbook, 1991). The group was joined in 1984 by Brunei and by Vietnam in 1995. 
In the early 1990s discussions were progressing on Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar 
joining the association but this had not been achieved by 1996 (Barclays Economics 
Department Country Report, 1996). There has been a steady build up of defence 
capabilities in all the countries of south-east Asia in the decade since the setting up 
of the association except for Vietnam and Thailand (SIPRI Yearbooks 1991, 1995). 
South East Asia's defence expenditure has risen as a proportion of world defence 
expenditure from 15% in 1980 to 25% in 1991.
The ASEAN countries have recognised that regional stability is highly dependant on 
the balance of military power and it was not until the 1990s that the Association 
started to address military issues (Cloughly, 1995). ASEAN was set up primarily for 
economic development and cooperation and not for military alliance. The ASEAN 
countries do not welcome interference from fellow members on their own domestic 
disputes and do not have multi-lateral co-ordination on military issues (Willett, 1996). 
The individual countries do have bilateral links, for example the Malaysian purchase 
of equipment from Indonesia. The ASEAN forces co-operated for the first time in 
1993 in a military exercise hosted by Australia, the forces comprising the navies of 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, Singapore Air Force and observers from Thailand 
(Cloughly, 1995). Also in 1993 security and defence were discussed between the
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member countries for the first time under the auspices of the newly created ASEAN 
Regional Forum. The discussions included regional security issues and economic co­
operation but did not extend to any multilateral defence arrangement or co-ordination 
of equipment procurement (Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 May 1993 and 18 December 
1993). In June 1996 the ASEAN Regional Forum issued a communique challenging 
China's claim to sovereignty in the South China Sea (Defence News, 29 July 1996). 
The significance of this event is that it was the first serious security issue addressed 
by the alliance.
Table 9.4 presents a summary of the arms production and military profiles of the 
ASEAN countries: the table shows the wide variations in the economics and the 
military profiles between the countries.
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9.4.1 Bninei
Brunei is the second richest ASEAN country, after Singapore, in terms of GNP per 
capita and has the smallest population (Europa World Yearbook, 1991). Brunei was 
a British Protected State until 1971 when it was granted full self government. Britain 
remained responsible for advice on defence matters until independence in 1984 but 
continued to have strong links with Brunei in military training and arms sales and in 
the presence of the British Gurkha battalion in Brunei (Cloughly, 1995). Brunei has 
military links with another ASEAN country in that Singapore has an infantry 
battalion based in Brunei. Brunei armed forces also have military training in 
Australia and in USA.
The flourishing economy of this oil rich country depends almost entirely on income 
from rents, royalties, taxes and dividends from the oil and gas industries (Europa 
World Yearbook, 1991). The need to diversify economically was recognised in a 
series of government development plans and in the fifth development plan covering 
1986 to 1990 plans were announced to set up a regional centre for finance and 
banking. Brunei has neither the requirement nor the capability to manufacture arms 
(Cloughly,1995). Brunei has a high level of education but lacks technology and 
marketing expertise to diversify industrially. Brunei has no arms manufacturing 
companies, no defence research organisations and no military service companies 
(Jane's International Defence Directory, 1995). The size of the armed forces is very 
small at 4,400 personnel in 1991 (Bonsignore, 1993) and the requirement for arms 
is negligible. Effort has been directed to a higher priority of becoming more self- 
sufficient in food production (Europa World Yearbook, 1991).
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9.4.2 Indonesia
Indonesia is the largest of the ASEAN countries with 13,677 islands, the largest 
being Sumatra (Europa World Yearbook, 1991). It has an oil-dependent economy 
and is a member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC. 
There are vast natural resources and Indonesia exports tin, gas, coffee, wood and 
rubber. A military priority is given to monitoring, controlling and safeguarding the 
waters and the islands' natural resources (Cloughly,1995).
Indonesia has experienced a history of arms blockades and political pressure from 
its supplier countries (SIPRI, 1971). Its traditional supplier, the USA, restricted arms 
supplies to the Indonesian armed forces and supplied arms to insurgents in 1958 and 
consequently Indonesia turned to other supplier countries, mainly Warsaw Pact 
countries. Again in 1960 the USA refused to make additional arms available and 
Indonesia obtained arms from the Soviet Union. When Great Britain embargoed 
arms exports to Indonesia in 1962 further supplies were obtained from the Soviet 
Union. In 1963 anti-British riots broke out in response to the establishment of the 
Federation of Malaysia, an event seen in Indonesia as perpetrating British 
imperialism. A number of British owned companies in Indonesia was seized and an 
arms embargo against Indonesia was enforced by Great Britain, USA and Canada.
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9.4.2.1 Arms production in Indonesia
Indonesia's goal is to achieve a degree of self sufficiency in arms production and 
aims to achieve a self-sustaining, dual use, defence/civil industry without government 
subsidy (Matthews, 1993). After Singapore, Indonesia has the second most 
diversified and advanced defence industrial base in the ASEAN group (Congress of 
the United States, Office of Technology Assessment). Countertrade is widely used 
to provide technology transfer to Indonesian civil and military industry and to secure 
offset manufacturing contracts (Congress of the United States, Office of Technology 
Assessment, 1991). In the early 1990s the country continued to import the majority 
of its defence equipment and the value of indigenous production, mainly production 
of aircraft, remained steady but low (Matthews, 1993).
9.4.2.2 The dual function ”Dwi Fungsi" defence industiy
Indonesia's approach to increasing self-sufficiency in arms differs from that of other 
industrialised countries in that the government policies are directed towards a defence 
industry which in peacetime allocates three quarters of its production capacity to civil 
production and one quarter to military production but which retains the capability to 
ramp up to surge production at a time of crisis (Matthews, 1993). By 1990 the 
defence industry continued to be subsidised by the government, but there were plans 
to remove industrial subsidies. The Minister of State for Research and Technology, 
Dr BJ.Habibie, laid out the plans for the integration of the country's civil-military- 
industrial development (Matthews, 1993) and the emphasis was on the promotion of 
efficiency through local technology development (Willett, 1996). The aim was to 
achieve a network of skilled subcontractors, funded partly by compulsory
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contributions from the prime contractors’ profits. The shipbuilding and aerospace 
industries were considered as the technological leaders of the civil-military 
industrialisation programs. Culturally, Indonesia's military role is merged with its 
civil activities. In February 1988 the dual function, or Dwi Fungsi, i.e. the military 
and socio-economic function of the Indonesian Armed Forces, the ABRI, was 
codified under new legislation. The armed forces and the civilians share defence 
responsibility and civilians are expected to wage guerrilla warfare in support of ABRI 
(Willett. 1996).
9.4.2.3 Aircraft industiy in Indonesia
The main focus of Indonesia’s defence industry has been the aircraft industry for the 
manufacture and assembly of transporter aircraft, trainers and helicopters mainly 
under licence (Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, 
1991). Table 9.4.2.3 shows the licensed military production activities in Indonesia 
from 1972 to 1992.
Table 9.4.2.3 Licensed production in Indonesia
Date Weapon system
1976 CN-212 Aviocar transport aircraft from Spain. Quantity 40.
1982 Model 412 helicopter from USA. 
Quantity 16.
1982 PB-57 Patrol craft from Germany F.R. 
Quantity 6.
1983 AS-332 Super Puma helicopter from France. 
Quantity 10.
1987 NBo-105 helicopter from Germany F.R. 
Quantity 60.
1992 Hawk-100 trainer aircraft from UK. 
Quantity 14.
1992 Hawk-200 trainer aircraft from UK. 
Quantity 10.
Source: table by current author from data presented by SIPRI (1993)
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The Indonesian government centralised the aerospace facilities to form the company 
Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara, IPTN, in 1976 (Congress of the United States, 
Office of Technology Assessment, 1991). In 1980 the Aircraft Technology Industries 
consortium of IPTN of Indonesia and CASA of Spain started the design and 
coproduction of the CN-235 multi-purpose transport aircraft. Design and production 
were shared equally. By 1995 215 of these aircraft had been ordered and 124 had 
been delivered in civil and military versions to eighteen countries such as France, 
Spain, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and the ASEAN countries Brunei, 
Indonesia and Malaysia (Jane's All the World’s Aircraft, 1995). The supply of 
Indonesian built CN-235 transporters to Malaysia involved a countertrade of 
Malaysian built Proton cars, and CN-235 transporters to Thailand involved a 
countertrade of rice (Willett, 1996). In 1989 Indonesia announced its first 
indigenously designed transport aircraft, the IPTN N-250-100, and the first flight of 
this aircraft was in 1995. Indonesia was seeking an agreement with USA to set up 
a second production line for the N-250-100 in the USA (Jane's All the World's 
Aircraft, 1995). The IPTN company has a division for the production of weaponry 
for aircraft. The company also produces components for the USA Boeing 737 and 
767, the German Fokker 100 and the USA Lockheed F-16, and carries out 
maintenance, overhaul and repair for a wide range of aircraft engines (Congress of 
the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, 1991).
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9.4.2.4 Ship building
Ninety per cent by value of Indonesia's trade is by sea and the country's ship building 
industry supports inter-island trade (Congress of the United States, Office of 
Technology Assessment, 1991). The company PT PAL specialises in the build and 
repair of civil and military ships. Indonesia has the capability to build patrol craft, 
for example in the 1950s and 1960s twenty seven patrol craft and two submarine 
chasers were built (SIPRI, 1971). Indonesia continues to rely heavily on the import 
of naval vessels, for example in the acquisition of 39 former East German ships in 
1992 (SIPRI, 1993). In 1995 a total of six naval ships were under construction for 
Indonesia, four being built domestically and two imported (Jane's Fighting Ships 
Special Report, 1995).
9.4.2.5 Ordnance
The company PT Pindad produces small arms and ammunition. The company's 
manufacture of civil products including electric generators, traction motors and 
airbrakes for the railway industry was in 1993 not running at full capacity and only 
the military product lines contributed to company profits (Congress of the United 
States, Office of Technology Assessment, 1991).
9.4.2.6 Countertrade
Indonesia has a strict countertrade policy in order to fill its production capacity and 
to benefit from technology transfer (Matthews, 1993). Table 9.4.2.3 shows the 
licensed production agreements of aircraft and ships. Offset agreements are often a 
feature of foreign purchases (Congress of the United States, Office of Technology
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Assessment, 1991). An offset deal concerning the purchase of F-16 fighter aircraft 
in the late 1980s committed General Dynamics to the procurement of components for 
F-16s (Willett, 1996). In the early 1990s the shipbuilders PT PAL negotiated 
collaborative agreements with the German company MAN, the Japanese company 
Mitsubishi and the Finnish Wartsilla for repair and maintenance contracts: PT
Pindad, the ordnance company had negotiated collaborative production of machine 
tools with Japanese, Dutch, German and Taiwanese companies (Willett, 1996).
9.4.3 Malaysia
In the 1990s Malaysia has had one of the fastest growing economies in South East 
Asia and has emerged from being a developing to a newly industrialised country 
(Kamiol, 1995). Malaysia’s exports were highly dependent on rubber and tin but the 
export list has diversified to palm oil, timber, petroleum, gas, cocoa and 
manufactured goods. The defence budget dropped from 6% of GDP to 2.3% of GDP 
from 1985 to 1988.
Since the Communist Party of Malaya launched an insurgency in 1948 the Malaysian 
Armed Forces were structured to concentrate on internal security (Europa World 
Yearbook, 1991). In 1989 the outlawed Communist Party agreed to a negotiated 
settlement with the government and following this agreement the government decided 
to change the nature of the armed forces from counterinsurgency to a conventional 
force (Kamiol, 1995). Equipment procurement in the first half of the 1990s was 
aimed at developing conventional force capability.
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Malaysia and Brunei are the few ASEAN countries which do not produce major 
weapons. Military production is limited to shipbuilding, small arms and ammunition 
and electrical equipment manufacture (Forecast International, 1993). Malaysia’s 
economic 5-year development plans include developing the armed forces capabilities 
and there have been efforts to link defence and economic development in the 6th 
Malaysian Plan of 1991-1995 (Kamiol, 1995). The Malaysian Defence Minister Dat’ 
Syed Hamid Albar emphasised that military procurement should be linked to 
industrial offset programmes. Examples of industry development plans to be linked 
with arms purchase were a) procurement of offshore patrol ships was linked to 
extending the capabilities of the Lumut shipyard from overhaul and maintenance to 
full shipbuilding (Willett, 1996), b) in 1994 a contract for 20 Russian Mikoyan 
MiG-29 fighter aircraft included payment with refined palm oil worth $95 million 
and c) as part of the 1994 Memorandum of Understanding with Korea the 
procurement of Daiwoo Infantry Fighting Vehicles was linked to an agreement by 
Daiwoo Heavy Industries to set up assembly plants in Malaysia for fork lift trucks 
and land excavating vehicles.
In 1995 two naval warships were under construction for Malaysia, both foreign built 
by Yarrow Shipyards of Glasgow and none were being built domestically (Jane's 
Fighting Ships Special Report, 1995).
Malaysia has had success in developing refurbishment and repair facilities for aircraft 
including facilities for the Hercules C-130 transporter aircraft. Airod Sdn Bhd, based 
in Selangor, is a joint venture company formed by the USA company Lockheed
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Aircraft Services and the Aerospace Industries Malaysia Sdn Bhd for the 
maintenance, repair and overhaul of both civil and military aircraft and the 
manufacture of components and electronics (Jane’s All the Worlds’ Aircraft, 1995). 
Another joint venture company Domier Seastar Malaysia SDn Bhd was formed in 
1993 by the German company Domier and three Malaysian companies, Aerospace 
Industries Malaysia, Realmild and Koperasi Polis. The DSM company agreed to 
establish a manufacturing facility scheduled to start production of Domier Seastar CD 
2 seaplanes in 1996 (Jane's All the Worlds’ Aircraft, 1995).
9.4.4 Singapore
Singapore possesses the largest defence industry in the ASEAN group (Congress of 
the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, 1991). The country has had 
rapid growth in civilian manufacturing in the 1960s, 70s and 80s (Europa World 
Yearbook, 1991) and the advanced industrial infrastructure supports a wide range of 
production capabilities and services, partly due to international corporations from 
USA, Europe and Japan setting up trading and manufacturing facilities in Singapore 
(Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, 1991).
Shanson (1990) described how Singapore's military strategy and stmcture were 
modeled with the help of Israeli advisers and there is a degree of similarity in that 
both countries have achieved a substantial level of domestic arms production. 
Singapore has made military links with foreign defence forces. Military training is 
carried out with USA, Taiwan, Indonesia and Brunei. Training on the F-16 fighter 
aircraft is carried out in USA and other flying training in Australia (Cloughly, 1995).
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The USA regional naval logistics command headquarters which was withdrawn from 
the Philippines is based in Singapore.
There has been high level of government involvement in the development of the 
defence industry. The Singapore Government promoted ship building in the late 
1960s and provided substantial investment in shipyards, the Singapore Shipbuilding 
and Engineering Pte, Sembawang Shipyard and Keppel Shipyard Pte (Congress of the 
United States, Office of Technology Assessment, 1991). Japanese shipping 
companies began using Singapore as an export base. The government attracted 
foreign investment in the aerospace industry. Foreign companies were given financial 
and tax incentives to set up manufacture and repair facilities in Singapore. There 
were ten-year tax breaks from the usual 33% corporate income tax (Congress of the 
United States, Office of Technology Assessment, 1991). Aircraft component 
manufacture, assembly and overhaul facilities were set up by Pratt and Whitney, 
Hawker Pacific, TRW, General Electric, Sundstrand, Garrett and Westinghouse. 
Companies were attracted by the skilled workforce and low wage rates. The output 
from the Singapore aerospace sector grew dramatically ($47million in 1977 to 
$795million in 1987). Many foreign airlines use Singapore as a repair and overhaul 
base. During the 1970s there was substantial foreign investment in electronics, metal 
working and precision instrumentation (Europa World Yearbook, 1991) and multi­
national companies such as Hewlett-Packard, National Semiconductor, SCM and 
Cincinnati Milacron located facilities in Singapore (Congress of the United States, 
Office of Technology Assessment, 1991).
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In 1979 the government initiated a substantial incentive scheme in terms of 
subsidised financing and capital depreciation allowances to promote investment in 
public and private research and development (Europa World Yearbook, 1991). A ten 
year Master Plan (1980 to 1990) was launched by the government to boost the 
technology base. This included the setting up of the Singapore Science Park for 
industrial and scientific institutions and the Selectar Air Base for the aeronautics 
industries.
The major defence industries in Singapore are government owned (Congress of the 
United States, Office of Technology Assessment, 1991). The government owned 
Chartered Industries of Singapore, founded in 1967, was transformed into the 
Singapore Technologies Corporation in 1983. STC is a corporation of 47 companies 
grouped in industrial, aerospace, marine and ordnance sectors. The subsidiary 
companies are run on a commercial basis and steps were taken towards privatisation 
in 1991.
The Singapore Technologies Aerospace company carries out overhaul and upgrade 
work on the C-130 military/civil transporter aircraft for the US Navy and also 
assembly of the Aerospatiale Super Puma helicopters (Jane’s All the Worlds' Aircraft 
1995). The company carries out engine overhaul for Pratt and Witney, General 
Electric and Northrop Grumman and component manufacture for F-16 and F5E/F 
fighter aircraft. In 1988 STA set up a joint venture with British Aerospace whereby 
STA carried out manufacture, repair and integration of B.Ae systems in return for 
marketing services.
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The shipbuilding companies have used licensed production, for example Singapore 
Shipbuilding and Engineering have licence-built five Type-62 corvettes from 
Germany (Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1995). France has awarded a repair and overhaul 
contract for the French Indian and Pacific Oceans fleet. All of the seven warships 
under construction for Singapore in 1995 were built domestically and none were 
being imported from overseas (Jane's Fighting Ships Special Report, 1995).
9.4.5 Thailand
The defence industry of Thailand is minimal and there is no indigenous production 
of major weapon systems (Forecast International, 1993). Small arms production was 
started in 1969 and in the 1990s Thailand had almost achieved self-sufficiency in 
small arms, artillery and ammunition (Forecast International, 1993). Thailand has a 
low level of production of aircraft components. There is heavy reliance on foreign 
technology and designs for military production. Thailand does have a military and 
paramilitary shipbuilding capability. Licensed ship-building has been important. 
Licence arrangements have been made for Thalang mine countermeasures craft (in 
1980) and Fantrainer training ships (in 1983 to 1991) from Germany, Province class 
fast attack craft (1989 to 1992) from the UK and PS-700 landing ships from France 
(1984 to 1989) (Willett, 1996). In 1995 all four of the warships under construction 
for Thailand were being supplied from abroad and none were being built domestically 
(Jane's Fighting Ships Special Report, 1995).
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9.4.6 Philippines
The Philippines is a relatively poor country within ASEAN, with a small military 
equipment budget (Bonsignore, 1993). The Armed Forces of the Philippines has 
historically been responsible for arms production and until the 1990s private sector 
arms production was illegal (Forecast International, 1993). Arms production is 
carried out in the manufacture of small arms, ammunition, and communications 
equipment. The country has a shipbuilding industry and in 1995 sixteen warships 
were under construction for the Philippines, twelve being imported and four being 
produced domestically. There has been very low level of licensed production of 
military equipment. In 1992 there was a licensed production deal valued at 
$57 million for 150 armoured personnel vehicles from the UK (SIPRI, 1993).
The Philippine aircraft industry is still in its infancy, carrying out licensed production 
of mainly light aircraft and maintenance. The government established the Philippine 
Aerospace Development Corporation, PADC, in 1973 in order to develop an aviation 
industry (Jane's All the Worlds Aircraft, 1995). The PADC carries out aircraft 
manufacturing, assembly, servicing, maintenance and sales. PADC completed 
licensed production of 18 jet trainers type S.211 from Agusta of Italy in 1993 and 
a further six were built in 1994 (Jane's All the Worlds' Aircraft, 1995). The purchase 
of two Italian SF.600 aircraft in 1995 accompanied a licensed production arrangement 
for local assembly of an additional number of aircraft. The Philippine Helicopter 
Services Inc carries out maintenance and overhaul for BO 105 helicopters, Hughes 
McDonnel Douglas helicopter rotor blades, Allison turbine engines, Textron 
Lycoming and Teledyne Continental engines. The PADC also carries out US Foreign
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Military Sales work for the US company Sikorsky Helicopters. The international 
company Eurocopter International uses PADC as the Philippine agent for government 
and military sales and as a service centre. A subsidiary of PADC, the Philippines 
East Asia Cargo Airlines Inc, PEAC, was formed in 1990 as a joint venture between 
PAC and the Australian company Transnational Transport, TNT, to provide an 
international freight service (Jane's All the Worlds Aircraft, 1995).
The Philippine Aircraft Company Inc builds and carries out marketing functions for 
the PACI Skyfox light aircraft from USA SkyStar Corporation under an agreement 
announced in 1987. Initial local production of the PACI Skyfox started in 1988. 
PACI also manufactures aircraft components for other US companies(Jane's All the 
Worlds Aircraft, 1995).
9.4.7 Vietnam
Vietnam is a poor country with very large armed forces (Bonsignore, 1993). In 1989 
the government introduced an economic stabilisation program and by 1991 work was 
underway on a government initiative to establish an export-processing zone, the 
purpose of which was to increase skilled employment, introduce new technology and 
attract foreign investment (Europa World Yearbook, 1991). Vietnam has 
considerable petroleum reserves and the government set up petroleum exploration 
schemes in 1990 with foreign petroleum companies. The country has a shipbuilding 
capability and an embryonic electronics industry but by 1995 had not established a 
sufficiently diverse industrial base to support sophisticated arms manufacture. The 
country did have the capability to maintain and even upgrade arms but not carry out
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manufacture (Kamiol, 1996a).
The forces are equipped with mainly Russian arms and ex-US equipment abandoned 
by the Americans at the end of the Vietnamese war (Jane's Fighting Ships, 1995). 
From 1978 to 1990 the USSR provided ex-Soviet ships and fuel in return for the use 
of a Russian naval base at Cam-Ranh Bay near Phan Rang in South Vietnam (Jane's 
Fighting Ships, 1995). After 1991 further transfers of equipment were carried out on 
a more formal basis and transfers were negotiated at market prices. American ships 
were cannibalised for spares, scrapped or sold and although many remain in naval 
bases are unoperational. The air force operates Russian fighter aircraft including 
MiG-32 and Su-33 ground attack aircraft and in 1993 purchased the Su-27 Flanker 
aircraft (Cloughly, 1995). The army is equipped with Russian tanks but none are 
licensed manufactured in Vietnam (Jane's Armoured Fighting Vehicles, 1993). Up 
to 1995 Vietnam's traditional arms supplier, the former Soviet Union, did not arrange 
licensed manufacture of arms in Vietnam as it did in the Warsaw Pact countries and 
in India which was also a major customer country (SIPRI database, 1995). An 
agreement was made in 1994 on the supply of Russian missile boats, radars and 
fighter aircraft and in 1996 plans were underway for a joint venture between Vietnam 
and Russia on the construction in Vietnam of frigates and fast attack craft,air defence 
radars and surface-to-air missiles (Kamiol, 1996a).
Vietnam is pursuing a policy of attempting to expand trade and build closer ties with 
its neighbours (Cloughly, 1995). In the 1970s Vietnam developed a very close 
relationship with Russia, and in 1978 joined CMEA, the Council for Mutual
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Economic Assistance (member states Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Mongolia, Poland, USSR, Vietnam) (Europa World Yearbook, 1991). In 1990 and 
1991 the Soviet economy declined and financial assistance to Vietnam was 
substantially reduced. A first step to end isolation from the west and from the non­
communist world was taken when Vietnam assumed diplomatic relations with 
America in July 1995 and joined ASEAN in August 1995 (Cloughly, 1995).
9.4.8 Conclusion
1. A striking feature of the ASEAN countries in the 1980s and 90s has been strong 
economic growth. The priority has not been building stronger military forces 
but on commercial growth. As SIPRI (SIPRI Yearbook, 1993) points out, as 
major international threats decrease and internal security issues become more 
important, military expenditure increasingly follows the economic trends of the 
country. South East Asia's defence expenditure has risen as a proportion of 
world defence expenditure from 15% in 1980 to 25% in 1991. The traditional 
arms suppliers in USA, Russia and Europe having seen their domestic markets 
declining in the 1980s and 90s have sought to gain a share of the ASEAN arms 
market. However, the ASEAN countries have strong national identities and are 
seeking increasing self reliance in arms production. The USA, European and 
Russian defence exporters have offered technology transfer in sales negotiations 
enabling the recipient countries to develop their own military equipment 
manufacturing capability.
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2. Embargoes were experienced by Indonesia in the 1950s and 60s and this led to 
a desire to decrease reliance on the then current supplier nations by switching 
to other suppliers. In the 1990s many countries were very keen to supply arms 
which slightly decreased the reliance on specific nations, but the Asean countries 
continued to strive for improved self reliance. The ASEAN countries have 
reached different levels in arms production capability. In 1995 Singapore had 
the most advanced domestic arms industry of the ASEAN countries and Brunei 
had none.
3. The level of state involvement has been particularly important in the setting up 
of a defence industry in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, the Indonesian 
government with its policies of a dual function defence industry and countertrade 
bargaining, Malaysia with its countertrade policy and Singapore with its high 
level of industrial incentives and investment. All the ASEAN countries except 
Brunei had or in 1996 were negotiating licensing agreements as a means of 
achieving arms production. The use of joint ventures and licensed production 
has imported technology and provided skill to the local labour force to such an 
extent that Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore have been able 
to set up aircraft maintenance and overhall centres.
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9.5. CONCLUSIONS
The effects of reduced world military expenditure since 1987 on the defence 
industries of different countries has varied greatly. Reduction in arms production has 
been made in the world's leading arms producing countries whereas the setting up 
and continued increase of arms production is seen in some areas including some of 
the emerging nations. The countries studied in this section Australia, Israel, Japan 
and the ASEAN countries have increased the level of arms production. The case 
studies failed to support the hypothesis that licensed production leads to indigenous 
production. The reasons and the mechanisms used for setting up and retaining arms 
production vary from country to country and within a country have varied with time 
as circumstances changed.
Australia
The Australian arms industry has grown three-fold in turnover in the decade 1982 to 
1992 mainly as a result of the government's policy on achieving self-reliance (as 
described in Section 9.1 above). Australia gained advanced technologies and arms 
manufacturing capability through licensing agreements and manufactures highly 
sophisticated systems. The government has initiated schemes to support an arms 
export market in order to sustain its domestic defence industry.
Israel
Israel has developed a substantial arms industry at very high cost as described in 
section 9.2 above. The military expenditure per capita of population is the sixth
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highest in the world, Israel has been prepared to pay the price of developing a 
sophisticated arms industry for political and security reasons, having experienced 
more than nine arms embargoes in forty years. Industry in Israel has gained support 
from USA by financial assistance and by licensing arrangements for high technology 
weapon system manufacture.
Japan
Japan's arms industry has grown m  line with the growth rate of its gross national 
product (as described in section 9.3 above). Japan is one of the world's leading 
industrial powers and has the capability of manufacturing nearly all of its military 
equipment. Even though Japan is a pacifist nation under its constitution Japan is 
sixth in the world ranking of military expenditure and the Japanese defence industry 
has a substantial and steady domestic market. Many of the major Japanese industries 
have been involved in licensed production of weapon systems. The military 
production is strongly supported by the sophistication of commercial high 
technologies in which the advance has been driven by strong commercial markets, 
for example in consumer electronics.
ASEAN
Section 9.4 above described how the ASEAN countries have experienced strong 
economic growth and military expenditure has risen with the economic growth. 
Industrial expansion in ASEAN has included expansion in the defence industries. 
The use of joint ventures and licensed production has been a strong feature in 
countries such as Indonesia which are relatively new to arms production and in
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countries such as Singapore which have established arms industries.
Increased self reliance and ensured security of supply
The main impetus for the establishment of arms manufacturing has been the value 
put on increased self reliance and ensured security of supply. Section 9.4.2 above 
described embargoes experienced by Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s which led to 
a desire to decrease reliance on the then current supplier nations initially by 
switching to other suppliers and then by establishing a dual function commercial 
/military industrial capability. The Australian government decided to increase self 
reliance in arms following an announcement in 1969 by the President of the USA 
that the country's allies in South East Asia would have to mount their own defences 
against military threats and it was realised that Australian forces were nearly wholly 
dependant on imports for defence equipment (as described in section 9.1 above). By 
the 1990s self reliance was a part of Australia's defence policy. Israel which has been 
in a state of perpetual military tension and war since its declaration in 1948 has 
experienced a sequence of arms embargoes at times of extreme national crisis. The 
Israeli government pursued a policy of self reliance as necessary to the survival of 
Israel and to free Israel from political pressure from the supplier countries (section
9.2.1 above). Since the 1950s the increasing technical progress in Japanese industry 
led to increased self reliance in aerospace and military production. The Japanese 
government was lobbied to support increased self-reliance by the powerful industrial 
groups in Japan and by the growing unease of USA in the 1980s and 90s in 
continuing the supply of military technology to Japan (section 9.3 above). The
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emerging nations of the ASEAN with the exception of Brunei are seeking increased 
self-reliance in selected areas of arms production.
Regional power aspirations
Regional power aspirations have not played an obvious role in setting up domestic 
arms production although escalating military expenditure and an associated arms race 
in South East Asia has resulted in ASEAN, Australia and other countries, in the 
region being aware of the need to influence neighbouring nations to promote regional 
security and stability. Japan’s powerful military force and extensive weapons arsenal, 
mostly produced in Japan, are a display of regional power and a measure of the force 
which could be unleashed against an aggressor. The display is discrete and apparent 
to military observers while at the same time the pacifist policies of the Japanese 
constitution are given prominence and recognition. Israel, surrounded by heavily 
armed hostile neighbours, has to be seen as militarily powerful and its arms industry 
forms a valuable contribution to its military power.
Israel has experienced the political pressure exerted by supplier nations, not only in 
the extreme cases of arms embargoes, but also in having to consider the foreign 
policies of supplier countries. Examples of this were evident when the USA Nixon 
administration imposed political pressure on Israel during the 1968 to 1970 War of 
Attrition between Egypt and Israel, and again in 1973 to 1975 when political pressure 
was applied by the USA on Israel to accept a ceasefire to the Yom Kippur War. 
Israel itself sought to apply political pressure on China in connection with the supply
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of Chinese ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia, by agreeing to a series of joint military 
equipment developments based on Israeli technology.
Cost implications
Cost implications of self sufficiency have been of secondary consideration in the 
choice between domestic production or importing arms. In 1985 the Australian 
government provided funding to subsidise uncompetitive defence projects where 
imports would have provided cost saving in the short term, where defence contracts 
were considered strategically important and also where there were prospects of a 
valuable export market. Japan bore the cost of 1.2 billion yen for indigenous 
production of the Type 90 Main Battle Tank (one of three types of tank in the 
inventory of the Japanese defence forces in the 1990s) which was three times higher 
than the cost of the USA equivalent, the MIA 1 Abrams tank.
Licensed production
The setting up of defence production has been closely linked to importing technology 
and promoting skill in the domestic labour force. Licensed production has been a 
key feature of defence manufacturing from the early stages of setting up an 
embryonic defence industry to licensing deals in established companies. The pattern 
of licensed production has been seen in the countries covered in this study. The 
Japanese defence industry was restarted after World War II by technology transfer 
and licensed production of US designed equipment and has been used for land, sea
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and air weapons and military platforms. By 1995 the Japanese defence industry has 
become established and manufactures a wide range of weapons. In 1995 one third 
of Japanese missiles in use or in manufacture are of licensed design and two thirds 
of indigenous design. The largest missile manufacturer in Japan (in terms of 
numbers of missiles manufactured) has declared the intention of eliminating the 
dependence on licensed designs and has undertaken development projects to 
completely replace licensed with indigenous missile designs. Licensed production 
is being used in Australia and in all the ASEAN countries except Brunei in order to 
establish selected areas of industrial expertise, for example Australia in naval ship 
building, in Indonesia in shipbuilding and aircraft manufacture, and in Malaysia in 
aircraft components, repair and overhaul.
Examination of licensed production of naval ships in Australia showed that licensed 
production sets in place the skills and infrastructure for a defence industry, but does 
not necessarily lead to indigenous production of the type of systems previously built 
under license. The period of time between build requirements of similar types of 
ships can be as long as the operational lifetime of the system which in the case of 
a submarine is typically thirty years, by which time the state of the art will have 
progressed by six generations of technology. The licensed production does provide 
(a) opportunities for indigenous production of the associated systems and subsystems 
such as communications, command systems, weapons control etc. at the same time 
as the main licensed production, (b) provides the skills and puts into place the 
technology infrastructure in the domestic industry and (c) also provides the 
opportunity for support, maintenance and upgrade work for the operational lifetime
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of the equipment which could be up to thirty years. The value of associated 
contracts which are carried out by domestic industry in connection with a licensed 
production programme are not readily visible and therefore a study collating the value 
of indigenous and licensed production may miss a proportion of the indigenous 
content of a defence programme.
Offsets
The terms offered and negotiated under offset deals and the benefits accrued by the 
recipient countries vary widely. The ASEAN countries incorporate offset deals into 
procurement programmes as a matter of policy. The Australian government hoped 
that the introduction of offset deals in the 1970s on arms imports would provide 
benefit to Australian industry but the results in terms of quantity and content of offset 
work proved disappointing in terms of technology transfer or commercial gain.
Government policy
Government support is a strong feature of military industrial capability. Australian 
and Israeli defence policies are based on self-reliance and have taken steps to 
maximise domestic arms production for their own forces requirements and also to 
promote arms exports to amortise costs over larger production runs. Government 
policy has strongly dictated the shaping of the defence industries in ASEAN. In 
Indonesia the government industrial policy is directed towards Dwi Fungsi or 
commercial/military dual function, whereby three quarters of a company’s production
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capacity is allocated to civil production and one quarter to military production in 
peacetime but which ramps up to surge production at a time of crisis. The country's 
industrialisation programmes, including offsets and countertrade deals, have been 
focused by the government on the shipbuilding and aerospace industries. Malaysian 
government has linked defence and economic development, for example the 6th 
Malaysian Plan of 1991 to 1995 has linked military procurement to industrial offset 
programmes. Singapore has demonstrated high levels of government involvement in 
the development of the .defence industry. In the 1960s and 70s the government 
provided substantial investment in shipyards and encouraged foreign investment in 
the Indonesian aerospace industry. Foreign companies were given financial 
incentives and tax breaks to set up manufacture and repair facilities in Singapore. 
In the late 1970s the government initiated incentive schemes to promote investment 
in research and development. In Japan the main feature of government support to the 
arms industry has been the promotion of international co-operation in research and 
development and the arrangement of licensed production deals. Japanese industrialists 
have powerful lobby groups which bring influence to bear on government policy. 
The lobby groups proposed increased domestic share of defence procurement and the 
government five-year plan for 1991 to 1995 included plans aimed at reducing the 
reliance of Japanese industry on US sources. In Israel government involvement in 
the defence industry was important particularly in dealings and negotiations with 
USA. Military grants of approximately $1.8 billion annually from USA directly 
benefited Israeli industry for procurement, development and research programmes for 
aircraft, tanks, missiles and electronics systems.
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Gradual introduction of increasingly complex technology
Defence manufacturing technology builds slowly starting with comparatively simple 
technology such as repair and overhaul (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Singapore have been able to set up aircraft maintenance and overhaul centres), the 
design of medium technology systems such as tank turrets and then progressing to 
more skilled systems. An example is seen in the design of tank turrets in Israel in 
1954 to the manufacture of fighter aircraft in 1990. Israeli engineers learnt skills by 
working on licensed manufacturing and by working in defence companies in foreign 
countries and bringing the skills back to Israel. Investment by foreign companies in 
setting up manufacturing facilities in countries where they wish to access the defence 
markets has also brought military technology to those countries.
Availability of capital and diversity of country's industrial base
The availability of capital and the presence of a diversified industrial base influence 
the ability to set up and retain a defence industry. Singapore and Japan, which have 
become highly industrialised nations with stable economies, have highly capable 
defence industries. The Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam with very limited 
industrialisation have very low levels of arms production. Brunei has a strong 
economy and with minimal military expenditure has no need for an arms industry. 
Australia has shown restraint in making capital available for arms production and has 
directed effort and funding to selected areas of arms production, for example to naval 
equipment in line with its defence policy;
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Suivey by questionnaire
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10. SURVEY BY QUESTIONNAIRE
A survey was carried out to find why countries set up indigenous arms production. 
The purpose of the survey was to test the hypothesis that licensed production of arms 
leads to indigenous production. The countries investigated were Australia, Japan, 
Israel and the ASEAN countries. The questionnaire was pretested and adjusted until 
such time as it proved understandable. Questionnaires were sent to arms dealers, 
defence industrialists, military and government authorities in these countries and also 
to arms dealers in Europe and in USA. The questionnaires were sent by post and by 
facsimile.
The questionnaire covered the motivation for setting up an arms industry, the 
characteristics which influence the ability of the country to do so and the strategies 
used to achieve a defence industrial base. The questionnaire asked for each of the 
aspects to be rated in importance and asked for comment on any other important 
issues relating to the reasons or methods for setting up arms production.
The responses to the survey were analysed on a personal computer using a 
commercially available Excel (1995) mathematical software suite. The questionnaire 
document is shown in Annex 10.1 and result of the survey is presented numerically 
in Tables 10.2 and graphically in Figuresl0.3 to 10.8.
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10.1 THE SURVEY FORM
The survey form is shown in Annex 10.1 and covered:
1. Motivation to establish an arms industry
1.1 Strategic Motivation
Improved self reliance
Ensured security of supply, e.g. against embargoes 
Regional power aspirations 
Local arms race
1.2 Political
To import technology 
To upgrade skill in local labour 
To influence customer nations
1.3 Economic
Cost reduction
Save hard currency by minimising imports 
Potential earning of foreign exchange though export
2. Characteristics which influence or determine the ability to establish an arms 
industry.
Availability of capital 
Diversified industrial base
Level of state involvement e.g. government ownership or support. 
Access to export markets
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3. Methods to establish defence industry
Direct investment by USA, Europe etc.
Joint ventures and licensed production 
Employment of foreign defence experts 
Copying equipment
Gradual increase of complexity, e.g. first servicing, then assembly, and 
production
Gradual increase in complexity of types of equipment, e.g. first small 
arms, then missiles, tanks, jet aircraft, etc.
The questionnaire covered the motivation for setting up an arms industry, the 
characteristics which influence the ability of the country to do so and the methods 
used to achieve a defence industrial base. The questionnaire asked for each of the 
aspects to be rated with a score of 1 to 5, where the value 1 indicated no importance 
and the value 5 indicated great importance. The questionnaire also asked for 
comment on any other important issues relating to the reasons or methods for setting 
up arms production.
The questionnaire was sent to 290 arms dealers, defence industrialists, military and 
government authorities in the countries being studied, Australia, Israel, Japan and 
ASEAN and also to arms dealers in Europe and in USA. The questionnaires were 
sent by post and by facsimile. The questionnaire was also sent to six defence 
experts, four of whom responded. The experts' responses were not recorded in the 
survey in order to limit the survey to prime sources but the documents and references
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provided by the experts were included in country studies in Chapter 9.
10.2 RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE
Sixty three completed questionnaires were received which represented a 22% 
response rate of the total of 290 questionnaires sent. The highest response rate was 
from the group of arms dealers from Europe and USA many of whom are known to 
the current author. The lowest response rate was from Japan, 16% and the Asean 
countries, 7%.
10.3 RESULT OF THE SURVEY
The Table and Figure 10.3. presents a summary of the responses to the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire asked for each of the aspects relating to the setting up of 
indigenous arms production to be rated with a score of 1 to 5, where the value 1 
indicated no importance and the value 5 indicated great importance. The table shows 
the mean values of the ratings for each of the criteria together with the standard 
deviation of the values. The table shows the result for each of the countries studied 
and also the result of the responses from the world's arms dealers.
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TABLE 10.3 Result of the survey
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FIGURE 10.3a Result of survey by questionnaire indicating importance of criteria 
in setting up and maintaining defence industry.
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FIGURE 10.3b Result of survey by questionnaire indicating importance of criteria 
in setting up and maintaining defence industry.
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10.4 Australia: result of the survey by questionnaire on setting up arms production
Australia: motivation
The survey showed that the strategic motivation of improved self reliance and 
security of supply were considered the most important aspects of motivation in 
setting up and retaining a defence industry. The low value of standard deviation 
(0.61 and 0.46) shows that there was a fair level of agreement from the thirteen 
responses.
The political motivations of importing technology and upgrading skill in the local 
labour force and the economic motivations of the potential for earning foreign 
exchange, saving hard currency and cost reduction were also considered as important 
factors. The standard deviation values (1.01, 1.22, 0.80, 1.07 and 1.07) showed a
slightly wider variation in agreement than in the case of the two leading motivating__
factors.
There was slightly higher variation in the response (standard deviations 1.23) that a 
requirement to influence customer nations had low importance but close agreement 
(standard deviation 0.74) that a local arms race was unimportant.
Australia: factors which influence the ability and methods to establish a defence 
industry
There was a very high level of agreement (standard deviation 0.58 and 0.78) in the
Page 293
Chapter 10
responses that the use of joint ventures and licensed production and the availability 
of capital were very important in the setting up and maintaining a defence industry.
The other important aspects were the presence of a diversified industrial base, 
building up through complex stages and increasing equipment complexity, direct 
investment by European and USA arms suppliers, access to export markets and the 
level of state involvement (standard deviation 1.14, 0.66, 0.95, 1.22, 1.21).
Building by employing foreign experts and by copying equipment were considered 
unimportant (standard deviation 1.10 and 0.95).
10.4.1 Australia: comparison of results of the survey by questionnaire and by the 
country study.
The results showed strong agreement that the use of licensed production was very___
important. The country study showed that licensed production was widely applied 
and particularly to naval ship building in Australia. The country study also recorded 
that offset deals had failed to provide commercially or technically attractive contracts 
despite government action to monitor and improve offset performance. Comments 
on the responses to the questionnaire advised that
a) licensed production did not lead to the companies winning indigenous 
production orders but did assist in providing viable business and the 
technology and expertise to gain other contracts and
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b) offset deals were considered a failure. There was reluctance to enter into 
offset deals by Australian defence contractors. There was mention of "metal 
bashing" which indicated low skill level work and "being treated as cheap off­
shore labour" which indicated the low profitability of contracts offered by 
leading arms supplier countries.
and the comments vividly reinforced the findings of the study.
The level of state involvement was assessed as being of importance in the 
questionnaire survey but the country study demonstrated very high levels of 
government policies and actions to provide support to the defence industries in terms 
of research funding, scheduling procurements, provision of funding for uncompetitive 
but important work, assistance in securing exports and in the government's policy of 
self-reliance in arms procurement. It might have been expected from the country 
study that the questionnaire survey would have assessed the level of state 
involvement as being of higher importance. If the responses to the questionnaire 
been been provided by a higher proportion of government contacts then the replies 
may have leant more weight to the importance of government involvement.
The country study recorded that several of the world's major arms contractors had set 
up subsidiaries and joint venture companies in Australia in order to gain a share of 
the Australian defence market. The investment by foreign contractors was recognised 
as being important in the responses to the questionnaire.
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10.5 Israel: result of the survey by questionnaire on setting up aims production
Israel: motivation
The result of the survey by questionnaire showed that improved self reliance and 
security of supply were the leading motivating factors for Israel in setting up and 
retaining a domestic arms industry. The low values of standard deviation (0.63 and 
1.12) demonstrated agreement between the thirteen responses. The motivation of the 
potential to earn foreign exchange, the local arms race and the need to upgrade the 
skill in labour ranked next in importance. The requirement to influence customer 
nations, the saving of hard currency, and the requirement for cost reduction were 
considered less important. The least important motivation to Israel according to the 
responses was regional power aspirations.
Israel: factors which influence the ability and methods to establish a defence industry
The responses to the survey questionnaire showed strong agreement (standard 
deviation 0.80) that the level of state involvement was extremely important in 
determining the ability to set up and retain the arms industry in Israel. There was 
also strong agreement that the existence of a diversified industrial base, the 
availability of capital and the access to export markets were of high importance to 
the Israeli defence industry.
The strategy of rising through the learning curve by building increasingly complex
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equipment and through increasingly complex stages was considered as more 
important than copying equipment or taking part in joint ventures and licensed 
production contracts. Investment by other countries' arms producers and employing 
foreign experts was considered as of low importance.
10.5.1 Israel: comparison of results of the survey by questionnaire and results by the 
country study.
There was agreement between the survey by questionnaire and the result of the 
country study that self reliance and security of supply were the leading motivating 
factors in setting up and sustaining the arms industry in Israel. The country study 
detailed the history of arms embargoes and the political pressure applied by supplier 
countries at times of national crisis.
The result of the survey by questionnaire ranked the motivation of the potential to 
earn foreign exchange as important which corresponds to the country study findings 
that arms exports ranked third behind diamond export and tourism as Israel's top 
exchange earners. The country study showed that foreign earning through export, at 
a level of $237M per year, resulted from Israel being the world's twelfth largest arms 
exp orter. The questionnaire result ranked the local arms race as important which 
corresponded to the evidence summarised in the country study that Israel was 
surrounded by hostile neighbours in a region characterised by high and sustained 
military expenditure.
Page 297
Chapter 10
The result of the survey by questionnaire listed the strategy of building capability 
through increasing the complexity of the equipment being built and building systems 
through increasingly complex stages. The Israeli country study provided evidence 
of the expansion of arms manufacturing from the initial relatively simple operations 
to current state-of-the-art activities:
a) in the aircraft industry, where aircraft maintenance facilities were set up in Israel 
in the mid 1950s and progress has been made to the production and export of the 
high technology Kfir fixed delta-wing fighter aircraft.
b)from small arms and ammunition manufacture in the 1940s to the design and 
production in the 1980s of world-leading reactive armour for tank protection against 
armour-penetrating missiles.
The questionnaire result found that the strategies of copying equipment and of 
licensed production were considered as of less than medium importance. The country 
study indicates that this result is not surprising considering the history of licensed 
production which had been important from the 1950s until the embargoes associated 
with the Six-Day War in 1967 when Israel started its indigenous production 
programme. Also during the 1990s the USA became concerned about the loss of 
technology lead and refused Israel at least one request for a licensed production 
agreement.
The questionnaire result showed that employing foreign experts was of low
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importance. One of the questionnaire reply documents pointed out that Israeli 
nationals worked in defence manufacturing plants all over the world and they brought 
the technology and the skills back to Israel so there was not a need to employ foreign 
experts. It was further pointed out that Israeli's received a high level of military 
technology training during compulsory conscription in the armed forces and many of 
the most capable then moved on to the Israeli defence industries, thus creating a pool 
of highly trained staff.
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10.6 JAPAN: RESULT OF THE SURVEY BY QUESTIONNAIRE ON SETTING 
UP ARMS PRODUCTION
Japan: Motivation
The survey showed that the strategic motivation of improved self reliance and 
security of supply were considered the most important aspects of motivation in 
setting up and retaining a defence industry. The low value of standard deviation 
(0.60 and 0.70) shows that there was a fair level of agreement from the eight 
responses.
There was a similar level of agreement (standard deviations 0.60 and 0.66) that the 
need to upgrade local skill and to achieve cost reduction were of high importance, 
while the need to import technology was assessed as important. Rated as of less 
importance were the motivation to save hard currency and regional power aspirations.
Japan: Factors which influence the ability and methods to establish a defence 
industry.
There was high level of agreement (standard deviation 0.70 and 0.78) that the 
existence of a diversified industrial base and the availability of capital were the 
strongest factors influencing the ability to maintain a defence industry. Also assessed 
as being of high importance were the strategies of building through increasingly 
complex stages and building increasingly complex equipment. The level of state
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involvement, joint ventures and licensed production, copying equipment and access 
to export markets were considered as having low importance.
Japan: Ccomparison of results of the survey by questionnaire and results by the 
countiy study.
The results of both the survey by questionnaire and the country study showed that 
the requirement for self sufficiency and security of arms supply were of high 
importance to the promotion of the Japanese arms industry. The country survey 
showed that self sufficiency in arms had been assessed as fairly high at 40% to 90% 
in the 1990s and the Japanese government’s five year plan, Shin Chuki-Bofor, for the 
period 1991-95 included development plans specifically aimed at reducing industrial 
dependence on USA and achieving self-sufficiency in arms.
The result of the survey questionnaire showed the importance of upgrading skill and 
importing advanced technology. This result confirmed the findings of the country 
survey that the Japanese Government had directed effort for international cooperation 
in research and development in order to raise skill levels. The country survey also 
showed the development of aircraft, missile and arms industries in Japan had been 
based on technology transfer from USA.
The questionnaire survey showed that cost reduction was rated more highly than the 
need to save hard currency. The opposite view was indicated in the country report 
where it was reported that Japan had been willing to pay three times as much on
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procurement of its indigenous Type 90 Main Battle Tank as the USA equivalent, the 
Ml A1 Abrams. The reason for Japan investing in the Type 90 Tank may have been 
for cost saving in whole lifetime costs, self-sufficiency or for customisation to Japan’s 
operational requirements.
The survey by questionnaire found that the existence of a diversified industrial base 
and the availability of capital were the strongest factors influencing the ability to 
maintain a defenc e industry. This result corresponded to the country survey which 
recorded that Japan is one of the world’s leading industrialised nations with a highly 
diverse industrial base and had the sixth highest military expenditure in the world.
The result of the questionnaire survey showed that strategies of building through 
increasingly complex stages and building increasingly complex equipment were 
considered of high importance which corresponded to the findings of the country 
report. The country report also confirmed the finding of the survey by questionnaire 
in the high importance of strategies of building up manufacturing capability through 
increasingly complex stages and building increasingly complex equipment. The 
example of the gradual stages of designing and manufacturing more complex parts 
of tanks over forty years was illustrated in the country report.
The survey by questionnaire assessed the level of state involvement, joint ventures 
and licensed production and the practice of copying equipment as not of great 
importance. The country report has described the pacifist nature of the constitution, 
the limitation of military expenditure and also how the powerful industrial groups
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own the technology rights of the arms industry. These considerations would support 
the result of the questionnaire that state involvement was assessed as not of great 
importance. The country report showed how licensed production and technology 
transfer from USA had been important in the years since the early 1950s and that the 
Japanese arms industries had been largely based on production stemming from these 
licensing activities. In the 1990s the Japanese defence industrial capability has a 
substantially base on dual use technology, in which Japan is a world leader, and there 
is reduced dependence on US-originated technology. It was estimated that in the 
1990s only 10 to 60% of Japanese arms production was based on non-Japanese 
technology. The country report indicated that the importance of joint ventures and 
licensed production has decreased as the Japanese defence industry had matured.
The survey by questionnaire indicated that access to export markets was not 
considered important, a result which did not correspond to the findings of the country 
study. The country study revealed that Japan was in 1991 the world's twentieth 
leading arms exporter. The reason for the result of the questionnaire in connection 
with arms exports is probably that the level of arms exports is not widely known but 
the regulations forbidding arms exports are widely quoted.
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10.7 ASEAN : RESULT OF THE SURVEY BY QUESTIONNAIRE ON
SETTING UP ARMS PRODUCTION
ASEAN: Motivation
The survey showed that the strategic motivation of improved self reliance and 
security of supply were considered the most important aspects of motivation in 
setting up and retaining a defence industry. The value of standard deviation (1.09 
and 1.49) shows that there was not a very high level of agreement from the eight 
responses.
The survey showed that the need to upgrade the skill of local labour and to import 
technology were important political motivations to promote a domestic arms industry 
and important economic motivations were cost reduction and the need to save hard 
currency. Less important motivations were considered to be the potential for earning 
foreign exchange, the desire to influence customer nations and the influence of a 
local arms race.
ASEAN: Factors which influence the ability and methods to establish a defence 
industry
The result of the survey showed agreement (standard deviation 0.71) that the level 
of state involvement ranked very highly in importance in the setting up and 
sustaining an arms industry. Also ranked as important were a diversified industrial
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base, the availability of capital, the building up from comparatively simple to more 
complex procedures and systems, the use of joint ventures and licensed production 
and access to exports.
The survey showed that employing foreign experts and direct investment by US and 
European arms suppliers was of less importance and the strategy of copying 
equipment was of least importance.
ASEAN: Comparison of results of the survey by questionnaire and results by the 
countiy study.
The survey by questionnaire showed that the strategic motivation of improved self 
reliance and security of supply were considered the most important aspects of 
motivation in setting up and retaining a defence industry. The country studies 
showed that the arms industries of Singapore were the most advanced of ASEAN and 
the other countries had very immature arms industries. Indonesia had experienced 
arms embargoes and there were attempts to structure the arms industry to provide 
continuity of supply at a time of crisis.
The survey by questionnaire showed that the need to upgrade the skill of local 
labour and to import technology were important political motivations to promote a 
domestic arms industry and important economic motivations were cost reduction and 
the need to save hard currency. The countries study showed that the ASEAN 
countries have had strong economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s and the countries
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have been attempting to increase the level of industrialisation by a variety of methods 
including importing technology and training programmes.
The result of the survey showed agreement that the level of state involvement ranked 
very highly in importance in the setting up and sustaining an arms industry. The 
countries study showed a very high level of state involvement in Indonesia (policy 
on dual function civil/military industry, policy on countertrade), Malaysia (policies 
on technology transfers, offset deals) and Singapore (incentive schemes, investment 
policies).
The result of the survey by questionnaire showed that a diversified industrial base, 
the availability of capital, the building up from comparatively simple to more 
complex procedures and systems, the use of joint ventures and licensed production 
and access to exports were ranked as important. These findings were supported by 
the countries study. The countries survey showed that most highly developed 
defence industry within ASEAN was in Singapore which has a highly diversified 
industrial base and also has one of the highest military expenditures within ASEAN 
which would indicate the availability of capital. The countries study also showed 
that defence industries were beginning in the setting up of repair and overhaul 
facilities for example in Malaysia (aircraft industry), Philippines (aircraft industry) 
which illustrated a comparatively simple start for progression to more complex 
undertakings. The countries report confirmed the importance of licensed production 
agreements in Thailand (shipbuilding), Indonesia (aircraft), Malaysia (vehicles), 
Philippines (aircraft) and Singapore (shipbuilding).
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The survey by questionnaire gave the result that investment by US and European 
companies was not considered important in ASEAN countries. It may be that some 
potential western investment could be inhibited by the impounding of British 
companies' property in Indonesia in 1963. The countries report did show a level of 
investment by western arms companies, for example in Singapore. Malaysia and 
Singapore have actively sought investment by foreign high technology companies.
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10.8 T-TESTS: RESULT OF T-TESTS (TWO-TAILED DISTRIBUTION TEST) 
OF RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE
The set of tables, Tables 10.8, presents the probability associated with the two-tailed 
t-test in the testing of the sets of data for each of the countries examined. It would 
have been acceptable to use a k2 test but the data lent itself better to a two-tailed T- 
test. The T-tests measure the degree of similarity between the responses from the 
different countries and provides a value, P, for the probability or level of confidence 
of whether there is significance in the similarity between the data for one country and 
the data for each other country. A high probability value of 1 indicates strong 
similarity in the data for the countries being compared, for example Australia and 
Israel assessed the importance of earning foreign exchange in a similar way and both 
gave high rating to this aspect of economic motivation. A low probability of zero 
indicates significant difference in the sets of data for the countries being compared. 
The low probability values of zero, for example between Japan and the other 
countries on value of access to the arms export market, shows the high significance 
of the difference between the responses of the countries which results from Japan's 
policy on disallowing the export of arms.
The results of the T-tests show that the differences in responses between countries 
(average value of P is 0.34) is statistically significant which demonstrates that the 
importance of reasons for setting up arms production varies from country to country.
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Table 10.8.10 Probability values, P, of the T-test comparing the data for Australia 
with the data for Japan, Israel and the Asean countries.
Australia Australia Australia
Japan Asean Israel
Strategic Motivation
1.1A Improved Self Reliance 0.07 0.35 0.55
1.1B Security of Supply 0.82 0.15 0.83
1.1C Regions! Power 0.37 0.37 0.51
1.1D Local Arms Race 0.10 0.26 0.00
Political Motivation
1.2A Import Technology 0.31 0.80 0.03
1.2B Upgrade Local Skill 0.51 0.31 0.37
1.2C To Influence Customer Nations 0.00 0.58 0.88
Econom ic Motivation
1.3A Cost Reduction 0.90 0.79 0.42
1.3B Save Hard Currency 0.29 0.11 0.76
1.3C Potential for Earning Foreign Exchange 0.00 0.32 1.00
Influences the Ability
2A Availability of Capital 0.74 0.82 0.51
2B Diversified Industrial Base 0.30 0.70 0.85
2C Level of State Involvement 0.69 0.00 0.01
2D Access to Export Market 0.00 0.56 0.74
Methods of Establishing a Defence Industry
3A Direct Investment by Europe & US 0.00 0.15 0.01
3B Use of Joint Ventures and Licenced Production 0.00 0.03 0.00
3C Building by Employing Foreign Experts 0.01 0.49 0.12
3D Building by Copying Equipment 0.57 0.56 0.09
3E Building Through Complex Stages 0.51 0.07 0.60
3F Strategy of Increasing Equipment Complexity 0.66 0.92 0.10
\cc_files\questn4.xls
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Table 10.8.20 Probability values, P, of the T-test comparing the data for Japan with 
the data for Australia, Israel and the Asean countries.
Japan Japan Japan
Australia Asean Israel
Strategic Motivation
1.1A Improved Self Reliance 0.07 0.80 0.18
1.1B Security of Supply 0.82 0.14 0.73
1.1C Regional Pcwer 0.37 1.00 0.76
1.1D Local Arms Race 0.10 1.00 0.12
Political Motivation
1.2A Import Technology 0.31 0.60 0.40
1.2B Upgrade Local Skill 0.51 0.59 0.10
1.2C To Influence Customer Nations 0.00 0.07 0.00
Econom ic Motivation
1.3A Cost Reduction 0.90 0.84 0.31
1.3B Save Hard Currency 0.29 0.03 0.47
1.3C Potential for Earning Foreign Exchange 0.00 0.06 0.00
Influences the Ability
2A Availability of Capital 0.74 1.00 0.79
2B Diversified Industrial Base 0.30 0.61 0.14
2C Level of State Involvement 0.69 0.00 0.01
2D Access to Export Market 0.00 0.00 0.00
Methods of Establishing a Defence Industry
3A Direct Investment by Europe & US 0.00 0.19 0.39
3B Use of Joint Ventures and Licenced Production 0.00 0.10 0.49
3C Building by Employing Foreign Experts 0.01 0.08 0.20
3D Building by Copying Equipment 0.57 0.83 0.03
3E Building Through Complex Stages 0.51 0.20 0.98
3F Strategy of Increasing Equipment Complexity 0.66 0.66 0.24
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Table 10.8.30 Probability values, P, of the T-test comparing the data for Asean 
countries with the data for the Australia, Japan and Israel.
Asean Asean Asean
Australia Japan Israel
Strategic Motivation
1.1A Improved Self Reliance 0.35 0.80 0.54
1.1B Security of Supply 0.15 0.14 0.21
1.1C Regional Power 0.37 1.00 0.76 .
1.1D Local Arms Race 0.26 1.00 0.24
Political Motivation
1.2A Import Technology 0.80 0.60 0.23
1.2B Upgrade Local Skill 0.31 0.59 0.07
1.2C To Influence Customer Nations 0.58 0.07 0.49
Econom ic Motivation
1.3A Cost Reduction 0.79 0.84 0.41
1.3B Save Hard Currency 0.11 . 0.03 0.09
1.3C Potential for Earning Foreign Exchange 0.32 0.06 0.34
Influences the Ability
2A Availability of Capital 0.82 1.00 0.85
2B Diversified Industrial Base 0.70 0.61 0.55
2C Level of State Involvement 0.00 0.00 0.46
2D Access to Export Market 0.56 0.00 0.37
Methods o f Establishing a Defence Industry
3A Direct Investment by Europe & US 0.15 0.19 0.50
3B Use of Joint Ventures and Licenced Production 0.03 0.10 0.33
3C Building by Employing Foreign Experts 0.49 0.08 0.48
3D Building by Copying Equipment 0.56 0.83 0.09
3E Building Through Complex Stages 0.07 0.20 0.27
3F Strategy of Increasing Equipment Complexity 0.92 0.66 0.17
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Table 10.8.40 Probability values, P, of the T-test comparing the data for Israel with 
the data for the Australia, Japan and the ASEAN countries.
Israel Israel Israel
Australia Japan Asean
Strategic Motivation
1.1A Improved Self Reliance 0.55 0.18 0.54
1.1B Security of Supply 0.83 0.73 0.21
1.1C Regional Power 0.51 0.76 0.76
1.1D Local Arms Race 0.00 0.12 0.24
Political Motivation
1.2A Import Technology 0.03 0.40 0.23
1.2B Upgrade Local Skill 0.37 0.10 0.07
1.2C To Influence Customer Nations 0.88 0.00 0.49
Economic Motivation
1.3A Cost Reduction 0.42 0.31 0.41
1.3B Save Hard Currency 0.76 0.47 0.09
1.3C Potential for Earning Foreign Exchange 1.00 0.00 0.34
Influences the Ability
2A Availability of Capital 0.51 0.79 0.85
2B Diversified Industrial Base 0.85 0.14 0.55
2C Level of State Involvement 0.01 0.01 0.46
2D Access to Export Market 0.74 0.00 0.37
Methods of Establishing a Defence Industry
3A Direct Investment by Europe & US 0.01 0.39 0.50
3B Use of Joint Ventures and Licenced Production 0.00 0.49 0.33
3C Building by Employing Foreign Experts 0.12 0.20 0.48
3D Building by Copying Equipment 0.09 0.03 0.09
3E Building Through Complex Stages 0.60 0.98 0.27
3F Strategy of Increasing Equipment Complexity 0.10 0.24 0.17
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Table 10.8.50 Probability values, P, of the T-tests comparing the data provided by 
the world dealers (i.e. from Europe and from USA) with the data for Australia, Japan, 
Israel and the Asean countries.
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10.9 RESULT OF THE SURVEY
The respondents in the survey indicated that motivation, the ability and the methods 
used have influence on the level of success in setting up and maintaining an arms 
industry.
The Figures 10.9 include:
Figure 10.9.1 Strategic motivation 
Figure 10.9.2 Political Motivation 
Figure 10.9.3 Economic Motivation
Figure 10.9.4 Criteria influencing the ability to set up indigenous arms manufacturing
Figure 10.9.5 Methods of establishing an indigenous arms industry
The Figures 10.9 provide a graphical presentation of the data provided in the 
responses to the questionnaire. The questionnaire asked for each of the aspects 
relating to the setting up of indigenous arms production to be rated with a score of 
1 to 5, where the value 1 indicated no importance and the value 5 indicated great 
importance. The figures are presented in a "3d-riser" format. The vertical axis 
represents score rating of importance on the scale 1 to 5, for each of the countries
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Figure 10.9.1 Values of importance of strategic motivations for establishing a 
defence industry
Strategic Motivation
World
Rac(
Value
5
4
3
2
1
0
Dealers
Australia
Local Arms 
Regional Power 
Security of Supply 
Improved Self Reliance
Asean
Israel
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Figure 10.9.2 Values of importance of political motivations for establishing a 
defence industry
Political Motivation
Upgrade Local Skill 
Import Technology
Value
5 
4 
3 
2 
1
0
World Dealers
Australia
Value
Influence Customer Nations
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Figure 10.9.3 Values of importance of economic motivations for establishing a 
defence industry
Economic Motivation
Exchanc
Value Value
5
4
3
2
1
0
World Dealers
Australia
Japan
Asean
Israel
Potential Earning Foreign
Save Hard Currency
Cost Reduction
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Figure 10.9.4 Values of importance of criteria influencing ability to establish a 
defence industry
Influences the Ability
Value
/Vorld Dealers
Australia
Japan
Asean
Israel
Access Export 
Level State Involvement 
Diversified Industrial Base 
Availability of Capital
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Figure 10.9.5 Values of importance of methods of establishing a defence industry
Methods of Establishing a Defence Industry
Equipn
Value Value
World Dealers
Australia
Japan 
Asean
Israel
Increase Complexity 
Complex Stages 
Copying Equipment 
Employ Foreign Experts 
Licenced Production 
USA/European investment
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Motivation
The result of the survey indicated that the motivation to set up an arms industry is 
primarily strategic and secondly political and the economic aspects carry less 
importance. In the countries studied, the motivation is based on the following factors 
in descending order of importance:
1. Improved self reliance (strategic)
2. Ensured security of supply, e.g. against embargoes (strategic)
3. To upgrade skill in local labour (political)
4. To import technology (political)
5. Save hard currency by minimising imports (economic)
6. Potential earning of foreign exchange though export (economic)
7. Cost reduction (economic)
8. To influence customer nations (political)
9. Regional power aspirations (strategic)
10. Local arms race (strategic)
There was close correlation between the countries on the levels of importance of 
strategic motivation, but Israel gave higher ranking than the other countries to the 
importance of a local arms race. This result corresponded to the report in the country 
study which described the Middle East as being an area of high military expenditure. 
Political motivation ranked of higher importance in Australia than in Japan or 
ASEAN countries. This result corresponded to the political importance on defence
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industrialisation described in the country study. The lower ranking of importance of 
political motivation in Japan in comparison to the other countries reflects the existing 
high technology status of Japan's industries and a lower need to import technology 
and upgrade skills. Comparison of countries' economic motivation showed the low 
ranking by Japan of the potential to earn foreign exchange, which reflects Japan's 
policy prohibiting the export of weapons.
Ability to set up an arms industry
The factors influencing the ability to set up and maintain an arms industry in the 
countries studied were, in descending order of importance.
1. The availability of capital
2. A diversified industrial base
3. The level of state involvement
4. Access to an export market
Both ASEAN and Israel ranked the level of state involvement highly in comparison 
to the other countries. This reflects the high level of state involvement in supporting 
and sustaining the arms industry in Israel and in the governments1 efforts to nurture 
embryonic arms industries in ASEAN.
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Methods to establish an arms industry
The importance of methods employed to establish and maintain an arms 
industry in the countries studied were, in descending order of importance:
1. Building equipment through increasingly complex stages of manufacture for 
example by first setting up repair and maintenance facilities, then assembly 
and progressing to full design and manufacture.
2. Strategy of building increasingly complex equipment, for example starting 
with ammunition, vehicles, ships, weapons to highly complex systems such 
as fighter aircraft.
3. Use of joint ventures and licensed production.
4. Direct investment by European or US arms suppliers
5. Building by copying designs
6. Building by employing foreign experts
There was similarity in high ranking of the level of importance of increasing the 
complexity of manufacturing operations and the types of equipment being built. 
Japan rated the other four methods, copying, employing foreign experts, licensed 
production and western investment, at significantly lower levels of importance than 
did the other countries. This probably results from Japan's technology lead 
particularly in dual use technologies and consequently a reduced need to develop 
existing skills. The world dealers and Israel gave higher ranking to the importance 
of copying equipment than did the other countries. It may be the case that world
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dealers are more willing to recognise close similarities between systems which have 
been imported and systems which have been later designed indigenously and 
resembling the imported models.
Examination of the importance of licensed production shows that Japan and Israel, 
both countries with advanced arms industries, ranked licensed production as 
significantly lower importance than did Australia, ASEAN or the western arms 
dealers,/ The significance of this difference may be that Australia and ASEAN are 
striving to build up a technically advanced arms industry and are using licensed 
production to achieve advancement. Western arms suppliers are letting licensing 
agreements to countries including emerging supplier nations in order to gain market 
share in those countries. In contrast, Japan and Israel had high levels of licensed 
production in the past when the defence industries were less mature. The country 
study reported that Japan had implemented a policy to reduce dependence on foreign 
technology in arms production.
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10.10 CONCLUSION
The survey by questionnaire examined the reasons and mechanisms for countries 
setting up and retaining arms production. The results of the survey for ASEAN, 
Australia, Japan and Israel were compared with the findings of the country studies. 
The survey failed to support the hypothesis that licensed production leads to 
indigenous production. The survey by questionnaire showed that the motivation to 
set up an arms industry is primarily strategic, secondly political and that economic 
motivation carries less importance.
The importance of different methods used to establish an arms industry varied from 
country to country, and within a country varied as the industries matured. Initially 
arms production is limited to ammunition and small artillery. The setting up of ship 
or aircraft maintenance and overhaul provides a mechanism to introduce a defence 
industrial capability. Manufacture under license introduces an increasingly complex 
manufacturing capability and infrastructure which enables indigenous manufacturing 
to be undertaken. As the arms industries became more mature the importance of 
licensed technology and technology transfers became less important.
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11.1 THE HYPOTHESIS BEING INVESTIGATED
On 3rd September 1939 the Second World War began and George Bernard Shaw 
wrote the prophetic words "There will be only two winners: the United States and 
the Soviet Union". For several decades following the end of World War II western 
and Soviet defence industries thrived on largely stable and steadily growing defence 
markets. This was based on the military balance of the cold war and the policy of 
deterrence between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. By 1987 the level of the world's 
military expenditure peaked at $2 million per hour. In 1989 the end of the cold war 
was brought about by diplomatic and political change in the East and in West and 
the defence industries were faced with long term decline in domestic and world 
markets. By 1991 the level of military expenditure had fallen by twenty per cent in 
five years to the level of $1.6 million per hour.
The world's major arms suppliers were forced to adjust to the declining market by 
downsizing, mergers and acquisitions, diversifying and by seeking an increased 
market share in other countries. While there were decreasing arms industries in the 
main supplier countries, other countries, and particularly the emerging nations with 
growing economies increased the level of arms production. The traditional arms 
suppliers competed to gain market share in the steady and increasing markets of these 
countries and offered technology transfers, offsets and licensed production 
arrangements. Countries such as those in the Pacific Rim with emerging economies 
and a growing technology base, are no longer willing to accept western equipment 
without some form of counter trade. They want to "catch up" with Europe and North 
America and believe they have the bargaining edge to do so. Supplier countries are 
being asked to enter into licensed manufacturing arrangements, offset, counter trade 
and technology transfer agreements to set up in-country manufacture. The traditional 
arms importing countries developed defence manufacturing skills and increased the 
domestic arms production in terms of value and also in the sophistication of the 
weapons being built. Within the domestic arms production an increasing level of 
indigenous design and manufacture is carried out. The arms industrialists of the 
traditional supplier nations have become concerned that licensed manufacturing leads 
to the countries eventually setting up their own production. The supplier would then 
lose that country as a customer and also introduce another potential supplier to
Page 327
Chapter 11
compete in the world market. The relationship between licensed and indigenous 
production of arms presented a fruitful area of research. A literature search did not 
identify any research which had undertaken an analysis of this relationship.
The hypothesis being investigated in this study is that licensed production leads to 
indigenous production of arms.
11.2 METHODS USED TO TEST THE HYPOTHESIS
Three methods were used to test the hypothesis: (a) a macro-analysis of the numerical 
data collated on twelve countries arms production, (b) a study of the arms production 
of the ASEAN and three other countries and (c) a survey by questionnaire of arms 
dealers and suppliers.
11.2.1 The macro-analysis
Method
Data was taken from the SIPRI database (SIPRI, 1993) on the value of trade, licensed 
production and indigenous production of major weapons over a twenty-five year 
period. The countries covered were twelve emerging nations, which are listed by 
SIPRI as developing countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Indonesia, 
Israel, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea and Taiwan. The twenty-five 
year period was from 1965 to 1990.
Result
The macro-analysis did not support the hypothesis that licensed production of arms 
measured by value results in indigenous production of arms measured by value. The 
macro-analysis showed that the value of the indigenous production of arms is not 
dependent on the value of licensed production in previous years, but is related to the 
current year value of licensed production. This showed that the value of indigenous 
arms production is not a result of the value of licensed production, but rather the 
values of indigenous production and licensed production are both the result of another
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cause.
If the value of indigenous production had resulted from the value of licensed 
production then there would have been a meaningful time lag between the value of 
licensed production and a later value of indigenous production.
11.2.2 Country studies
Method
The country studies examined the setting up of arms production in three countries 
Australia, Japan and Israel and the countries of the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations, ASEAN. The countries examined provide a range of military settings, from 
a country with no major threats to a country in an almost perpetual state of war and 
to an area overshadowed by an arms race, from a major industrial power to countries 
with limited industrial development and from financially secure countries to countries 
with struggling economy.
Result
The study found that whilst world military expenditure had declined since 1987 there 
was increased level of arms production in the countries selected for study, Australia, 
Israel, Japan and the ASEAN countries. The study did not support the hypothesis 
that licensed production leads to indigenous production. Instead the study showed 
that the reasons and the mechanisms used for setting up and retaining arms 
production varied from country to country and within a country have varied with time 
as circumstances changed.
Licensed production
The study found that the setting up of defence production was closely linked to 
importing technology and promoting skill in the domestic labour force. Licensed 
production has been a key feature of defence manufacturing from the early stages of 
setting up an embryonic defence industry to licensing deals of highly complex
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defence equipment in established companies. The pattern of licensed production was 
seen in the countries covered in this study. The Japanese defence industry was 
restarted after World War II by technology transfer and licensed production of US 
designed equipment and has been used for land, sea and air weapons and military 
platforms. By 1995 the Japanese defence industry has become established and 
manufactures a wide range of weapons. In 1995 one third of Japanese missiles in use 
or in manufacture are of licensed design and two thirds of indigenous design. The 
largest missile manufacturer in Japan declared the intention of eliminating the 
dependence on licensed designs and has undertaken development projects to 
completely replace licensed with indigenous missile designs. Licensed production 
is being used in Australia and in all the ASEAN countries except Brunei in order to 
establish selected areas of industrial expertise, for example Australia in naval ship 
building, in Indonesia in shipbuilding and aircraft manufacture, and in Malaysia in 
aircraft components, repair and overhaul.
Examination of licensed production of naval ships in Australia showed that licensed 
production sets in place the skills and infrastructure for a defence industry, but does 
not necessarily lead to indigenous production of the type of systems previously built 
under licence. The period of time between build requirements of similar types of 
ships can be as long as the operational lifetime of the system which in the case of 
a submarine is typically thirty years, by which time the state of the art will have 
progressed by six generations of technology. The licensed production does provide 
(a) opportunities for indigenous production of the associated systems and subsystems 
such as communications, command systems, weapons control etc. at the same time 
as the main licensed production, (b) provides the skills and puts into place the 
technology infrastructure in the domestic industry and (c) also provides the 
opportunity for support, maintenance and upgrade work for the operational lifetime 
of the equipment which could be up to thirty years. The value of associated 
contracts which are carried out by domestic industry in connection with a licensed 
production programme are not readily visible and therefore a study collating the value 
of indigenous and licensed production may miss a proportion of the indigenous 
content of a defence programme.
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Gradual introduction of increasingly complex technology
The country studies showed that defence manufacturing technology builds slowly 
starting with comparatively simple technology such as repair and overhaul (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore have been able to set up aircraft maintenance 
and overhaul centres), the design of medium technology systems such as tank turrets 
and then progressing to more skilled systems. An example was seen in the progress 
from the design of tank turrets in Israel in 1954 to the manufacture of fighter aircraft 
in 1990. Israeli engineers learnt skills by working on licensed manufacturing and by 
working in defence companies in foreign countries and bringing the skills back to 
Israel. Investment by foreign companies in setting up manufacturing facilities in 
countries where they wish to access the defence markets also brought military 
technology to those countries.
Increased self reliance and ensured security of supply
The country studies emphasised the importance of increased self reliance and ensured 
security of supply. Embargoes were experienced by Indonesia in the 1950s and 
1960s which led to a desire to decrease reliance on the then current supplier nations 
initially by switching to other suppliers and then by establishing a dual function 
commercial /military industrial capability. The Australian government decided to 
increase self reliance in arms following an announcement in 1969 by the President 
of the USA that the country's allies in South East Asia would have to mount their 
own defences against military threats and it was realised that Australian forces were 
nearly wholly dependant on imports for defence equipment. By the 1990s self 
reliance was a part of Australia's defence policy. Israel which has been in a state of 
perpetual military tension and war since its declaration in 1948 has experienced a 
sequence of arms embargoes at times of extreme national crisis. The Israeli 
government pursued a policy of self reliance as necessary to the survival of Israel and 
to free Israel from political pressure from the supplier countries. Since the 1950s the 
increasing technical progress in Japanese industry led to increased self reliance in 
aerospace and military production. The Japanese government was lobbied to support 
increased self-reliance by the powerful industrial groups in Japan and by the growing 
unease of USA in the 1980s and 90s in continuing the supply of military technology
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to Japan. The emerging nations of the ASEAN with the exception of Brunei sought 
increased self-reliance in selected areas of arms production.
Regional power aspirations
Regional power aspirations have not played an obvious role in setting up domestic 
arms production although escalating military expenditure and an associated arms race 
in South East Asia has resulted in ASEAN, Australia and other countries in the 
region being aware of the need to influence neighbouring nations to promote regional 
security and stability. Japan’s powerful military force and extensive weapons arsenal, 
mostly produced in Japan, are a display of regional power and a measure of the force 
which could be unleashed against an aggressor. The display is discrete and apparent 
to military observers while at the same time the pacifist policies of the Japanese 
constitution are given prominence and recognition. Israel, surrounded by heavily 
armed hostile neighbours, has to be seen as militarily powerful and its arms industry 
forms a valuable contribution to its military power.
Israel has experienced the political pressure exerted by supplier nations, not only in 
the extreme cases of arms embargoes, but also in having to consider the foreign 
policies of supplier countries. Examples of this were evident when the USA Nixon 
administration imposed political pressure on Israel during the 1968 to 1970 War of 
Attrition between Egypt and Israel, and again in 1973 to 1975 when political pressure 
was applied by the USA on Israel to accept a ceasefire to the Yom Kippur War. 
Israel itself sought to apply political pressure on China in connection with the supply 
of Chinese ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia, by agreeing to a series of joint military 
equipment developments based on Israeli technology.
Cost implications
Cost implications of self sufficiency have been of secondary consideration in the 
choice between domestic production or importing arms. In 1985 the Australian 
government provided funding to subsidise uncompetitive defence projects where 
imports would have provided cost saving in the short term, where defence contracts 
were considered strategically important and also where there were prospects of a
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valuable export market. Japan bore the cost of 1.2 billion yen for indigenous 
production of the Type 90 Main Battle Tank (one of three types of tank in the 
inventory of the Japanese defence forces in the 1990s) which was three times higher 
than the cost of the USA equivalent, the M1A1 Abrams tank.
Offsets
The terms offered and negotiated under offset deals and the benefits accrued by the 
recipient countries vary widely. The ASEAN countries incorporate offset deals into 
procurement programmes as a matter of policy. The Australian government hoped 
that the introduction of* offset deals in the 1970s on arms imports would provide 
benefit to Australian industry but the results in terms of quantity and content of offset 
work proved disappointing in terms of technology transfer or commercial gain.
Government policy
Government support is a strong feature of military industrial capability. Australian 
and Israeli defence policies are based on self-reliance and the governments have 
taken steps to maximise domestic arms production for their own forces requirements 
and also to promote arms exports to amortise costs over larger production runs. 
Government policy has strongly dictated the shaping of the defence industries in 
ASEAN. In Indonesia the government industrial policy is directed towards Dwi 
Fungsi or commercial/military dual function, whereby three quarters of a company’s 
production capacity is allocated to civil production and one quarter to military 
production in peacetime but which ramps up to surge production at a time of crisis. 
The country’s industrialisation programmes, including offsets and countertrade deals, 
have been focused by the government on the shipbuilding and aerospace industries. 
The Malaysian government has also linked defence and economic development, for 
example the 6th Malaysian Plan of 1991 to 1995 has linked military procurement to 
industrial offset programmes. Singapore has demonstrated high levels of government 
involvement in the development of the defence industry. In the 1960s and 70s the 
government provided substantial investment in shipyards and encouraged foreign 
investment in the Indonesian aerospace industry. Foreign companies were given 
financial incentives and tax breaks to set up manufacture and repair facilities in
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Singapore. In the late 1970s the government initiated incentive schemes to promote 
investment in research and development. In Japan the main feature of government 
support to the arms industry has been the promotion of international co-operation in 
research and development and the arrangement of licensed production deals. Japanese 
industrialists have powerful lobby groups which bring influence to bear on 
government policy. The lobby groups proposed increased domestic share of defence 
procurement and the government five-year plan for 1991 to 1995 included plans 
aimed at reducing the reliance of Japanese industry on US sources. In Israel 
government involvement in the defence industry was important particularly in 
dealings and negotiations with USA. Military grants of approximately $1.8 billion 
annually from USA directly benefited Israeli industry for procurement ^development 
and research programmes for aircraft, tanks, missiles and electronics systems.
Availability of capital and diversity of countiyTs industrial base
The availability of capital and the presence of a diversified industrial base influence 
the ability to set up and retain a defence industry. Singapore and Japan, which have 
become highly industrialised nations with stable economies, have highly capable 
defence industries. The Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam with very limited 
industrialisation have very low levels of arms production. Brunei has a strong 
economy and with minimal military expenditure has no need for an arms industry. 
Australia has shown restraint in making capital available for arms production and has 
directed effort and funding to selected areas of arms production, for example to naval 
equipment in line with its defence policy.
11.2.3 Survey by questionnaire 
Method
The third method used to test the hypothesis and to investigate the reasons and 
methods for countries setting up indigenous arms production was a survey by 
questionnaire. Questionnaires were sent to arms dealers, defence industrialists, 
military and government authorities in Australia, Japan, Israel and the Asean
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countries and also to arms dealers in Europe and in USA. The questionnaire covered 
the motivation for setting up an arms industry, the characteristics which influence the 
ability of the country to do so and the strategies used to achieve a defence industrial 
base. The questionnaire asked for each of the aspects to be rated in importance and 
asked for comment on any other important issues relating to the reasons or methods 
for setting up arms production. The responses to the survey were analysed on a 
personal computer using commercially available mathematical software.
Result
The survey by questionnaire did not support the hypothesis that licensed production 
leads to indigenous production of arms. Instead the survey found that licensed 
production was one of the methods to establish an arms industry and by comparison 
the importance of methods employed to establish and maintain an arms industry in 
the countries studied were, in descending order of importance:
1. Building equipment through increasingly complex stages of manufacture for 
example by first setting up repair and maintenance facilities, then assembly 
and progressing to full design and manufacture.
2. Strategy of building increasingly complex equipment, for example starting 
with ammunition, vehicles, ships, weapons to highly complex systems such 
as fighter aircraft.
3. Use of joint ventures and licensed production.
4. Direct investment by European or US arms suppliers.
5. Building by copying designs.
6. Building by employing foreign experts.
The survey showed that all the countries examined gave highest ranking of 
importance to increasing the complexity of manufacturing operations and the types 
of equipment being built. Japan and Israel, both countries with advanced arms 
industries, ranked licensed production as of significantly lower importance than did 
Australia, ASEAN or the western arms dealers. The significance of this difference 
may be that Australia and ASEAN are striving to build up a technically advanced 
arms industry and are using licensed production to achieve advancement. Western
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arms suppliers are letting licensing agreements to countries including emerging 
supplier nations in order to gain market share in those countries. In contrast, Japan 
and Israel had high levels of licensed production in the past when the defence 
industries were less mature. The country study reported that Japan had implemented 
a policy to reduce dependence on foreign technology in arms production.
Japan rated the other four methods, copying, employing foreign experts, licensed 
production and western investment, at significantly lower levels of importance than 
did the other countries. This probably results from Japan's technology lead 
particularly in dual use technologies and consequently a reduced need to develop 
existing skills. The world dealers and Israel gave higher ranking to the importance 
of copying equipment than did the other countries. It may be the case that world 
dealers are more willing to recognise close similarities between systems which have 
been imported and systems which have been later designed indigenously and 
resembling the imported models.
Motivation
The result of the survey indicated that the motivation to set up an arms industry is 
primarily strategic and secondly political and the economic aspects carry less 
importance. In the countries studied, the motivation is based on the following factors 
in descending order of importance:
1. Improved self reliance (strategic)
2. Ensured security of supply, e.g. against embargoes (strategic)
3. To upgrade skill in local labour (political)
4. To import technology (political)
5. Save hard currency by minimising imports (economic)
6. Potential earning of foreign exchange though export (economic)
7. Cost reduction (economic)
8. To influence customer nations (political)
9. Regional power aspirations (strategic)
10. Local arms race (strategic)
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There was close correlation between the countries on the levels of importance of 
strategic motivation. Israel gave higher ranking than the other countries to the 
importance of a local arms race. It was pointed out by an Israeli arms supplier that 
Israel’s indigenous defence industry provided the benefit of strategic surprise, in 
fielding previously unknown weapons at a time of crisis.
Ability to set up an arms industry
The factors influencing the ability to set up and maintain an arms industry in the 
countries studied were, in descending order of importance
1. The availability of capital
2. A diversified industrial base
3. The level of state involvement
4. Access to an export market
Both ASEAN and Israel ranked the level of state involvement highly in comparison 
to the other countries. This reflects the high level of state involvement in supporting 
and sustaining the arms industry in Israel and in the governments' efforts to nurture 
embryonic arms industries in ASEAN.
11.3 VALIDATION INTERVIEWS
Twenty-five military and defence industrial experts were approached to comment on 
the results of the studies. The twenty-five experts contacted were Lord Weinstock, 
Lord Prior, Sir Geoffrey Patti, Air Marshal Sir Donald Hall, Sir John Weston, 
Richard Evans, Iain Duncan-Smith, HRH Prince Muda Mohamed Bolkiah, John 
Barry Wilmshurst, Lord Cuckney, Arthur Walsh, Erith Davies, Sebastian de Ferranti, 
Nicholas Franks, Arthur Dyer, Sir Robert Easton, Graham Smart, Bryan Drake, 
Captain Garry Kennedy, David Richardson, Peter Clark, David Laraman, Col.Rick 
Brown, Jim Celephane and David Fowler.
Seven of the experts on weapons production and arms trade were able to respond 
with comments on the findings of the studies and why the tests gave the results
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obtained. All three studies gave the same result that the value of indigenous 
production is not a result of the value of licensed production of arms and the experts 
were asked if the results met with their experience and understanding of arms 
production.
The experts consulted (Appendices 11.1 to 11.7) concluded that the results were 
reasonable and agreed with their own experience that joint ventures and licensed 
production were used to establish a domestic arms industry but the impetus for 
setting up and carrying out indigenous production came from strategic, political and 
economic motives and the socio-economic background of the particular country.
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DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The overall ranking in importance of the criteria in establishing an indigenous arms 
industry found in the study was:
Rank Strategic motivation
1 Improved self reliance
3 Ensured security of supply at time of crisis(against arms embargoes etc)
18 Regional power aspirations
19 Local arms race
Political motivation
10 To import technology
8 To increase employment and upgrade level of skilled labour
16 To exert influence on customer nations
Economic motivation 
15 Cost reduction
11 To save hard currency
14 Potential for earning foreign exchange through export
Socio-economic criteria which influence the ability to set up arms industry
2 Availability of capital
4 Diversified industrial base
6 Level of state involvement
12 Access to export markets
Methods to establish an arms industry
13 Direct investment by US/Europe
9 Use of joint ventures and licensed production
17 Building by employing foreign experts
20 Building by copying equipment
5 Building through increasingly complex stages (maintenance, servicing, 
assembly and test, construction, design)
7 Strategy of increasing the complexity of the equipment being built
(ammunition and artillery, land vehicles, aircraft, ships, missiles, submarines)
All the countries surveyed demonstrated the importance attributed to increased self 
reliance and ensured security of supply. One of the experts consulted (Appendix 
11.2) pointed out that in areas where licensed production had been withheld, such as 
South Africa and Israel, operational, commercial and political pressure had led to
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greater self reliance and new innovative technology.
There was general agreement between the countries about the methods of establishing 
a defence industry. There was emphasis on the importance of building up arms 
capability in starting with less complex procedures such as in-service maintenance 
and testing, and then progressing to more ambitious procedures such as assembly and 
test and finally manufacture and design. Similar emphasis was given to the 
importance of gradually increasing the complexity of the weapons or armS being 
built, starting for example with the relatively simple but high volume ammunition and 
artillery industry. This pattern was seen in the country studies where the relatively 
young arms industries of the ASEAN countries were setting up aircraft and naval 
maintenance and overhaul facilities and also in the findings of the literature survey 
which showed the general order in which indigenous arms production was set up: 
artillery, propeller driven aircraft, guided missiles, armoured vehicles, main battle 
tanks, jet aircraft, major surface warships, radar, helicopters and finally submarines.
There was agreement that copying equipment or employing foreign experts were not 
considered important. One Israeli arms supplier pointed out that his country had 
access to Israeli nationals working in arms industries throughout the world, that 
Jewish immigrants into Israel were highly skilled so there was no need to use foreign 
experts. Another Israeli arms supplier pointed out that Israel had a pool of highly 
trained ex-military personnel who had completed compulsory military service.
A result of the survey was that only the world's dealers and Australia considered that
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joint ventures and licensed production were important methods of establishing an 
arms industry. One of the arms experts consulted (Appendix 11.2) pointed out that
a) in many cases licensed production has been limited by withholding knowhow, 
source codes etc., thus reducing the capability to transfer to self reliance and
b)licensed production does not inevitably lead to indigenous production because it 
is often the requirement of a sale but will not be "followed through". One of the 
experts consulted (Appendix 11.3) said there was no surprise that the values of 
licensed and indigenous production moved together because the lice:&e arrangement 
would have been entered into to meet a short term need. One justified the other and 
in countries where budgets were tight, such demonstrations of success are important. 
After such demonstration of "success" the reporting of consequential indigenous 
production would be "lost" for all sorts of reasons. Defence experts consulted 
(Appendices 11.6 and 11.7) agreed with the result of the macroanalysis that the value 
of indigenous production is not a result of the value of licensed production and that 
political, strategic and economic factors significantly impact the level of indigenous 
arms production.
One arms consultant (Appendix 11.4) made the point that the use of joint ventures 
and licensed production have been used by countries at all levels of capability (not 
only newly emerging suppliers but also established supplier countries), citing 
examples of US A with the licensed production of the UK Harrier jet, the UK with 
nuclear capability, Iraq with Scud missiles, and Israel with an array of US systems.
Arms dealers stressed that a personal and powerful economic motivation for
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importing and not manufacturing was the provision of generous commission in the 
form of consultancy fees. One dealer pointed out that a personal strategic motivation 
for not establishing an arms industry, particularly in unstable newly emerging nations 
is that it could lead to the creation of a politically powerful industrial leader, for 
example a minister of industry, (whose interests may not coincide with that of the 
established military leader). An unattributable source was quite emphatic that the 
reasons for arms procurement by whatever means were: firstly to stop the government 
from being overthrown, secondly to overthrow the government, thirdly to deliver a 
suitable amount of commission to the right set of people and fourthly to provide the 
means to attack or defend against an enemy nation. This forthright opinion reflects 
the view of Krause (1992) who reported that the three forces shaping the patterns of 
military innovation and production and the subsequent transfer of weapons and skill 
were wealth, power and war.
One of the arms experts consulted (Appendix 11.3) pointed out that in his experience 
political gain played a much bigger role than was acknowledged in the results of the 
study and any type of production generates employment, money and political power. 
His experience was that political advantage at an important time in the development 
of a country plus long term political advantage to be gained from arrangements were 
by far the most important driving forces in arms procurement. Another expert 
consulted (Appendix 11.2) expressed surprise at the result that economic motivation 
ranked so low and he pointed out that if responses had been obtained from finance 
ministers or finance directors then the ranking may well have been higher. One 
expert (Appendix 11.1) stressed the importance of the economic motivation in the
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emerging nations in the Far East pursuing the growing arms markets of the Pacific 
Rim countries.
11.4 CONCLUSIONS
The study has examined how the defence industry has addressed the reduced defence 
budgets and how countries seeking to build domestic arms industries were 
undertaking licensed production programmes. The study tested the hypothesis that 
licensed production in the defence industry leads to indigenous production. The 
hypothesis was tested using a macro analysis, four case studies and a survey and the 
results were discussed in validation interviews with experts in arms manufacture and 
markets. The results of the tests did not support the hypothesis. The panel of 
experts found the results of the tests corresponded to their experience and 
understanding of the arms industry and that the main impetus for setting up 
indigenous arms production came from strategic, political and economic motives and 
the socio-economic background of the country. If it were possible to extrapolate the 
result into the future, then defence companies would feel confident that setting up 
licensed production does not lead to import substitution by countries setting up 
indigenous production.
11.5 FURTHER RESEARCH
The study carried out in this report examined the criteria in the setting up and- 
retaining an arms industry and did not support the hypothesis that licensed production 
led to indigenous arms production. The finding of the study invites an area of
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research in other business activities, for example research to test the hypothesis that 
licensed production in car manufacturing leads to countries setting up indigenous 
production.
The macro analysis described in Chapter 8 examined a set of financial data on the 
value of major weapon systems produced in each country. An alternative approach 
could be to test the hypothesis on a different set of data specifically for a major 
weapon system type such >as helicopters, ships, aircraft or missiles. Another ? 
relationship suggested in the literature review was that arms embargoes led to the 
requirement for increased self sufficiency. The investigation as to whether 
embargoes cause the level of indigenous arms production to increase would support 
or fail to support an hypothesis that arms embargoes lead to indigenous production.
The literature review showed that the third world and the emerging nations have been 
equipped with arms to a large extent with the products of relatively few nations. In 
recent years attempts have been made to redress this imbalance by the introduction 
of offset agreements, technology transfer programmes and counter trade agreements, 
but an imbalance probably still exists.
Two separate factors are present. There has been a simple balance of payments 
deficit, quantifiable in cash terms. Also, there has been a capability imbalance in that 
exporters tend not to release equipment which represents their own state-of-the-art. 
These two measures of the imbalance provide an interesting and potentially fruitful 
area for investigation.
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If consistent measures of the imbalance could be obtained, these may show that the 
gap between the exporting and importing countries' cash flows and capabilities has 
narrowed. This would seem to be the case generally in that an increasing number 
of countries will only enter into large equipment purchases if the supplier provides 
technology transfer arrangements. Technology transfer arrangements including 
licensed production act to reduce the measure of imbalance.
If, therefore, the financial and technology gap between exporting and importing 
regions is narrowing, then the equipment suppliers who are currently dominant can 
only protect their markets by acquiring overseas production capability. Such a trend 
would indicate that cash and production were moving to the buyer's countries and 
therefore the currently dominant sellers will see their global market share decline 
unless they manufacture in the emerging nations.
If on the other hand the gap were found to be constant or widening, then licensed 
production and technology transfers present no threat to an exporting company's 
market dominance. On the contrary, a widening trend would indicate that the market 
is in fact becoming increasingly dominated by those large exporting companies. 
Such companies can expect to grow by acquisition, merger and joint venture. Indeed, 
this has largely been the case in the predominantly internal markets of the US and 
Europe during the periods of post war growth.
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A central question of importance to defence companies is :
Do companies maintain global maiket dominance by meiger, 
acquisition and joint endeavour in their home maikets and thereby 
continue to dominate the woiid maiket, or do they pursue the growth 
of oveiseas production capacity and thereby service those markets 
from the inside?
The question invites an area of further research: the relationship to be explored is that 
an increased level of domestic in-country production in the emerging nations results 
in the narrowing of the technology and financial gap between the established supplier 
countries and emerging nations. This may be the relationship in the markets from 
the Developed World into the Third World and the Emerging Nations.
The measurement of the technology gap, the financial gap and the level of domestic 
production over a period of time when the importing country has been engaged in 
domestic arms production will show whether the financial and technology gap has 
increased or narrowed. Similarly the value of domestic arms production could be 
measured over the same period. If the result shows that the financial and technology 
gaps have narrowed while the levels of domestic production have increased, then the 
existence of the relationships would be supported. If it is the case that the financial 
and technology gaps have remained stable or have decreased, or that the level of 
domestic production has not increased, then the relationships would be in doubt.
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The relationships to be explored could be expressed mathematically as:
TTechnology Gap — fl (UDomestic production)
FFinancial Gap =  f2 (Y)Domestic production)
The variable TTechnology Gap is a measure in years and quantifies the difference in 
age of the design of a military system, e.g. helicopter or a fighter aircraft in use in 
the importing country relative to the exporting country. A n  example of a decreasing 
technology gap is seen in Japan, where in the mid 1970s Japan was using aircraft 
designed in USA in the 1950s (= 20 year gap) and in the 1990s Japan is building 
aircraft with the USA (= 5 year gap). Published data banks are available on the 
military systems of virtually all the countries of the world and on each category of 
military system: fixed wing bombers, fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, etc. A 
judgement can be made on the age of the system in use from design completion date 
to the first import date by the importing country.
The unit to be measured for the FFinancial Gap variable is the ratio of arms imports to 
arms exports in the trading countries over a chosen timescale during which offset 
arrangements have been implemented. A high value in the ratio of arms import to 
arms export indicates a high financial gap between the importing country being 
examined and the exporting nation. Data banks are readily accessible on the world 
trade in arms. Publications listing arms and military trade figures for virtually all 
countries include those by SIPRI, USA Congressional Research Service, US Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency.
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The DDomestic production variable is a measure, valued in constant year US$, of the 
value of domestic arms production in the importing country.
A second and parallel relationship to be explored is that the exporting nations 
providing high technology weapons in a decreasing market results in the market 
becoming dominated by fewer larger companies which grow by acquisition and 
merger. It is proposed that the size of the world's major defence companies in terms 
of defence business turnover and values of acquisition and mergers could be 
measured over periods of increasing, stable and declining military expenditure. The 
relationships to be explored could be expressed mathematically as:
N Number o f major companies — gl (DDefence market size)
^AN umber o f mergers and acquisitions =  g2 (QChange in Market size)
The variable 'NNumber of major companies is a measure of the number of major defence 
companies over a specified size (measured in constant year US$ turnover in defence 
business) and can be measured over a period when the defence market has been 
increasing, steady and in decline. Data is published on the top 50 and top 100 
defence companies.
The variable MNumber o f mergers and acquisitions is the number of mergers and 
acquisitions of defence businesses could be found by data search in company records 
and published surveys.
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The variables DDefence market size and Cchange in market size are a measure of the size 
of the defence market measured in constant year US$ and the change in market size 
is measured as a percentage change per annum in the defence market size. Published 
databases provide records of the sizes of defence markets.
To investigate the hypothesis the model could be based on the observed data by 
using best fit modelling which correlates observed data with the generalised equations
T Technology Gap =  f l  {^Domestic production)
YFinancial Gap =  f2 (D Domestic production)
relating the technology gap, the financial gap with domestic production, and
^Number o f major companies — gl (DDefence market size)
M Number o f mergers and acquisitions — g2 (C  Change in Market size)
relating the numbers and sizes of defence companies and the numbers of mergers and 
acquisitions to the market size and to the rate of decline in the market. In order to 
determine the functions fi,f2,gl,g2, the data could be tried against a range of models 
such as linear, polynomial, logarithmic, exponential etc. in order to identify that 
which provides the best fit, as measured by a figure of merit called "the goodness of 
fit" (Mathsoft Inc., 1993).
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11.6 SUMMARY
In the 1990s military threats have become more sophisticated but defence budgets 
have been reduced. There is a political preference for diplomatic and economic 
sanctions rather than direct military intervention. This study has examined an area 
of change in the nature of the defence markets and their effects on the arms industry. 
The investigation did not support the hypothesis that licensed production results in 
indigenous arms production in the countries studied, but instead showed that both 
types are the result of political, strategic and economic motives. The arms market 
is substantial and many nations believe a modem defence industry is necessary for 
a credible military capability. Both industry and governments should seek to benefit 
mankind from the opportunities presented by today's political order.
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ANNEX 8.3
Calculation of correlation coefficients between indigenous and 
licensed arms production for Argentina
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Annex 8.3 : Calculation of correlation coefficients between indigenous and licensed 
arms production for Argentina
x x  := RE A D P R N (argentna)
D  :=
length(D <0>)  = 26  
leng th (xx<r>)  = 4  
n  := 0..25  
m  0..3
A  £ Z )
26 „ average of each row
:= D,um - 4^mtake away average of each row 
EO := E T ^ E l ;= ETI>E2  ;= ET2>E 3  := ET3>
Make sure that MathCad does not try to evaluate array using a negative index. 
fO (p,q) := i f  (p>q, E0p,0 ) f l (p )  ;= i f  (p>0, E l pf0) 
f2 (p )  := i f  (p>0, E2pf0)f3(p) : = i f  (p>0, E3pf0) 
correlation coefficients 
p  := 0..7
average of EO from p to 26
BO— := —-— Y ' fiK nj?)  
p 2 6 - p  Y
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average of El from 0 to 26-p
B1 := — Y j l { n p )
p 26  -p  “
same with E2 and E3
B2„ := - 2 _
r  2 6 - p
y / 2 ( n p ) B3„ : =  —
p 2 6 - p
yf3(n-p)
Numerator of correlation coefficient
X 0 n := - 2 — y < E 0 - B 0 f
2 5 - p  n p 1/(N-1) times sum of squares
r o  : =  — —  y  m n - p ) - B l f
25 p  n P  1/(N-1) times sum of squares
- E -  y (E O n-BOp).mn-p)-Blp) 
C0p 25^  » <_________________
C O T = (  0.941 0.325 0.223 0.174 0.291 0.13 -0 .079  -0.219 )
EO and El of the same year show a 94.1% correlation - very high
Y0p := - 2 -  y ( f 2 { n - p ) - B 2 f
ZD p  n
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- 2_  y{E 0 n-B0^.mn-p)-B2 ) 
C l  - g r g - j ;--------------------------------
^ Y 0 P
C 1T = (  0 .334 0.338 0.522 0.4 0.289 -0 .04  0.094 0 .3 0 7 )
EO and E2 of two years back show a 52.2%  correlation - highish
Y0P := ~  y m n  p )  B3pf  
25 - p  n
C2 := 25 P  "
1 y ( E 0 n- B 0 p) . ( f 3 ( n p ) B 3 p)
JX0~Wp
C2T = (  0 .767  0 .428 0.511 0.438 0.368 0.061 0.043 0 .1 1 4 )
highest correlation of sum of EO, El and E2 with EO is in the same year
Appendices
ANNEX 10.1 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE FORM
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Contents of the Questionnaire
The questionnaire asks you to categorise the importance of various aspects of 
countries setting up indigenous production. The countries include Asean, Israel, 
Australia and Japan.
1. Motivation to establish an arms industry
1.1 Strategic
Improved self reliance
Ensured security of supply, e.g. against embargoes 
Regional power aspirations 
Local arms race 
Other
1.2 Political
To import technology 
To upgrade skill in local labour 
To influence customer nations
1.3 Economic
Cost reduction
Save hard currency by minimising imports 
Potential earning of foreign exchange though export
2. What influences or determines the ability to establish an arms industry?
Availability of capitals 
Diversified industrial base
Level of state involvement e.g. government ownership or support.
Access to export markets
Other
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3. Methods to establish defence industry
Direct investment by USA, Europe etc.
Joint ventures and licensed production 
Employment of foreign defence experts.
Copying equipment
Gradual increase of complexity, e.g. first servicing, then assembly, and 
production
Gradual increase in complexity of types of equipment, e.g. first small 
arms, then missiles, tanks, jet aircraft, etc.
Other
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
DEFENCE PRODUCTION IN COUNTRY
P lease categorise the importance of each item in the setting up of indigenous 
defence production in the country, and add any com m ents on issu es you 
believe relevant.
1. MOTIVATION TO ESTABLISH AN ARMS INDUSTRY
1.1 STRATEGIC MOTIVATION TO ESTABLISH AN ARMS INDUSTRY
A. Improved self reliance. □ ' □ □ □ □
Please tick one box Extremely Not
important important
B. Ensured security of supply. □  □  □  □  □
Please tick one box Extremely Not
important important
C. Regional power aspirations.
Please tick one box
D. Local arms race.
Please tick one box
□ □
Extremely
important
□ □ □
Not
important
□ □
Extremely
important
□ □ □
Not
important
E. P lease  comment on any other STRATEGIC motivation to establish or not 
to establish an arms industry in a country.
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1.2 POLITICAL MOTIVATION TO ESTABLISH AN ARMS INDUSTRY
A. To import technology. □  □  □  □  □
Please tick one box Extremely Not
important important
B. To upgrade skill in local labour. □  □  □  □  □
Please tick one box Extremely Not
important important
C. To influence customer nations. □  □  □  □  □
Please tick one box Extremely Not
important important
D. Please specify and comment on any other POLITICAL motivation to 
establish or not to establish an arms industry.
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1.3 ECONOMIC MOTIVATION TO ESTABLISH AN ARMS INDUSTRY
A. Cost reduction. □  □  □  □  □
Please tick one box Extremely Not
important important
B. Save hard currency by minimising imports of defence equipment
□ □ □ □ □
Please tick one box Extremely Not
important important
Potential earning of foreign exchange through export
□ □ □ □ □
Please tick one box Extremely Not
important Bmportant
D. Please specify and comment on any other ECONOMIC motivation to 
establish or not to establish an arms industry.
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2. WHAT INFLUENCES/DETERMINES THE ABILITY TO ESTABLISH AN 
ARMS INDUSTRY
A. Availability of capital to establish a technology-intensive defence industry 
(e.g. for manufacturing facilities, R&D, imports, domestic defence procurement 
budget).
□ □ □ □ □
Please tick one box Extremely Not
important important
B. A diversified industrial base (e.g. aerospace, metallurgy, machinery, 
electronics) has been:
□ □ □ □ □
Please tick one box Extremely Not
important important
C. The level of state involvement (e.g. direct ownership to ensure viability or 
government provides fiscal and trade incentives) has been:
□ □ □ □ □
Please tick one box Extremely Not
important important
D. A ccess to export markets to ensure viability of domestic defence industry 
has been:
Please tick one box Extremely Not
important important
E. Please specify and comment on any other issues relating to the country's 
ability or inability to establish an arms industry.
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3. METHODS OF ESTABLISHING A DEFENCE INDUSTRY
A  The use of direct investment by European, USA or other countries' defence 
industries has been:
□ □ □ □ □
please tick one box Extremely Not
important important
B. The use of joint ventures and licensed production has been:
□ □ □ □ □
Please tick one box Extremely Not
important important
C. Building an industrial defence capabilit'/through employing foreign defence 
experts has been:
□ □ □ □ □
Please tick one box Extremely Not
important important
D. Building an industrial defence capability through copying equipment which 
has been obtained from other countries has been:
□ □ □ □ □
Please tick one box Extremely Not
important important
E. Building industrial defence capability through increasingly complex stages  
(e.g. assembly and test, expert procurement and specification of systems, 
system design, build, but retaining purchase of more complex items such as  
avionics) has been:
□ □ □ □ □
Please tick one box Extremely Not
important important
F. The strategy of increasing the complexity of the type of defence equipment 
being built (e.g. types in increasing complexity: artillery, propeller aircraft, 
missiles, tanks and armoured vehicles, jet aircraft, ships, radar, helicopters, 
submarines) has been:
□ □ □ □ □
Please tick one box Extremely Not
important important
G. Would you explain any other methods the country has or could have used 
to establish an arms industry.
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